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Résumé
Cette thèse étudie les fuites de carbone et les pertes de compétitivité dans les in-
dustries énergie-intensives générées par des politiques climatiques inégales. Après
uneméta-analyse des études demodélisations évaluant les fuites de carbone en cas
de politique climatique unilatérale avec ou sans Ajustements Carbone aux Fron-
tières, nous utilisons de l’économétrie des séries temporelles pour établir l’absence
de preuves de fuites de carbone opérationnelles liés à des pertes de compétitivité
dues du Système Communautaire d’Echanges de Quotas d’Emissions (SCEQE)
pour le ciment et l’acier. Ensuite, nous décomposons les émissions du secteur ci-
mentier Européen en sept effets avec laméthode LogMeanDivisia Index, etmon-
trons que les variations peuvent être attribuées principalement à l’effet d’activité.
Les réductionsd’émissions apportéespar le SCEQEsont estimées à2%entre2005
et2012 tandis que lemontantdes “profits de rente” est évalué à3.5milliardsd’euros.
D’autre part, nous démontrons que l’industrie cimentière a réagi stratégiquement
à l’introduction d’une nouvelle règle censée diminuer le nombre d’allocations gra-
tuites pour les installations en sous-production. Les entreprises ont augmenté ar-
tificiellement la production dans certaines usines, générant des distorsions allant à
l’encontre de la transformation bas-carbone du secteur. Enfin, nous discutons de
réformes possibles pour le SCEQE et plaidons pour des allocations proportion-
nelles à la production pour le court terme.
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Abstract
This thesis contributes to the literature on carbon leakage and competitiveness
losses in energy-intensive industries generated by uneven climate policies. After a
meta-analysis of modelling studies assessing carbon leakage with or without Bor-
der Carbon Adjustments; we use time series econometrics and find no evidence
of competitiveness-driven operational leakage due to the European Union Emis-
sions Trading System (EUETS) for steel and cement. Next, we decompose emis-
sions the European cement sector into seven effects with a Log Mean Divisia In-
dex method, and show that most of the variations can be attributed to the activity
effect. Abatement due to the EU ETS is estimated at around 2% between 2005
and 2012 while the amount of “overallocation profits” is assessed at 3.5 billion eu-
ros. Further, we demonstrate that the cement industry strategically reacted to the
introduction of a new rule supposed to reduce free allocation in low-producing
installations. Companies artificially increased production in some plants, gener-
ating distortions going against the low carbon transformation in this sector. We
finally discuss possible reforms in the EU ETS and advocate for output-based al-
location in the short term.
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Introduction
International negotiations have failed to achieve what standard economic theory
recommended: imposing a globally uniform price on greenhouse gas emissions
that approximate their social costs (Tirole, 2009), therebyachieving climate change
mitigation in the most cost-effective way. Paris agreements in 2015 are expected
to shape the post-2020 global climate architecture in a bottom-up approach, each
country submitting an Intended National Determined Contribution1 or INDC,
including goals and policies to achieve them. Climate policies have been and will
continue to be uneven across theworld, setting a challenge tomove forward a low-
carbon economy.
Indeed, oneof themain reasonsof theworldwide lackof ambitious climatepoli-
cies is the possible threat to the competitiveness of heavy industries and the result-
ing carbon leakage. The asymmetry of carbon costs between regions may induce
immediate losses of market share to the benefit of foreign competitors (opera-
tional leakage) or in the longer run location of energy-intensive industries in re-
gions withmore favorable climate policies (investment leakage)(Reinaud, 2008).
As a result, emissions would rise in non-constrained countries, causing so-called
carbon leakage. As carbon dioxide is a global pollutant (i.e. the geographic loca-
tion of emissions has no influence on its environmental impacts) it would weaken
or nullify climate policy efficiency. Moreover, the additional cost generated by cli-
mate policies may reduce the domestic industry’s market share, destroy jobs and
reduce profits. Such adverse effects are grouped together under the heading of a
1What is included in INDC is at the discretion of the States. It may include short or long term
targets in terms of emissions or renewable capacites, policies to achieve these targets and other
elements like need for international support or intended provision of finance (Ecofys, 2014).
1
loss in “competitiveness,” a term the popularity of which is inversely proportional
to its clarity.
The risk of carbon leakage is not uniformally distributed across sectors, but is
complex to assess as it depends on various mechanisms (Ecofys and Oko Insti-
tut, 2013). First, the sector has to face a high carbon cost, which depends on its
carbon intensity and its abatement potential. Second, imports and exports must
be sensitive to domestic price, which depends on international trade barriers, bar-
gaining power of the sector, products homogeneity and transportability. Finally,
there must not be relevant substitutes with low carbon intensity. Because exports
of electricity are very limited, the power sector is not exposed to carbon leakage,
but it is different for the so-called energy-intensive trade exposed (EITE) sectors
which include cement, iron and steel, aluminium, chemicals, pulp and paper, oil
refining, glass or ceramics.
Political debates essentially focus on negative outcomes of unilateral climate
policies related toglobal emissions andcompetitiveness, butpositive aspects,mostly
due to technological change and innovation, can also be highlighted. Porter and
Van der Linde (1995) contested the established paradigm that strict environmen-
tal regulation was necessarily harmful for business, and claimed that “properly
crafted” regulation could enhance competitiveness through innovation. Jaffe and
Palmer (1997) further distinguished the “weak” version (properly designed en-
vironmental regulation fosters innovation) from the “strong” version (benefits of
innovation can outweigh compliance costs so the overall impact on competitive-
ness is positive) of the Porter Hypothesis. After twenty years of studies, a general
consensus prevails to support the “weak” version while results are more mixed for
the “strong” version (Ambec et al., 2013). Pioneering climate policies can also en-
courage the development of new eco-industries. Domestic firms could then ben-
efit from a FirstMover Advantage (Lieberman andMontgomery, 1988) and seize
export opportunities in new emerging markets. For example, the world leader in
the wind power industry is the Danish company Vestas, which benefitted in its
early stages of development from the ambitious national wind policy. At the same
time, the competitive advantage of climate pioneers is not guaranteed, and dom-
inant positions in industries featuring fast technical progress are fragile. Finally,
the diffusion of low carbon technologies outside the carbon constrained region,
2
called climate spillovers (Golombek andHoel, 2004), generates negative leakage.
Renewable installed capacities in China (which has become the world leader in
wind installed capacities since 20102 and is soon to become the leader in photo-
voltaics installed capacities) would certainly not be as high had feed-in tariffs not
been implemented in Europe and in the United States.
Because of the EITE industries’ influence over the policy process, specific mea-
sures to protect these sectors are systematically integrated in climate policy pack-
ages. Broadlydefined, themain twooptions areBorderCarbonAdjustments (BCAs),
which consist in reducing the carbon price differentials of the goods traded be-
tween countries, and free allocation of allowances or tax exemptions. More specif-
ically, free allocation can be based on ex ante rules only (being computed with
historical emissions, or historical production multiplied by a benchmark) or fea-
ture ex post adjustments (based on actual production, such as output-based al-
location (OBA)). BCAs, which have been intensively discussed but never been
implemented, will be discussed in Chapters 1 and 2. OBA, which have been im-
plemented in the California carbon market since 2012, will serve as reference in
Chapters 4 and 5.
In themajorpart of this thesis, the impactof climatepolicies onenergy-intensive
industries will be tackled through the example of the cement sector in the Euro-
peanUnion Emissions Trading System (EUETS). The unique age and size of the
EU ETS, implemented in 2005, offers a natural field experiment. In addition, as
the cement sector is highly carbon-intensive, the issues of carbon leakage, com-
petiveness and free allocation rules are magnified. Before detailing the plan of the
thesis, we will then provide some insights on the EU ETS and on the cement sec-
tor.
The cement sector represents 5% of global anthropogenic emissions and about
9% of emissions covered by the EU ETS. After reaching a peak in 2008 with 260
Mt, European cement production was severely impacted by the economic reces-
sion and never recovered (we estimate the production in 2013 at 180 Mt). Ce-
mentmanufacture canbedivided into twomain steps: clinker production (90% to
95% of emissions, virtually all from direct emissions), and blending and grinding
clinker with other material to produce cement (indirect emissions due to electric-
2http://www.gwec.net/global-figures/interactive-map/
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ity use). The two broad options to decrease cement carbon intensity are then to
either decrease clinker carbon intensity or reduce the clinker-to-cement ratio. In-
deed, clinker substitutes such as blast furnace slag, fly ash or pozzolanas (volcanic
rocks), being by-product of other industries or natural resources, have a much
lower carbon intensity than clinker. Options to reduce clinker carbon intensity are
limited by the fact that two third of emissions are process emissions that cannot be
reduced. Only breakthrough technologies such as carbon capture and sequestra-
tion (CCS), or innovative cements not based on clinker, could significantly lower
cement carbon intensity in the long run. Cement is very carbon-intensive and is
a homogenous product. However, the industry presents other characteristics po-
tentially limiting the risk of carbon leakage. It is poorly traded internationally, be-
cause of its bulkiness and because the raw material, limestone, is present virtually
everywhere in the world. Besides, the cement sector is very oligopolistic and has
regularly faced sanctions from national competition authorities. Producers have
relatively high market power, especially inland compared to near the coasts be-
cause of transportation costs.
The EU ETS, presented as the “flagship” or “cornerstone” of the European cli-
mate policy, has celebrated its tenth anniversary in 2015. It covers approximately
45% of European emissions with a global cap of around 2 GtCO2 spread across
approximately 11,000 installations.3 Beside domestic aviation, added in 2012, the
covered sectors can be broadly distinguished between power and heat on the one
hand, and manufacturing sectors on the other hand. The functioning of a cap-
and-trade system goes as follows. First, allowances are auctioned or distributed to
installations, the total amount of them being fixed by a global cap. Then, entities
can buy or sell allowances to cover their emissions, and a carbon price emerges
through supply and demand. The flexibility that trading brings is supposed to en-
sure that emissions are cut in themost cost-effectiveway. Direct sale of allowances
by auctioning has significant economic advantages over free allocation (Hepburn
et al., 2006). For example, the value of the auction revenues can be used to re-
duce other distortionary taxes and improve macroeconomic efficiency. Mean-
while, auctioning avoids windfall profits to polluters, incumbent and new firms
are treated on an equal basis, and many other distortions that arise with free allo-
3http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/ets/index_en.htm
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cation are avoided. However, in a world of uneven climate policies, free allocation
is seen as necessary to mitigate carbon leakage.
After a first test phase (2005-2007) and a second phase corresponding to the
period of compliance to the Kyoto protocol (2008-2012), the third phase started
in 2013 and will last until 2020. Each phase is characterized by different rules, the
most critical beingwhether allowances are auctionedor freely allocated to installa-
tions, and in the latter case the way they are distributed. Rules of the fourth phase
(2020-2030) are currently under discussion, while those of the third phase will
hardly bemodified. For phase III, a list of sectors “deemed tobe exposed to carbon
leakage” was established using two quantitative indicators: the share of carbon
costs relative to value added (using a CO2 price of 30 euros per ton) and the trade
intensity (imports plus exports in value divided by market size). These sectors,
which represent the overwhelming majority of manufacturing emissions, receive
free allocation based onhistorical productionmultiplied by sectoral benchmarks.4
The EU ETS has been the largest implemented carbon market and the world-
wide reference in terms of cap-and-trade policy, setting an example for other car-
bon pricing initiatives (World Bank & Ecofys, 2014). However, this leadership
position is increasingly being challenged. First, China should surpass the EU in
terms of carbon market size in the following years, as the largest emitter on the
planet will most likely implement a nationwide emissions trading system (Zhang,
2015). Second, a severe crisis and the inability of European authorities to engage
meaningful structural reforms have undermined the system (Branger et al., 2015).
A massive surplus of allowances, corresponding to more than a year of emissions,
combined with the uncertainty in the stringency of long term targets, have driven
down the carbon price. The latter has stayed below eight euros since 2012, com-
pared to around 25 euros inmid-2008. The surplus of allowances is due to a com-
bination of factors (Koch et al., 2014): the economic downturn, the effectiveness
of renewable energy policies and the inflow of a significant number of cheap inter-
national credits. However, concerns about carbon leakage and competitiveness
have aggravated the price drop by: (i) first reducing the environmental ambition
4In addition, a cross-sectoral correction factor (CSCF) is applied, equal to 0.9427, then declin-
ing at 1.74% per year. It ensures that the total amount of free allocation relative to the cap does not
overcome a certain value. Finally, the activity level threshold (ALTs) rules reduce free allocation
in case of important activity reduction (see Chapter 5).
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of the EU ETS, and (ii) delaying market reforms intended to strengthen the car-
bon price signal.
We now turn to the plan of this thesis, which is structured around five indepen-
dent chapters, corresponding to five published articles. Except for Chapters 1 and
2 which are advanced literature reviews essentially on ex ante studies, we adopt an
ex post empirical approach in this thesis. Slight cuts have beenmade in the original
articles in order to avoid redundancies, as well as minor updates related to policy
issues and references.
Chapter 1 provides an in-depth literature review on carbon leakage and issues
of competitiveness linked to uneven climate policies, and can be seen as an exten-
sion of this introduction. After a definition of key concepts, studies assessing the
risk of carbon leakage are reviewed. We point out a discrepancy between ex ante
(mostly CGEsmodels) and ex post studies (one of which being the chapter 3). Ex
ante studies forecast a carbon leakage ratio (which corresponds to the emissions
increase in the rest of theworld related to home abatement) of 5-25%while ex post
studies find no empirical evidence of carbon leakage. Policy packages address-
ing leakage and competitiveness issues are discussed, with an emphasis on BCAs.
Models show that BCAs restore competitiveness of domestic energy-intensive in-
dustries and partially reduce carbon leakage, but have important distributional ef-
fects, shifting a part of the burden from the abating coalition to third countries. To
implement BCAs, a series of technical choices have to be made, such as sectoral
coverage, geographical coverage, inclusion of indirect emissions or exports, car-
bon content, or use of revenues. These choices would be crucial for the compati-
bility of BCAs with the World Trade Organization (WTO), which remain highly
contentious among legal experts. Two past events, the WTO Shrimp-Turtle dis-
pute and the attempt of inclusion of aviation in the EU ETS, shed some light on
possible outcomes of unilateral imposition of BCAs. We argue that factors of suc-
cess for their implementation include in-depth discussions with third countries
on BCAs features prior to their implementation, flexibility provided to impacted
countries to achieve comparable policies, relatively conservative values of carbon
content and the altruistic use of revenues (handed back or routed to the Green
Climate Fund).
Chapter 2 narrows down the literature surveywith amore quantitative perspec-
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tive, by investigating ex ante studies in energy-economy modelling assessing car-
bon leakage and competitiveness losses in energy-intensive industries. Following
best practice guidelines of Nelson and Kennedy (2009), the meta-analysis aggre-
gates 25 studies dating from 2004 to 2012 which included BCAs in one of their
scenarios, altogether providing 310 estimates of carbon leakage ratios. First, de-
scriptive statistics are presented. Kernel density estimations showing probabil-
ity distributions of estimates are used to merge results across studies. A meta-
regression analysis is then performed to explore the impact of different assump-
tions on the leakage ratio estimates, such as the size of the coalition, the abatement
target, Armington elasticities (modelling international trade) and BCAs features.
We find that, all other parameters being constant, BCAs reduce the leakage ratio
by six percentage points. We also give statistical evidence that augmenting the size
of the abating coalition reduces the leakage ratio while increasing the abatement
target augments the leakage ratio. Finally, in the meta-regression, the inclusion of
all sectors and the presence of export rebates appear to be the two most efficient
features to reduce leakage, followed by the adjustment level based on foreign car-
bon content.
Following the previous quantitative survey of ex ante literature on carbon leak-
age, we contribute to the literature on ex post studies in Chapter 3 by investigating
a potential competitiveness-driven operational carbon leakage due to the Euro-
pean Union Emissions Trading scheme (EU ETS). We focus on the two largest
CO2 emitters among European manufacturing sectors, cement and steel, and the
first two phases of the EU ETS (2005 to 2012). From a simple analytical model,
an equation is obtained linking net imports (imports minus exports) of cement
and steel to local and foreign demand along with carbon price. The model im-
plies that there should be a positive correlation between carbon price and net im-
ports. The econometric estimation of this relation is made with two different
econometric techniques, ARIMAandPrais-Winsten, whichprovide consistent re-
sults. Local and foreign demand are robust drivers of trade flows, but no signifi-
cant effect of the carbon price on net imports of steel and cement is found. We
conclude that there is no evidence of carbon leakage in these sectors, at least in
the short run. These industries have benefitted from a large overallocation of al-
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lowances during this period, but free allowances bear anopportunity cost.5 There-
fore, provided one considers standard economic theory valid (companies behav-
ing as profit-maximizers), the overallocation of allowances should not have had
an influence on operational leakage. Our results would then suggest that within
the historical price range for CO2 (below 30 euros per ton), operational carbon
leakage is not a serious threat for the energy-intensive industries.
Chapter 4 presents a detailed study on the European cement sector, made by
cross-referencing the Getting the Numbers Right (GNR), database developped
by the Cement Sustainability Initiative and the registry of the EU ETS, the Euro-
pean Union Transaction Log (where we collected plant-by-plant information on
276 cement plants). The variations of emissions from 1990 to 2012 are broken
down using the Log-Mean Divisia Index (LMDI) method (Ang, 2004), both at
the EU level and at the national level for six major producers (Germany, France,
Spain, theUnitedKingdom, Italy andPoland). Thismethod allowsmeasuring the
impact of seven effects on emission variations, which correspond to different mit-
igation levers that were previously discussed: activity, clinker trade, clinker share,
alternative fuel use, thermal and electrical energy efficiency, and decarbonisation
of electricity. We demonstrate thatmost of the emission changes in the EU27 can
be attributed to the activity effect though since the 1990s, there has been a slow
trendof emission reductionsmostly due to the clinker share effect (decrease in the
clinker-to-cement ratio), the fuel mix effect and the electricity emission factor ef-
fect. Making assumptions on counterfactual scenarios, the abatement induced by
the EU ETS is estimated at 2.2% 1.3% from 2005 to 2012, mostly because of a
small acceleration in clinker reduction and alternative fuel use. However, we can-
not exclude that these effects were due to the rise in energy prices rather than the
EUETS. Decomposing the allowance surplus allows assessing overallocation and
thus overallocation profits. We estimate that the cement industry reaped 3.5 bil-
lion euros of overallocation profits during phases I and II, mainly because of the
slowdown in production, while allowance caps were unchanged. This figure re-
5As long as they are allocated independently of current output (which is the case except par-
tially for 2012, see Chapter 5), the operator of an installationmay reduce emissions in order to sell
allowances even though he has receivedmore allowances than its emissions (Montgomery, 1972).
Free allocationwould be inefficient at preventing leakage in the short term andwould only provide
a disincentive to plant relocation (Wooders et al., 2009).
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lated to production represents a very significant amount of the margins observed
in the sector (Boyer and Ponssard 2013). Presented at first as a threat to com-
petitiveness, the EU ETS has paradoxically boosted European cement industry
profitability.
European authoritiesmodified the allocation rules with the intention to reduce
excess free allocation in low-activity plants. After 2012, whenever the activity level
of an installation falls below some threshold (50%, 25%, 10%) relative to its his-
torical activity level, the allocationwould be reduced accordingly (50%, 25%, 0%).
For installationsoperatingbelow the threshold, the financial gain from“artificially”
increasing output to reach the threshold may outweigh the costs, particularly in
carbon intensive sectors. We show inChapter 5, exploiting the constituted EUTL
cement installation-level database, that cement companies strategically reacted to
this activity level thresholds (ALTs) rule in order to maintain a high amount of
free allocation. The quantification of distortions due to the thresholds necessi-
tates the elaboration of a counterfactual scenario for 2012, which is developed by
using a panel data model combining historical data at the country and plant level.
We estimate that in 2012, ALTs induced 6.4Mt of excess clinker production (5%
of total EU output), which corresponds to 5.8Mt of excess CO2 emissions (over
5% of total sector emissions). The distortion effects are magnified in crisis-hit
countries with low demand, especially in Spain and Greece. As intended, ALTs
do reduce overallocation (by 6.4 million allowances) relative to a scenario with-
out ALTs, but this gain is small compared to an output based allocation method,
which would further reduce overallocation by 40 million allowances (29% of to-
tal cement sector free allocation). We then show, revisiting preliminary evidence
from Neuhoff et al. (2014), that in order to avoid distubing local markets while
increasing production, cement companies (i) shifted production among nearby
plants, (ii) exported clinker or cement to othermarkets (iii) increased the clinker-
to-cement ratio. As the decrease of the latter was the main levy of emissions re-
duction in the sector (see Chapter 4), the operational distortions due to the intro-
duction of ALTs are particularly detrimental. These considerations suggest that
the ALTs rule may need to be reconsidered for sectors such as cement for which
carbon costs represent a significant share of production costs. A relatively easy-to-
implement solution for the short term would be to implement full output-based
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allocation.
The main argument of this thesis is that competitiveness, which was called a
“dangerous obsession” for macroeconomic policy by Krugman (1994), may be
so for climate policy as well. The pursuit of carbon leakage mitigation has con-
tributed to make the EU ETS an administrative nightmare which fails to give a
clear signal towards low carbon transition. In the conclusion, we will discuss pos-
sible reforms and propose directions for future research.
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1
Climate policy and the “carbon haven”
effect
TheKyotoProtocol has been an attempt to set a global climate architecture aimed
at abating carbon emissions on a global scale. The commitment period of the
protocol ended in 2012 with mixed results. While abating technologies have im-
proved, in particular renewable energies, the world’s CO2 emissions reached a
record in 2011 with 31.6 Gt 1 , an increase of 50% compared to 1990 emissions,
and are likely to keep increasing in the next decade. Despite the growing emer-
gency of serious climate change impacts, international negotiations are blocked
because of strong free-riding incentives (Carraro and Siniscalco, 1993), lobbying
from energy intensive sectors and equity concerns about theNorth-South burden
sharing. Climate policies will remain sub-global in the years to come, and unilat-
eral or regional policies, including regulations, subsidies, carbon taxes and carbon
1https://www.iea.org/newsroomandevents/pressreleases/2013/june/
four-energy-policies-can-keep-the-2c-climate-goal-alive.html
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markets, have emerged as some industrialized countries decided unilaterally to re-
duce their emissions. The top-down global Kyoto approach is shifting towards a
bottom-up architecture with different CO2 prices (Rayner, 2010; Weischer et al.,
2012).
In a world with uneven climate policies, the carbon price differentials across re-
gions modify production costs and may shift the production of energy-intensive
goods from carbon-constrained countries to “carbon havens”, or countries with
laxer climate policy. Since a decrease in emissions in one part of the world leads
to an increase in emissions in the rest of the world, this phenomenon is referred
to as carbon leakage. The PollutionHaven effect, that is, themigration of dirty in-
dustries to countries with less stringent regulations, is one of themost contentious
debates in international economics (Taylor, 2005). A major difference exists be-
tween local pollutants, which constitute the overwhelming part of studies in the
pollution haven literature, and CO2. CO2 is a global stock pollutant: the geo-
graphic location of emissions does not matter (Siikamäki et al., 2012b). A pro-
duction shift would then reduce the environmental benefits of the policy while
potentially damaging the economy.
In the context of growing globalisation, environmental policies can also have a
strategic role. The fierce competition to attract foreign direct investment or the
threat of industrial relocation could lead to a “regulatory chill” or even a “race-to-
the bottom”, depending on the willingness of countries to downgrade environ-
mental standards. Indeed, the fear of carbon leakage and loss of competitiveness
in energy-intensive industries are the main arguments against ambitious climate
policies in industrialized countries. Modest mitigation targets have gone hand in
hand with policy packages intended to protect sectors at risk of carbon leakage
(mainly cement, iron and steel, aluminium and oil refineries). In the European
Union Emission Trading System (EU ETS), the biggest carbon pricing experi-
ment so far, tradable allowances are distributed free of charge for these sectors . In
the US, the Waxman-Markey proposal, which was adopted by the House of Rep-
resentatives in 2009 but not by the Senate, would have introduced a nationwide
carbonmarketwithmeasures to face these issues: allowances distributed freely on
the basis of current output (output-based allocation) and border carbon adjust-
ment (BCA). The latter, aimed at “levelling the carbon playing field”, is widely
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discussed among politicians, business leaders and academics. However, it is of-
ten considered as protectionism disguised as green policy (Evenett and Whalley,
2009) among developing countries, and its World Trade Organisation compati-
bility remains contentious. The political outcome of its implementation is highly
uncertain. BCA may increase the incentives of third countries to join the abat-
ing coalition but may also create international friction and lead to tit-for-tat trade
retaliations (Bordoff, 2009; of Foreign Trade, 2010). The recent setbacks of the
inclusion of aviation in the EU ETS are a reminder that any attempt to regulate
emissions outside a country’s jurisdiction is extremely problematic: foreign air-
lines and governments complained aboutthis inclusion, which pushed the EU to
delay the inclusion of international flights by one year. Whether this inclusionwill
take place at the end of the delay period is still unclear.
This chapter provides a literature review on competitiveness and carbon leak-
age issues fromaneconomic, political and legal perspective. First, section1.1 gives
the definition of the main terms involved. Section 1.2 provides an evaluation of
the carbon leakage risk, distinguishing ex ante Computable General Equilibrium
(CGE) modelling from ex post econometric studies. Section 1.3 examines the
policies aimed at reducing carbon leakage and competitiveness losses with an em-
phasis on Border Carbon Adjustment. Since the consistency of BCA with WTO
is a decisive matter, it is discussed in further detail in section 1.4. Section 1.5 con-
cludes.
1.1 Definitions
1.1.1 Carbon leakage
While competitiveness concerns and carbon leakage are often associated, they are
two distinct phenomena. Carbon leakage is the increase of emissions in the rest
of the world when a region implements a climate policy, compared to a situation
where no policy is implemented (Quirion, 2010). It can bemeasured by the leak-
age rate or leakage-to-reduction ratio, which is the rise in emissions in the rest of
the world divided by the abated emissions in the region that has adopted a climate
policy. A 50% leakage-to-reduction ratio means that half of the mitigation effort
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is undermined by the increase of emissions in the rest of the world, and not the
misguided interpretation that 50% of emissions have “leaked” in the rest of the
world. If this ratio is under 100%, emissions have decreased on a global scale, so
the policy is environmentally beneficial. A ratio above 100% is theoretically pos-
sible, because the carbon intensity of CO2-intensive products can be higher in the
rest of the world, but has only been found in one outlier model (Babiker, 2005).
Estimates of leakage rates are typically in a range of 5%-20% depending on many
factors (see below). Carbon leakage occurs through twomain channels: the com-
petitiveness channel and the international fossil fuel price channel (Dröge, 2009).
The root of the competitiveness channel is that the cost of compliance gives a com-
parative disadvantage for regulated firms vis-à-vis their competitors. This change
of relative prices can lead to a change of the trade balance (less exports and more
imports). In the short term, this would correspond to a change of the utilisation
rate of existing capacities (operational leakage), while in the long term, it would
correspond to a change in production capacities (investment leakage). These
changes induce a shift of production, and then of emissions, from the regulated
part of the world to the unregulated part of the world. Besides, abating countries
almost necessarily have to cut their fossil fuel consumption, which drives down
the international prices of carbon-intensive fossil fuels: coal, oil and, perhaps even
more, non-conventional fossil fuels (Persson et al., 2007). This decrease in prices
reduces the net cost of climate policies in fuel-importing abating countries since
a part of abatement is borne by fossil fuel exporters who lose a part of their rents.
However it leads to a rise of their consumption in countries with less stringent
policies. Because of international energy markets, the shrink in consumption in
one region involves an increase in consumption in the rest of the world, caus-
ing carbon leakage through the international fossil fuel price channel. Yet two
caveats are in order. First, CO2 capture and storage (CCS) does not reduce fuel
consumption. Quirion et al. (2011) show that for this reason, CCS brings down
carbon leakage compared to a climate policy providing the same abatement with-
out CCS. Second, the world oil market is dominated by OPEC, and alternative
assumptions about OPEC’s behaviour lead to opposite results regarding leakage
through the oil market, which can even become negative (Bohringer et al., 2014).
The same reasoning applied to the whole world but with two temporal periods is
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known as the Green Paradox (Sinn, 2008; Eisenack et al., 2012) which could be
considered inter-temporal leakage: a rising CO2 price would be seen as a future
resource expropriation by fossil fuel owners whowould then increase resource ex-
traction. Yet, although the mechanism of the Green Paradox is well understood,
its quantitative importance decreases when realistic features are included in the
models (Gerlagh, 2010). Despite the overwhelming importance of the competi-
tiveness channel in the climate policy debate, in virtually all models including the
two channels, the international fossil fuel price channel predominates (Gerlagh
and Kuik, 2007; Fischer and Fox, 2012; Boeters and Bollen, 2012; Weitzel et al.,
2012).
1.1.2 Competitiveness
The term “competitiveness” has been used in numerous studies, reports and arti-
cles and underlies economic policies. However, this concept is difficult to define
and susceptible to ambiguities. At a firm or sectoral level, competitiveness can
refer to “ability to sell” or “ability to earn”. Competiveness as “ability to sell” is
the capacity to increase market share, and can bemeasured through indicators in-
volving exports, imports and domestic sales (Alexeeva-Talebi et al., 2007). Com-
petitiveness as “ability to earn” is the capacity to increase margins of profitabil-
ity, and can be measured with indicators involving some measures of profit or
stock values. Distinguishing these two notions is useful since the same climate
policy can have different impacts on both. For instance, distributing free emis-
sion allowances based on historic data only, as is the case in the US SO2 ETS
(Schmalensee and Stavins, 2013), increases the ability to earn but not the ability
to sell, since anoperator can close a plant and continue to receive the same amount
of allowances. Hence, only competitiveness as ability to sellmay generate leakage.
The notion of competitiveness at the national level is controversial, and is con-
sideredmeaningless by some economists, such as (Krugman, 1994). Themain in-
dicator is the balance of trade, that is, the difference between the monetary value
of exports and imports, but an increase in the balance of trade may result from
many factors, some of which are completely unrelated to the competitiveness of
domestic firms, like a contraction in domestic demand. Whether climate policies
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have to protect competitiveness at a national level or at a sectoral level is a legiti-
mate question. EUETS sectors contribute 40% of EU emissions, but less than 5%
of its Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and an even smaller share of its jobs (Eller-
man et al., 2010). The sectors at risk of carbon leakage (see below) account for
slightly more than 1% of GDP in the UK (Hourcade et al., 2007) and 2% in Ger-
many (Graichen et al., 2008). However, they account for a much higher share of
Greenhouse Gas (GHG) emissions so protecting their competitiveness in order
to limit leakage cannot be discarded prima facie.
1.1.3 Sectors at risk
All sectors do not face the same risk of carbon leakage. The risk is higher if the
carbon cost is high and the international competition is fierce. Hence, in the at-
tempt to classify sectors exposed to carbon leakage, two indicators are generally
used, one measuring the carbon cost and the other the trade intensity. For the
EU ETS, the carbon cost is measured by the value at stake, defined as the carbon
costs relative to the gross value added of a given industrial sector. The trade inten-
sity is measured by the ratio in values between imports plus exports and the EU
total market size. A sector is considered at risk if one or both of these indicators
is above a certain threshold (see Figure 1.1). Table 1 shows the different indica-
tors and thresholds to identify sectors at risk in the EU, the US and Australia. The
most vulnerable sectors, usually gathered around the common denomination of
Energy Intensive Trade Exposed (EITE) sectors, include iron and steel, cement,
refineries and aluminium. The EITE sectors are well-organized and constitute a
strong lobby that has managed so far to influence climate policies. Indeed, all cli-
mate policies have provided more favourable rules for these sectors compared to
others. In addition, these “specific rules” are generallymore favourable in the final
amendments than in first drafts (CEO, 2010). The classification of sectors in itself
(which sectors are at risk and which are not), because of its economic impacts, is
subject to political and academic controversy and face strong industrial lobbying
(Clò, 2010; Martin et al., 2014).
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Figure 1.1: Sectors classified “at risk of carbon leakage” in Europe (source:
Grubb and Counsell (2010)). The size of the circles is proportional to the sector
emissions.
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1.1.4 Positive impacts of climate policies on competitiveness and abatement in
foreign countries
Though the political debate has focused on the negative impacts of climate poli-
cies, some authors argue that at least in some sectors or firms, stringent environ-
mental regulations can force firms to bemore efficient in their processes, and then
more competitive. This is referred to as the Porter hypothesis (Porter and Linde,
1995), which is highly controversial but has been corroborated in Europe by a re-
cent econometric study (Costantini and Mazzanti, 2012). Further, it is possible
to highlight twomechanisms symmetrical of carbon leakage and competitiveness
losses: climate spillovers and first mover advantage.
Environmental regulations foster innovationandgenerate technological progress
inGHGsavings technologies (Newell et al., 1999; Jaffe et al., 2002;Dechezleprêtre
et al., 2008). Diffusion of these technologies reduces emissions in non-abating
countries and then creates negative leakage, or positive climate spillover (Ger-
lagh and Kuik, 2007; Maria and Werf, 2008; Golombek and Hoel, 2004; Bosetti
et al., 2008). There is empirical evidenceof climate spillovers, especially in energy-
saving technologies (Popp, 2002), but also in renewables. Feed-in tariffs in Den-
mark, Germany and Spain generated a massive induced technical change in wind
and solar technologies (Peters et al., 2012) and are thus in part responsible for
the spectacular development ofwindpower capacities inChina, which became the
world leader in terms of windpower installed capacities, shifting from 2.6 GW in
2006 to 75 GW in 2012 (Roney, 2013). Another, yet evenmore difficult to quan-
tify source of negative leakage is the international diffusion of climate policies: im-
plementing any new policy involves some risks, and observing climate policies in
other countries allows reducing these risks and possibly avoiding some mistakes.
Just as the EU has closely observed the US SO2 cap-and-trade to set up the EU
ETS, subsequent ETSdevelopments have benefited from theEUETS experience.
The same stands for other climate policies such as renewable subsidies (especially
feed-in-tariffs pioneered by Denmark and then Germany) and energy efficiency
regulations.
Finally, Baylis et al. (2014) have recently identified a new mechanism gener-
ating negative leakage, which they label the Abatement Resource Effect (ARE).
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The intuition is that when a climate policy reduces emissions in one part of the
economy, it may draw factors of production away from other, carbon-intensive
activities. The authors show that if this effect is strong enough, an economy may
exhibit negative net leakage in response to the policy change. While the possibility
of negative leakage through this mechanism is not disputed, (Carbone, 2013) as
well as (Winchester and Rausch, 2013) have recently assessed the ARE in more
complex models and conclude that the negative leakage due to the ARE is more
than offset by positive leakage mechanisms.
Technological knowhow in climate-related technologies gained by domestic
firms could be used to capture market share in emerging markets (first-mover ad-
vantage). If other countries join the abating coalition, these firms have a compar-
ative advantage vis-à-vis their competitors. This ability to gain market share by
being the first to develop a technology is the first mover advantage. Emerging in
models (Pollitt et al., 2015), it could be considered a long-term competitiveness
factor. The clearest case concerns the EU wind industry, which is the dominant
supplier in all word markets except China, due to the already mentioned feed-in-
tariffs implemented in the 1990s. However, whileGermany benefited from a first-
mover advantage the Photovoltaic (PV) industry until 2011, the German PV in-
dustry has since been largely surpassed byChina, showing how fragile a dominant
position can be in industries featuring fast technical progress (Kazmerski, 2011).
1.2 Evaluation of carbon leakage
1.2.1 Ex ante studies
Climate change mitigation policies are diverse and include various forms of regu-
lations, subsidies, carbon taxes and emission trading systems (ETS). Yet carbon
leakage has mostly been assessed for ETS and carbon taxes. There is extensive lit-
erature assessing ex ante carbon leakage from hypothetical carbon taxes or ETS
that can be traced back to Felder and Rutherford (1993). The majority of these
studies rely onComputableGeneral Equilibrium(CGE)models (Böhringer et al.,
2012a;Mattooet al., 2009;Fischer andFox, 2012;Dissou andEyland, 2011;Lanzi
et al., 2012; Balistreri and Rutherford, 2012; Peterson and Schleich, 2007), but
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someusepartial equilibriummodels (Gielen andMoriguchi, 2002;Mathiesen and
Maestad, 2004; Monjon and Quirion, 2011; Demailly and Quirion, 2006, 2008).
CGEmodels, which simulate the behaviour of entire economies, are pertinent to
study the effect of policies on trade in different sectors (Kehoe et al., 2005) but
they generally rely onmore aggregated data (almost exclusively the Global Trade
Analysis Project database) that may hide impacts on more specific sectors (Si-
ikamäki et al., 2012a; Alexeeva-Talebi et al., 2012). Moreover, most CGEmodels
feature a zero-profit condition so cannot assess competitiveness as ability to earn.
An exception is Goulder et al. (2010) whose model features capital adjustment
costs, which implies that capital is imperfectly mobile across sectors and allows
the model to capture the different impacts of policy interventions on the profits
of various industries. Assessing a hypothetical federal ETS in the US, the authors
conclude that freely allocating fewer than 15% of the emissions allowances gen-
erally suffices to prevent profit losses in the most vulnerable industries. Freely
allocating all of the allowances substantially over-compensates these industries.
Thesemodels provide a wide range of estimations for leakage and competitive-
ness losses (as ability to sell). First, results depend on scenario hypotheses: the
bigger the abating coalition, the smaller the leakage rate while themore ambitious
the target, the higher the leakage. Linking carbonmarketswithin the abating coali-
tion (Lanzi et al., 2012), authorizing offset credits (Böhringer et al., 2012a) or ex-
tending carbon pricing to all GHG (Ghosh et al., 2012) increases economic effi-
ciency and then reduces leakage. Second, themodels are very sensitive to two sets
of parameters: fossil fuel supply elasticities (for the international fossil fuel price
channel) and Armington elasticities (for the competitiveness channel) (Monjon
andQuirion, 2011; Alexeeva-Talebi et al., 2012; Balistreri and Rutherford, 2012).
The former indicate to what extent a decrease in fossil fuel demand reduces the
fuel price, while the latter represent the substitutability between domestic and for-
eign products.
A recent comparative study of 12 different models gave themost robust results
so far (Böhringer et al., 2012a). The estimate of leakage is 5-19% (mean 12%)
when Annex I countries (except Russia) abate 20% of their emissions through
carbon pricing without taking any measure to protect EITE sectors. The loss of
output in these sectors is 0.5%-5% (mean 3%) in the coalition and an output gain
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of 1%-6.5% (mean 3%) is observed in the rest of the world. A detailed review of
leakage estimates is provided in chapter 2. These aggregate results hidedifferences
among sectors, but even at sectoral levels, leakage estimates contrast sharply with
alarmist predictions made by industry-financed studies. For example, according
to a (BCG, 2008) study funded by the European cement industry, under carbon
pricing at 25 euro /tCO2 without climate policy outside the EU ETS or measures
against leakage, importers would supply 80% of the European cement market. A
peer-reviewed study that analyses a very similar scenario (except that the CO2
price is at 20 euros per ton) concludes that importerswouldonly supply 8%, versus
3% absent climate policy (Demailly andQuirion, 2006). These contrasted results
can be explained by different assumptions about available production capacities
abroad and the nature of competition assumed in the cement market.
1.2.2 Ex post studies
The first studies assessing empirically the impacts of environmental regulations
on trade dealt with local pollution issues (Kalt, 1988; Tobey, 1990; Grossman
and Krueger, 1993; Jaffe et al., 1995). They showed little evidence to support
the “pollution haven” effect: their estimates of the impact of environmental reg-
ulations on trade flows were either small or insignificant. However, recent stud-
ies have shown some evidence of the pollution haven effect in small proportions
(Dean et al., 2005; Levinson and Taylor, 2008). Paradoxically, dirty industries
seem less vulnerable, because of capital intensity and transport costs (Ederington
et al., 2003). The empirical validity of the pollution haven effect continues to be
one of themost contentious issues in the debate regarding international trade and
environment (Kellenberg, 2009). Nevertheless a massive environmental reloca-
tion has never been observed.
Environmental tax reforms (ETR, i.e. carbon taxes whose revenues are used to
cut other taxes, mostly on labour income) established in some European coun-
tries offer another natural experiment to empirically treat these questions. Kee
et al. (2010) analyse the evolution of imports and exports in energy-intensive in-
dustries, comparing countries which did and did not implement a carbon tax. The
authors find a statistically significant negative impact on exports of a carbon tax
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only in the cement sector while, strangely enough, they find a positive impact on
exports in the paper as well as iron and steel sectors. No statistically significant
impact was found on imports for any sector. (Miltner and Salmons, 2009) found
that, out of 56 cases (seven countries andeight sectors studied), the impact ofETR
on competitiveness was insignificant in 80% of the cases, positive in 4% and neg-
ative for only 16%. However, EITE sectors benefited from exemptions and lower
taxation rates, which may explain why more negative impacts were not observed.
If ETRdidn’t proveharmful for these industries, theyhad apositive impact on eco-
nomic wealth, giving empirical arguments for the double dividend theory (Barker
et al., 2009), e.g. a taxation shift from labour to pollutionmay stimulate economic
growth as well as reducing pollution (Goulder, 2002; Bento and Jacobsen, 2007).
Aichele and Felbermayr (2012) econometrically assessed the impact of having
an emission target under the Kyoto Protocol (i.e. being a developed country and
having ratified the Protocol) on CO2 emissions, the CO2 footprint
2 and CO2 net
imports, using adifferences-in-differences approachonapanel of 40 countries. To
account for a potential endogeneity bias (the fact that countries with an expected
low or negative growth in emissions may be more likely to have ratified the Pro-
tocol) they use the International Criminal Court participation as an instrumental
variable for Kyoto ratification. They concluded that countries with a Kyoto tar-
get reduced domestic emissions by about 7% between 1997-2000 and 2004-2007
compared to the countries without a target, but that their CO2 footprint did not
changed (CO2 net imports increased by about 14%). These results imply that do-
mestic reductions have been fully offset by carbon leakage. However two caveats
are in order. First, China became a member of theWTO in 2002, just when most
developed countries ratified the Protocol. Sincemost CO2 net imports are due to
trade with China (Sato, 2013), the rise in net imports may well be due to China
WTO membership rather than to Kyoto. Second, apart from those covered by
the EU ETS, countries with a Kyoto target haven’t adopted significant policies to
reduce emissions in manufacturing industry. Hence, if Kyoto had caused leakage
(through the competitiveness channel), it should showupon theCO2 net imports
2The CO2 footprint equals domestic emissions plus CO2 net imports, i.e. domestic emissions
plus emissions caused by the production of imported products, minus emissions caused by the
production of exported products.
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of countries covered by the EU ETS rather than of countries covered by a Kyoto
target; yet the authors report thatEUmembershipdoes not increaseCO2 imports,
when they include both EUmembership and the existence of a Kyoto target in the
regression. This conclusion invites to look more directly at the impact of the EU
ETS.
The studies focusing on the EU ETS, the largest carbon pricing experiment so
far, have not revealed any evidence of carbon leakage and loss of competitiveness
in sectors considered at risk of carbon leakage, such as cement, aluminium, and
iron and steel (Reinaud, 2008; Ellerman et al., 2010; Sartor, 2013;Quirion, 2011).
More studies will undoubtedly be conducted in the following years, for the EU
ETS and the other carbon markets that have emerged, as more hindsight will be
provided. So far, the empirical resultsare in sharp contrast to the “exodus of EU in-
dustry” claimed by the European Alliance of Energy Intensive Industries (Oxfam,
2010).
1.2.3 Synthesis
Ex ante modelling studies vary in their results because of policy scenarios (size of
the coalition, abatement targets) and some crucial model parameters (Arming-
ton elasticities for the competitiveness channel, and oil supply elasticities for the
international fossil fuel channel). A meta-analysis of recent studies which details
the role of these factors is provided in Chapter 2. In the absence of BCA, most
of these studies suggest leakage rates in the range of 5-20%. Conversely, ex post
econometric studies have not revealed empirical evidence of these issues. Why
such a difference?
First, effects of carbon taxation are always in practice compensated by “policy
packages”. Because of carbon leakage and competitiveness concerns, sectors at
risk in the EU ETS received allocations free of charge while in every case of CO2
tax, they benefited from lower tax rates or exemptions. In addition, aluminium
producers and other electricity-intensive industries, protected by long term elec-
tricity contracts, have not always suffered the pass-through of carbon costs to con-
sumer by electricity companies (Sijm et al., 2006). Moreover, in the case of the
EU ETS, the CO2 price has been below 14 euros for the majority of the time
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since the launch of the system, arguably too low a value to entail noticeable im-
pacts. Further, empirical studies have focused so far on operational leakage and
not investment leakage (change in production capacities), which could be studied
through the analysis of foreign direct investments. Over time, newcarbonmarkets
are launched and time series get longer, giving more room for empirical research.
However, assessing the “true” impact of asymmetric carbon pricing will always
be hampered by the compensation measures aimed at reducing competitiveness
losses. Another reason for the gap between ex ante predictions and ex post anal-
ysis could be that models generally do not (or only vaguely) take into account
positive aspects of climate policies, such as climate spillover and first mover ad-
vantage. More research understandings of the positive aspects of climate policies
would be useful when exploring the climate and competitiveness linkages. Other
possible areas of improvement is further contribution to the empirical literature,
which remains thin, and progress in international trade theories.
1.3 Policies to address leakage and competitiveness concerns
The elaboration of policy tools designed to “level the carbon playing field” has led
to an extensive body of literature. One can classify these measures in three broad
categories: a global approach, levelling down the cost of carbon and border ad-
justments (Grubb and Counsell, 2010; Dröge, 2009). Each of these categories
has many variants and a combination of different tools could also be considered.
The next sections discuss their specific features, pros and cons. None of these in-
struments seems tobe a “magic bullet” to address both economic efficiency, equity
and practical feasibility concerns (Böhringer et al., 2012a). Some argue that poli-
cies to address this problem should be sector-specific (Grubb andCounsell, 2010;
Dröge, 2009), but so far tools that have actually been implemented or considered
to address competitiveness and leakage concerns only distinguished sectors “at
risk” from the others: see Figure for Europe (EU ETS phase II and III), the US
(Waxman-Markey amendment), Australia (Clean Energy Legislative Package),
the California ETS and the New Zealand ETS.
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Figure 1.2: Policy packages for sectors at risk of carbon leakage (source: Hood
(2010); Spencer et al. (2012)).
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1.3.1 Global approach
The first-best solution would be the existence of a uniform carbon price allowed
by international climate agreements and flexibility mechanisms. However, be-
cause of the negative perspective of international climate negotiations, this option
seems highly unlikely until at least 2020.3 A pragmatic alternative would then be
to embrace cooperative sectoral approaches (Houser, 2008;Zhang, 2012;Hamdi-
Cherif et al., 2011) but much confusion remains regarding what they should be.
Developed countries favour the form of industry targets and timetables, and diffu-
sion of performance standards, thus addressing leakage and competitiveness con-
cerns. Conversely, developing countries such as India are suspicious of the impo-
sition of binding targets through sectoral approaches and interpret sectoral agree-
ments as a catalyst for technology transfer (Meckling and Chung, 2009).
1.3.2 Levelling down the cost of carbon
Levelling down can be achieved through investment subsidies, sectoral exemp-
tions or free allocation of permits, so as to decrease or even suppress the carbon
cost for targeted sectors. All are equivalent to subsidies, and are then subject to
the agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM) of the World
Trade Organization. Exempting the most vulnerable sectors was implemented in
Norway (Bruvoll and Larsen, 2004) and Sweden (Johansson, 2006) when their
carbon tax were introduced. It solves the competitiveness and leakage concerns
but at a substantial economic cost (Rivers, 2010; Böhringer et al., 2012b): since
emissions in these sectors will not be reduced, to reach a given aggregate target,
more abatement must take place in the others, including less cost-effective op-
tions.
Instead of auctioning, three main options for allocating free allowances have
been considered: historic, output-based and capacity-based allocation (used in
the EU ETS). These free allocation methods induce side effects: in order to pre-
vent competitiveness issues, other distributional and cost-effectiveness issues are
created. In caseofhistoric andcapacity-basedallocation the ability topass-through
3The goal of international negotiations is to sign international agreements before 2015 that
would be implemented after 2020.
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carboncosts createswindfall profits for theoperatorsof covered installations (Sijm
et al., 2006; Sandbag, 2012). Nevertheless, simulations indicate that output-based
allocations seemmore efficient to counteract leakage and protect industrial com-
petitiveness while assuring political acceptability (Quirion, 2009; Rivers, 2010).
1.3.3 Border adjustments
BorderCarbonAdjustments (BCA) consist of reducing the carbon price differen-
tials of goods traded between countries, inspired by measures in place for Value
Added Tax. Based on theoretical grounds to improve the cost-efficiency of sub-
global climate policies (Markusen, 1975; Hoel, 1996), BCAwere also considered
a way to “punish” the US for free-riding the Kyoto Protocol (Hontelez, 2007).
Later, theUS incorporatedBCA in theWaxman-Markey amendment, aimingmainly
at Chinese products (van Asselt and Biermann, 2007). However the fierce criti-
cism of China and India led President Obama to dissociate the US administration
from this proposal (declaring “We have to be very careful about sending any pro-
tectionist signals”, (Broder, 2009)). Among the advocates of BCA, one can cite
Paul Krugman (Krugman, 2012), who argues that BCA are “a matter of levelling
the playing field, not protectionism”.
Many technical points are to be considered for the implementation of BCA
(Cosbey et al., 2012; Monjon and Quirion, 2011), which are not inconsequential
technical details, but would determine the viability of this option under interna-
tional laws:
• Covered sectors. There is a general consensus that only sectors at risk should
be covered by the scheme; however, the classification of sectors at risk may
becontroversial (for example for the thirdphaseofEUETS, seeClò (2010);
Martin et al. (2014)).
• Covered countries. Country exceptions may occur, for example, for Least
Developed Countries for equity purposes or, as in the Waxman-Markey
bill, for countries that have taken “comparable action” on climate policies.
However climate policies are so various, being a mix of carbon pricing, reg-
ulation and subsidies, that comparing different climate policies is not easy.
One can distinguish two principles: “comparability in effectiveness” as in
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theWTOShrimp-Turtledisputeor “comparability of efforts” as in theCom-
mon but Differentiated Responsibilities principle.
• Inclusion of indirect emissions. Taking into account the indirect emissions
from electricity consumption is relevant for industries with high electricity
costs, such as aluminium, but highly complicates the calculation of adjust-
ment factors. The energy mix differs among countries, and calculation of
emissions from electricity consumption is contentious, because of differ-
ences between marginal and average specific emissions.
• Inclusion of export rebates. They are useful to level the playing field also in
third countries markets, but their WTO compatibility is not guaranteed.
• Carbon content. One can consider four options: exporter’s average emis-
sions, home country’s average emissions, self-declaration or best available
technology (BAT) based on benchmarks. A reliable knowledge of the car-
bon content of every foreign product seems out of range because of infor-
mation asymmetry and administrative costs. To avoid a WTO challenge
because of discrimination, these estimations should be rather conservative,
which favours BATbenchmarking, or a choice between home country’s av-
erage emissions and self-declaration (Ismer and Neuhoff, 2007).
• Legal form of the adjustment. The adjustment could take the form of a tax
or of an obligation to surrender allowances. The origin of these allowance
is to be determined (home region or under UNFCCC, with the possibility
or not to come from offset credits).
• Use of revenues. The share of revenues between the importing country,
the exporting country and an international body to be designated is crucial
and may be the biggest levy of political acceptability. Many have argued
that these revenues could be used to finance clean technology transfer or
adaptation through a Green Climate Fund (Godard, 2009; Grubb, 2011;
Springmann, 2013).
• Timing. Aperiodof good faith couldbeoffered to third countries before the
implementation of such measures. Clear conditions for phasing out must
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also be decided.
Amongall these features, someare incorporatedas scenario alternatives inmod-
els, such as the covered sectors (Ghosh et al., 2012; Peterson and Schleich, 2007;
Mattoo et al., 2009; Winchester et al., 2011), the inclusion of indirect emissions
(Böhringer et al., 2012b; Monjon and Quirion, 2011), the inclusion of export re-
bates (Lanzi et al., 2012; Fischer and Fox, 2012; Bednar-Friedl et al., 2012), the
carbon content (McKibbin et al., 2008;Kuik andHofkes, 2010) and theuseof rev-
enues (Boeters and Bollen, 2012; Böhringer et al., 2014; Rivers, 2010). However,
both technical difficulties and administrative costs (as input-output matrices for
carbon content are “available” inmodels) and legal challenges (as they go beyond
energy-economymodelling) are under-evaluated in these models.
Border adjustments are effective to reduce leakage through the competitive-
ness channel (but obviously not leakage through the international fossil fuel price
channel): in model simulations, the leakage rate decreases by about 10 percent-
age points on average (Böhringer et al., 2012a). They are also very effective to
protect competitiveness but they shift a part of the mitigation burden to develop-
ing countries (Bao et al., 2013). With a CGE model, Mattoo et al. (2009) find
that strong BCA imposed by US would depress India and China manufacturing
exports between 16% and 21%. However, it must be remembered that China will
in all likelihood consume domesticallymore than 98%of its steel production4 and
99% of its cement production:5 the effects of BCA on Chinese production would
then be very small. BCAmight conflict with the Principle of Common but Differ-
entiated Responsibilities of the UNFCCC (Dröge, 2011).
Its effect on international negotiations is unclear: they couldbeusedas a “strate-
gic stick” to force other countries to join the abating coalition (Lessmann et al.,
4In 2007 (and, respectively, 2011), China produced 489 Mt (resp. 684 Mt) of steel and ex-
ported 50Mt (resp. 13Mt). ThereforeChina consumed 90%of its production in 2007 and 98% in
2011 (sourcehttp://www.issb.co.uk/asia.html). Steel production is expected to boom
whereas exportations are expected to stay in the same level.
5China produced 2 Gt of cement in 2011 and exported 15,6 Mt in 2009 (we
suppose the exports in 2011 have the same magnitude), meaning that China con-
sumed 99% of its production. source http://www.globalcement.com/news/
itemlist/tag/Chinaandhttp://www.articlesbase.com/business-articles/
chinese-cement-industry-realized-the-sales-of-cny-50072-billion-in-2009-1937146.
html
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2009), but they could also trigger a trade war because of “green protectionism”
suspicions (of Foreign Trade, 2010). For example, China strongly opposes BCA
and claims that energy-intensive exports are already taxed (Voituriez and Wang,
2011). Climate coalition countries have an incentive to deviate from the optimal
carbon tariff rate to change their terms of trade (Weitzel et al., 2012), and even
with good-quality data, there is room for judgement discretion in carbon content
estimation and hence disguised protectionism (Holmes et al., 2011).
Some argue that the “carrot” of technology transfer would be more effective
than the “stick” of BCA (Weber and Peters, 2009). Further, the benefits of inter-
nal improvements of emission trading systems within the abating coalition like
linking markets and extending sectoral coverage could outweigh those of BCA
(Springmann, 2012; Lanzi et al., 2012). Finally, the most controversial aspect of
this measure is its compatibility with theWTO, discussed in the next section.
1.4 Border Carbon Adjustments and the World Trade Organiza-
tion
TheGeneral Agreement onTariffs andTrade (GATT)was established in a world
without climate change on the international agenda, so its rules were not drafted
to address climate policies, making the interpretation of legal texts particularly dif-
ficult. PastWTO cases, such as the Superfund, Tuna-Dolphin and Shrimp-Turtle
reveal some information, butmany features of BCA are unprecedented andWTO
panels are not bound by previous decisions (no rule of stare decisis) (Zhang and
Assunção, 2004). Hence, assessing theWTOconsistency of BCA according to its
specific features divides legal experts and has led to extensive literature on the sub-
ject (Biermann and Brohm, 2004; Goh, 2004; Frankell, 2005; Cendra, 2006; van
Asselt andBiermann, 2007; Ismer andNeuhoff, 2007;Pauwelyn, 2007;Green and
Epps, 2008; Sindico, 2008; Quick, 2008; Bordoff, 2009; Low et al., 2011; Zhang,
2012). If there is a consensus among legal experts, it is that all the technical points
discussed above are key for BCA’s WTO consistency.
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1.4.1 World Trade Organization principles
The WTO was created in order to promote free trade by prohibiting unjustified
protection and discrimination. The legal principle underlying all WTO regula-
tion is the non-discrimination principle, divided into two key principles: the Na-
tional Treatment principle (NT, article I) and the Most Favoured Nation prin-
ciple (MFN, article III). NT prohibits country A to discriminate against country
B or country C products over its own goods, whereas MFN forbids country A to
discriminate against country B goods over country C goods (Avner, 2007).
BCA could then respect the general regime of WTO providing they respect
these core principles. However, a second-best option could be to fall under the
GATT exception regime (article XX). Indeed, providing they are not used as a
means of arbitrary discrimination (article XX chapeau, which is a lighter version
of art. III), measures that do not find justification under the general regime can
still be implemented if they follow one of the eight subparagraphs of art. XX. In
the case of BCA, it could be Art. XX (b) or (g), if BCA are considered “necessary
to protect human, animal, or plant health of life” or “relating to the conservation
of natural resources”.
In practice, assessing whether a version of BCA may follow the general or the
exception regime of WTO involves answering many technical questions that are
beyond the scope of this chapter. To convey a glimpse of the type of legal reason-
ing, this section briefly discusses perhaps one of the most important questions:
can two products that differ onlyin their carbon content be considered “unlike”
products? If the answer is positive, the discrimination between these twoproducts
under BCA does not violate the MFN principle. A difference in carbon content
for “same” products is called, in WTO technical language, a difference in PPM
(Product and Production Method, basically the way products are made). WTO
distinguishes PPM into two categories: product-related PPM and non-product-
relatedPPM,whether thePPMis considered “incorporated in theproduct” ornot.
First, legal experts disagree on whether carbon emissions are a product-related or
a non-product-related PPM, depending on the interpretation of “incorporated in
the product”, whether as “physically present in the product” or “part of the prod-
uct”. Second, WTO rules allow discriminating product-related PPM, but are un-
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clear for non-product-related PPM. A conservative interpretation would say that
products differing only in non-product-related PPM are “like” products, but re-
cent case law seems to take a different direction (Low et al., 2011).
1.4.2 Lessons from the past
Sections 1.4.2 and 1.4.2 briefly explain two cases that provide some insights into
thehypothetical consequencesofBCA implementation, the first (the shrimp-turtle
dispute) on the legal side and the second (the aviation inclusion in the EU ETS)
on the political side.
The Shrimp-Turtle dispute
In order to protect five endangered species of sea turtles, the US banned in 1989
shrimps coming from countries where shrimpers where not equipped with turtle-
excluders devices, a compulsorymeasure for US shrimp trawlers. In 1997, a coali-
tion composedof India,Malaysia, Pakistan andThailand challenged theUSunder
the WTO, arguing that the import prohibition (Section 609 of Public Law 101-
162) was inconsistent with the WTO rules. The Dispute Settlement Panel gave
reason to the coalition, both in first judgement and in appeal in 1998. The main
reasonwas that the embargo underminedmembers’ autonomy to determine their
own policies, because it focused on turtle-excluder devices and did not provide
enough flexibility in turtle protection policies to third countries. After this dispute
the US revised the conditions of Section 609. But these were still not satisfactory
for Malaysia, which challenged again the US in 2000. The WTO this time gave
reason to the US both in the first judgement and in appeal in 2001. It founded
that US provided “good faith” in negotiating an international agreement on the
protection and conservation of sea turtles, as it was recommended by the Appel-
late Body. It also concluded that conditioning market access on the adoption of a
programme comparable in effectiveness allowed for sufficient flexibility.
The political ordeal of aviation inclusion in the EU ETS
On November 2008, Directive 2008/101/EC launched the inclusion of aviation
in the EUETS starting in January 2012. Most of the allowances were supposed to
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be freely distributed, but because of the decrease of the global cap, the expected
growth in air traffic and the limited ways of mitigation, it became clear that air-
line companies were going to buy a growing number of credits over time for their
compliance. Despite some precautions (free allowances, sophisticated rules pro-
tecting fast-growing companies, use of revenues for climate-related initiatives, ex-
emptions in caseof “equivalentmeasures” inother countries), theEuropeanCom-
mission has received a series of attacks coming from airline companies, their trade
bodies and governments. The points at issue were sovereignty, the Common but
Differentiated Responsibilities principle of the UNFCCC (as airlines from devel-
oping and developed countries received the same treatment), the Chicago Con-
vention of 1944 limiting taxation on aviation commercial fuel, and the use of rev-
enues (Sandbag, 2012). In 2012, a growing “coalition of the unwilling” led by
China, India, Russia and theUS agreed a series of retaliatorymeasures if EU states
imposed sanctions for non-compliance. These pressures led the European Com-
mission to “stop the clock” in November 2012, proposing a one-year deferring of
the application of the scheme for intercontinental flights, leaving time to ICAO,
the International Civil Aviation Organisation, to adopt a global policy. The im-
plementation of the scheme as proposed in the directive remains highly uncertain
at this time.
Conclusion
The shrimp-turtle case teaches us that the exception regime of theWTO can rule,
that this institution takes seriously into account the attempt to conclude inter-
national agreements before implementing trade measures (Tamiotti, 2011), and
that flexibilitywas the cornerstoneofWTOdisputepanel decisions (Zhang, 2012).
However the degree of legal complexity of BCA is far beyond a simple ban on
shrimps.
The setbacks of the inclusion of aviation in the EU ETS show us that countries
are deeply reluctant to relinquish someof their sovereignty, especiallywhen finan-
cial consequences are at stake. One can reasonably assume that BCA for EITE in-
dustries are more controversial in terms of political acceptance than the inclusion
of aviation in the EU ETS. Then, BCA implementation would certainly involve a
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strong diplomatic and economic response, especially from the developing coun-
tries.
1.4.3 Political and legal challenges of Border Carbon Adjustments
International institutions state that free trade has a role to play in climate poli-
cies by promoting clean technology transfer and suppressing murky subventions
to dirty sectors, but remain ambiguous concerning the legality of BCA (Bank and
UNEP, 2007; Olhoff et al., 2009). The joint UNEP-WTO report (2009, p. 89)
reads: “the general approach under WTO rules has been to acknowledge that
some degree of trade restriction may be necessary to achieve certain policy ob-
jectives, as long as a number of carefully crafted conditions are respected”. Legal
experts are alsodividedon the subject, thebottom lineofmost analyses is that legal
acceptability and political feasibility of BCAwould depend on the specific designs
of suchmeasures (Tamiotti, 2011). There is no guarantee of the legal success and
political acceptability of BCA, but two features would help. First, in-depth discus-
sions with third countries to identify the potential points of conflict, rather than
unilateral imposition of trademeasures, are desirable (Low et al., 2011)). Second,
flexibilitymust be a central piece of the policy package, which couldmean allowing
third countries national “comparable action” instead of systematic border carbon
pricing.
Even with all these legal precautions, one can reasonably assume that, if BCA
were to be implemented, third countries would publically condemn it as “green
protectionism” or “eco-imperialism” (Dröge, 2011). WTO and UNFCCC share
the unpleasant fact of being bogged down in international negotiations blockage
(thenext stepof theKyotoProtocol forUNFCCC, and theDoha round forWTO),
and a clashbetween climate and trade regimeswouldbedetrimental toboth global
trade and climate agreements.
If BCA are not likely to be implemented in the following years, they will un-
doubtedly be considered more and more, as abatement targets gaps are growing
among countries. A “weak” version of BCA, based on best available technologies
benchmark with the handing back of revenues, would seem the most preferable
option, offering less vulnerability to a potential WTO dispute and giving certain
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compensations to other countries (Godard, 2009; Ismer and Neuhoff, 2007).
1.5 Conclusion
The reality for the foreseeable future is that climate policieswill remain sub-global.
Different mitigation targets among countries are legitimate under the Principle of
Common but Differentiated Responsibilities (Zhang, 2012), but too uneven cli-
mate policies are less efficient if they cause carbon leakage and are unlikely to sur-
vive the national policy-making process if they entail significant competitiveness
losses. These concerns are among the main arguments against the implementa-
tion of stringent climate policies in industrialized countries. How worrying are
they?
Ex post studies have not shown significant evidence of leakage to date, but ar-
guably the climate policies implemented so far may have been too moderate to
allow measurement ofsuch effects. Ex ante studies indicate a leakage in the range
of 5 to 20% in case of unilateral climate policies withoutmeasures tomitigate leak-
age. However, the induced diffusion of climate-friendly innovations generates
abatement even in regions without climate policies, which may well compensate
for leakage. Thus, leakage is clearly not a convincing argument against climate
policies, although it invites actions to complement carbon pricing with specific
measures in order to maximise their efficiency. Is competitiveness a more con-
vincing argument against climate policies? Carbon costs matter, but they are one
factoroutofmany(capital abundance, labour forcequalification, proximity to cus-
tomers, infrastructure quality, etc.) contributing to the competitiveness of an in-
dustry (Monjon andHanoteau, 2007). Massive environmental relocations in case
of stringent policies announced by Energy Intensive Trade Exposed (EITE) trade
associations are not realistic: because these industries are very capital-intensive,
they are less prone to relocation in general compared to “footloose” industries
(Ederington et al., 2003). In the case of the EU ETS, competitiveness concerns
have led to an over-allocation of permits, a generous use of offsets from the CDM
and JI and finally a crash in carbonprice. At this time theEuropeanCommission is
struggling to tackle the growing structural supply-demand imbalance. The mod-
est proposition of back-loading 900million of allowances was rejected on 16April
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2013 by the European parliament, mainly for competitiveness reasons.6 Hence,
competitiveness, which was called a “dangerous obsession” for macroeconomic
policy by Krugman (1994), may be so for climate policy as well. That said, be-
cause of the influence of EITE industries in the policy process, specific measures
to protect these sectors are part of every realistic policy package.
Moreover, they may allow countries in the abating coalition to raise the am-
bition of their climate policy, and also extend the size of the climate coalition, as
they would lessen the incentives of free-riding. Simply exempting these sectors is
too costly to be justifiable: since emissions in these sectors would not be reduced,
more abatement should take place in the others, including less cost-effective op-
tions. Onpurely economicgrounds and fromthepoint of viewof the abating coali-
tion, economic analysis favours the implementation of BCA, but from a legal and
diplomatic point of view, the situation ismuch less clear-cut. If properly discussed
with emerging economies, a BCAbased onbest available technology benchmarks,
with revenues earmarked for climate-relatedprojects in developing countries,may
be the best solution. A fall-back option is to distribute free allowances in propor-
tion to current output of EITE industries (output-based allocation): although less
cost-effective, it could be an acceptable compromise between efficiency and feasi-
bility. However, just as free allowances based on historic or capacities, the option
implemented in the EU ETS, it could generate massive lobbying and competitive
distortions since every industry tries to receive as much allowances as possible.
Besides, the WTO compatibility of output-based allocation is not more granted
than that of BCA (James, 2012).
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2
Would border carbon adjustments
prevent carbon leakage and heavy
industry competitiveness losses?
Insights from a meta-analysis of recent
economic studies
A growing body of academic literature has been developed in the recent years to
quantify the impacts of uneven climate policies on carbon leakage and competi-
tiveness, and to find the best policy measures to counteract them. Among them,
border carbon adjustments (BCAs), which consist in taxing products at the bor-
der on their carbon content, are widely discussed. Some literature reviews have
been published recently synthesizing these studies (Chapter 1 andZhang (2012);
Quirion (2010); Dröge (2009); Gerlagh and Kuik (2007)) but to our knowledge
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no quantitative meta-analysis has been conducted.
Meta-analysis is a method developed to provide a summary of empirical results
from different studies and test hypotheses regarding the determinants of these es-
timates (Nelson and Kennedy, 2009). It has been extensively used in medical re-
search. The first meta-analysis in economics can be traced back to Stanley and
Jarrell (1989). In the field of environmental and resource economics, themajority
of meta-analyses summarizes the results of different nonmarket valuation studies
(VanHoutven et al., 2007; Brander andKoetse, 2011; Barrio and Loureiro, 2010;
Ojea and Loureiro, 2011; Richardson and Loomis, 2009). Closer to our subject,
one can cite two studies on marginal abatement costs to mitigate climate change,
one for all sectors (Kuik et al., 2009) and the other specific to agriculture (Ver-
mont and De Cara, 2010). An extensive review of meta-analysis methods in en-
vironmental economics is given in Nelson and Kennedy (Nelson and Kennedy,
2009).
In this chapter, we conduct a meta-analysis on 25 studies dating from 2004 to
2012, altogether providing 310 estimates of carbon leakage ratios according to dif-
ferent assumptions and models. The typical range of carbon leakage estimates is
from5% to25%(mean14%)without policy and from -5% to15%(mean6%)with
BCAs. We conduct a meta-regression analysis to further investigate the impact of
different assumptions on carbon leakage estimates. Impact of key model param-
eters, such as Armington elasticities, and policy features such as linking carbon
markets or extending pricing to all greenhouse gases sources can be highlighted.
We find that, all other parameters being constant, BCAs implementation reduces
the leakage ratio by 6 percentage points.
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follow. Section 2.1 describes the
database and section2.2provides somedescriptive statistics. Themeta-regression
model is explained in section 2.3 and results are discussed in section 2.4. Section
2.5 concludes.
2.1 Database description
Many articles and working papers deal with carbon leakage and competitiveness
issues but only some of them are models giving ex ante numerical estimates. The
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bodyof literature regarding these issues also comprises ex post econometrical anal-
yses, analyticalmodels and political or juridical studies (Cosbey et al., 2012; Ismer
andNeuhoff, 2007;Monjon andQuirion, 2011b). The first criterion to be part of
our sample was to provide numerical estimations of carbon leakage with a model.
The second criterionwas, since the purpose of this chapter is to investigate the im-
pact of border carbon adjustments on leakage, to include BCAs in the scenarios.
Thirdly, we discarded old studies (before 2004) to focus on the recent literature.
To constitute our sample, we searched for studies in standard search engines
(Web of Science, Google Scholar) and cross references with keywords “carbon
leakage” and “border carbon adjustments”. The research was completed in De-
cember 2012. Our sample is made of 25 studies dating from 2004 to 2012, most
of them(14) are part of the recent EnergyEconomics Special Issue. Some are grey
literature (MIT working paper, World Bank working paper, etc), others are pub-
lished in energy economics and environmental economics journals (Energy Eco-
nomics, Energy Policy, the Energy Journal, Energy Policy, Climate Policy etc).
The majority are computable general equilibrium (CGE) models which rely on
theGTAP database (except for one), the others are sectoral or multi-sectoral par-
tial equilibriummodels. The number of carbon leakage estimates per study varies
from 2 (Weitzel et al., 2012) to 54 (Alexeeva-Talebi et al., 2012), with a mean of
12.6.
The studiedeffect-size in themeta-regressionanalysis is the leakage-to-reduction
ratio or leakage ratio,
l =
4ENonCOA
 4ECOA
where4ECOA is the emissions variation in the climate coalition between the cli-
matepolicy scenario and the counterfactual business-as-usual scenario, and4EnonCOA
the emissions variation in the rest of the world. Its common use avoids us tomake
approximate conversions between studies. In other words all studies calculate the
same thing, which is necessary in ameta-analysis as a ”synthesis requires the ability
to define a common concept to be measured”(Smith and Pattanayak, 2002)).
In themajority of the cases results were available on tables, but sometimes they
were taken fromgraphsorderived fromowncalculation like inMattooet al. (2009).
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Figure 2.1: Leakage ratio in selected studies (mean, minimum and maximal
values with or without BCAs), ranked by mean value without BCAs
2.2 Descriptive Statistics
2.2.1 First sight
Figure 2.1 presents ranges of leakage ratio estimates for the 25 studies (mean,min-
imum and maximal values with or without BCAs). Leakage ratio estimates range
from 2% to 41% without BCAs and from -41% to 27% with BCAs. Eight studies
findnegative values of leakage ratio in case ofBCAs, with three studies (Mathiesen
and Maestad, 2004; McKibbin et al., 2008; Lanzi et al., 2012) finding values be-
low -15%. Internal variations (within one study) of leakage ratio estimates range
from almost null (Alexeeva-Talebi et al., 2007) to relatively high (Mathiesen and
Maestad, 2004; Bednar-Friedl et al., 2012; Ghosh et al., 2012) depending on the
scenarios and models.
Comparing scenarios by pair (with and without BCAs, all the other parame-
ters being constant), we can observe that in all cases, BCAs led to a reduction
of the leakage ratio.1 These results are in contrast with (Jakob et al., 2013) who
found that BCAs could increase the leakage ratio2. For each pair, we calculate the
1In figure 2.1, for FF2012 (Fischer and Fox, 2012), the mean with BCAs is higher than with
no BCAs, but the “equivalent” BCAs scenarios corresponds to the highest value of leakage ratio of
the no BCAs scenario (Europe only abating).
2In this paper, under certain conditions, if in non-coalition countries, the carbon intensity of
exports (“clean” sector) is higher than those of local production (“dirty” sector), a reallocation
of production induced by BCAs from “clean” to “dirty” sector would increase emissions in non-
coalition countries and then leakage ratio on a global scale.
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Figure 2.2: Leakage ratio reduction in case of Border Carbon Adjustment (same
ranking as in figure 2.1)
leakage ratio reduction in percentage points (defined asLeakageRatioReduction =
LeakageRatioNoBCAs   LeakageRatioBCAs). In the majority of the cases, the leakage
ratio reduction due to BCAs stands between 1 and 15 percentage points, but there
are some outliers above 30 percentage points, where BCAs actually generates neg-
ative leakage ratios (McKibbin et al., 2008; Mathiesen andMaestad, 2004).
Apart from carbon leakage, competitiveness losses in energy-intensive indus-
tries constitutes the other component of the climate trade nexus. Though exten-
sively used in the public debate, the notion of competitiveness remains ambiguous
(Alexeeva-Talebi et al., 2007). Some authors consider that this notion is mean-
ingless at the national level (Krugman, 1994). At the sectoral level, it may refer to
“ability to sell” or “ability to earn”. In CGEmodels, competitiveness is most of the
time implicitly defined as “ability to sell” and measured by gross output. In our
sample, 17 of the 25 studies show results of output change for industries. Based
onGTAP sectors, EITE sectors often regroups refined goods, chemical products,
non-metallic minerals, iron and steel industry and non-ferrous metals (although
sometimes refined goods is aside). Some studies present only disaggregated re-
sults by sectors, and not the output change for EITE sectors as a whole. In this
case, we use the average of the output of iron and steel and non-metallic minerals
sectors (or average of cement and iron and steel) as a proxy for EITE sectors.3
The output change of EITE sectors varies from -0.1% to -16% without BCAs
3For the only two studies where output changes were available both by sector and for EITE
sectors as a whole (Lanzi et al., 2012; Ghosh et al., 2012), it was a correct proxy. Iron and Steel
(resp. Non-Metallic Minerals) being a bit less (resp. more) impacted than EITE as a whole.
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and from +2.2% to -15.5% with BCAs. There is a clear dichotomy between CGE
models where output loss range is 0%-3% (except for Alexeeva-Talebi 2012 (b)
andGhosh et al. 2012 where it is a bit more (around 3%-7%)) and sectoral partial
equilibriummodels where output loss range is 8%-15%. In all cases, BCAs reduce
the output loss among EITE industries4 and in five cases (Peterson and Schleich,
2007; Alexeeva-Talebi et al., 2007; Kuik and Hofkes, 2010; Mattoo et al., 2009;
Ghosh et al., 2012), the output variation of EITE industries is even positive.
The welfare (or in some studies GDP) variation of the abating coalition ranges
from -1.58% to 0.02%without BCAs and from -0.9% to 0.40%with BCAs (the en-
vironmental impact is never taken into account in thewelfare estimation5). Though
BCAs improve welfare of coalition countries compared to a no BCAs scenario,
they most of the time do not reestablish a “neutral” situation (e.g a variation near
0%). The welfare variation is still negative after BCAs, because the consumers
of the coalition pay higher prices in EITE sectors’ products. This improvement
of welfare in coalition countries goes hand in hand with a degradation of welfare
in non-coalition countries. BCAs have big distributionnal impacts: they transfer
a part of the burden to the non-coalition countries (Böhringer et al., 2012c). In
the studies that report it (Böhringer et al., 2012c; Lanzi et al., 2012; Mattoo et al.,
2009), globalwelfare is decreasing with BCAs.
2.2.2 Merging studies
Gathering all the estimates of carbon leakage in the 25 studies, we compute kernel
density estimations for the estimates accross all studies. As the number of esti-
mates varies greatly (from 2 to 54) across studies, we consider two ways of merg-
ing results, the “scenarios equality” method and the “articles equality” method. In
the “scenarios equality” method, we add all estimates regardless of the article they
are from. Then an article with N estimates “weights” N=2 times more in the fi-
nal distribution than an article with only two estimates. In the “articles equality”
methodhowever, weights are put on estimates to assure that each article “weights”
4However in the CASE model (Monjon and Quirion, 2011a,b), cement output is more re-
duced in the presence of BCAs.
5In the Energy Economics special issue, leakage is endogenously compensated by a higher
abatement to assure a same environmental impact in all scenarios in order to compare welfare
variations.
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Figure 2.3: Output change of EITE industries in selected studies (ranked by
mean value without BCAs)
Figure 2.4: Welfare variation in abating coalition (ranked by mean value with-
out BCAs)
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Figure 2.5: Leakage Ratio. “scenarios equality” merging
the same in the final distribution.6 By this process the distribution of results with
the “articles equality”method is less smooth because there are artificially some ac-
cumulation in the distribution. However the distributions share the same shape
with both results, especially for the leakage ratio and the output variation of EITE
industries, which can be interpreted as a sign of the robustness of the results.
Both leakage ratio distribution and EITE output change distribution are bi-
modal. For leakage ratio without BCAs there is a concentration around 5% and
another around 12%.7 We can see that a leakage ratio above 100%, theoretically
possible if the carbon content of products is higher outside the climate coalition
is well out of the range of estimates in the literature. For EITE output variation
there is a concentration at -2% and another one (more spread out) at -7%, which
can be interpreted as the dichotomy between CGE models and PE models. The
coalition welfare variation distribution is unimodal, with amode of -0.6%without
BCAs and -0.3% with BCAs.
One can easily visualize in figures 5 to 10 the impact of BCAs in reducing the
leakage ratio, restoring some competitiveness and to a lesser extent improving
6IfNk is the number of estimates in the article k, the weight for an estimate from article i is then
maxk(Nk)
Ni
(and the closest integer value for kernel estimate using Stata). In this case each article
weightsmaxk(Nk) in the final distribution.
7Not a single estimate of leakage ratio is negative without BCAs, the negative part is an artifact
in the kernel density estimation
60
Figure 2.6: Leakage Ratio. (Kernel density estimates)
coalition welfare with the left shift of the leakage ratio distribution and the right
shifts of output change and coalition welfare change distributions.
2.3 Meta-regression analysis
2.3.1 Methods
Meta-regression is widely used in meta-analysis as it is an interesting way to go
beyond standard literature review, by combining numerical results from different
studies in a statistical manner (Vermont and De Cara, 2010; Kuik et al., 2009;
Horváthová, 2010). Guidelines on how meta-regression analysis of economics
research should be conducted were recently published (Stanley et al., 2013). The
guidelines were divided into three topics: research questions and effect size; re-
search literature searching, compilation and coding; and meta-regression model-
ing issues.
The first topic is discussed in the introduction (general context of the research
question and statement of the effect studied) and in the end of part 2.1 (how the
effect size is measured by the leakage ratio, which is a common metric). The sec-
ond topic is discussed in the beginning of part 2.1 (how the literaturewas searched
andwhat are the criteria for study inclusion). Table 2.1 gives detailed information
on the articles used in the meta-analysis. Stanley et al. (2013) encourage that two
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Figure 2.7: Output change of EITE industries (Kernel density estimates). “sce-
narios equality” merging
Figure 2.8: Output change of EITE industries (Kernel density estimates). “ar-
ticles equality” merging
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Figure 2.9: Welfare variation (Kernel density estimates). “scenarios equality”
merging
Figure 2.10: Welfare variation (Kernel density estimates). “articles equality”
merging
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Figure 2.11: BCAs leakage reduction (in percentage points)
or more reviewers should code the relevant research. In this study, only the first
author searched and coded the research literature.
In the rest of this part, we will detail the third topic (modeling issues). As rec-
ommended as good practice, we display descriptive statistics of the variables that
are coded (see Table 2.7 in the appendix 2.6.2 for the effect size e.g. the leak-
age ratio, and Table 2.2 for the regression variables). Publication bias is a major
issue in meta-regression analysis. This form of sample selection bias occurs if pri-
mary studieswith statisticallyweakor unusual results are less likely tobepublished
(Nelson and Kennedy, 2009). For example, it has been widely recognized to ex-
aggerate the effectiveness of pharmaceuticals (Doucouliagos and Stanley, 2009).
Statistical techniques to take this bias into account exist (Stanley, 2005; Rothstein
et al., 2006;Havranek, 2013) but they require standard errors of the estimates. We
cannot apply thesemethods here sincewe deal with numerical studies (no statisti-
cal significancy is involved and then no standard errors are given with the results).
It is highly likely that a publication bias also exists in the area of modeling studies:
authors compare their results with those of the literature and are able to change
the settings or calibration of their models to influence the results. Our best option
to address this issuewas to embrace asmany studies as possible without artificially
setting aside some of them, e.g. non peer-reviewed papers.
Another potential issue is the existence and the treatment of outlier observa-
tions (some estimates that are unrepresentative or overly influential). To discard
outliers we first perform a robust estimation procedure using iteratively Huber
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weights8 (Huber, 1964) and only keep estimates whose final weights are above
a certain threshold (5%). Among the first original samples of 310, 144 and 166
values (for “All”, “no BCAs” and “BCAs”, see later), 16, 10 and 6 observations
were dismissed (20 out of 25 articles have less than one discarded estimate). The
fact that the articles with themore discarded estimates were the relatively old ones
(MathiesenandMaestad (2004), Babiker (2005)andPetersonandSchleich (2007))
suggests that the literature is converging (which could also reflect a publication
bias...). Estimation of parameters without the treatment of outliers is given in the
appendix 2.6.1 as a sensitivity analysis. The reader can verify that the exclusion of
outliers slightly improves the statistical significance of some coefficients without
substantially affecting the results of the meta-regression analysis.
Finally, heteroskedasticity in effect size variance and non-independence of ob-
servations of the same primary studies due to within study dependence has long
been recognized as a potential estimation problem for meta-regression (Nelson
and Kennedy, 2009). Some authors favor the use of a “best-set” of estimates,
meaning a single estimate per study (Stanley, 2001) but this shrinks dramatically
the pool of estimates. In our case we used a Random Effect Multi-Level (REML)
model with study identifiers as inDoucouliagos and Stanley (2009), to control for
the potential dependence of estimateswithin a primary study. A secondmethod, a
“cluster-robust”OLSestimator,9 as inKuik et al. (2009)andVermont andDeCara
(2010)), is used as a sensitivity analysis (see appendix 2.6.1). Some differences on
the coefficient values exist but overall our findings are robust to the method em-
ployed.
2.3.2 The model
To investigate the sources of heterogeneity among the different carbon leakage
estimates, we test three variations of themeta-regressionmodel based on different
samples: one for all leakage ratio estimates, one for estimates in the absence of
8The Stata command that is used is rreg.
9The observations are gathered in 15 clusters (see Table 2.1). Studies withmany observations
are the first clusters (with the exception ofMonjon andQuirion (2011a) andMonjon andQuirion
(2011b) which are merged because results are from the same model CASE II), then studies that
share common features are gathered in same clusters (2 or 3 studies per cluster representing 10-15
observations).
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BCAs and the last one for estimates in the presence of BCAs:
Leakageij = Const+ β1GEij + β2Coasizeij + β3Abatementij
+ β4Linkij + β5GHGij + β6Armingtonij
+ β7BCAsij + uij
(2.1)
LeakageNoBCAs;ij = Const+ β1GEij + β2Coasizeij + β3Abatementij
+ β4Linkij + β5GHGij + β6Armingtonij
+ uij
(2.2)
LeakageBCAs;ij = Const+ β1GEij + β2Coasizeij + β3Abatementij
+ β4Linkij + β5GHGij + β6Armingtonij
+ β8Expij + β9Foreignij + β10AllSectij + β11Indirectij
+ uij
(2.3)
where Leakageij is the i-th estimate of leakage ratio reported in the j-th study.
The choices of the variables in the models are driven by the scenarios and the
available data in the studies, as well as the debates in the literature. The first vari-
ables are GE (a dummy variable set equal to 1 if the model is a CGE), Coasize
(the size of the abating coalition in percentage of worldwide emissions10) and
Abatement (the abatement target)11. Then we have two dummies related to sce-
narios Link (if permit trading is authorized between the different regions of the
coalition12) andGHG (if all carbon sources, and not only CO2 are considered).
Armington elasticities, which are used to model international trade, are con-
10In the overwhelming majority of the articles, the coalitions were centered on Europe, in sev-
eral cases enlarge toAnnex 1 except Russia (A1xR) or A1xR plusChina. Therefore no variable was
considered to describe the coalition in itself (for example EU or US), but only its size in terms of
worlwide emissions.
11The logarithm of Coasize and Abatement have been tried as variables without changing the
statistical significancy of the results
12which supposes that the abating coalition is composed of more than one region in themodel.
For example if Europe is the abating coalition it is not considered that permit trading is allowed.
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sidered as a crucial parameter in leakage ratio estimates (Monjon and Quirion,
2011a; Alexeeva-Talebi et al., 2012; Balistreri and Rutherford, 2012). Most of the
time theywere not explicitly displayed in the articles. However some studiesmade
sensitivity analyses on this parameter (for example doubling or dividing in half
the original values). In the meta-analysis, the Armington parameter is then, rather
than a numerical value, an “almost dummy” linked with “high” (+1), “low” (-1),
“very high” (+2) or “very low” (-2) Armington elasticities values13 when sensitiv-
ity analysis were performed on these parameters. It would have been interesting
to incorporate a parameter for the fossil fuel supply elasticity which is also recog-
nized to be determinant in the leakage ratio estimations for the international fossil
fuel channel (Light et al., 1999; Gerlagh and Kuik, 2007). However, because they
were not available most of the time, it was decided not to take them into account
in the meta-regression.
BCAs is a dummy which takes the value of 1 if BCAs are implemented. It is
the central parameter of our study since we primarily investigate to what extent
BCAs are efficient to reduce leakage. Four dummies detail the policy features of
the BCAs: Exp (if export rebates are part of the scheme), Foreign (if the adjust-
ment is based on foreign specific emissions, instead of home specific emissions or
best available technology), AllSect (if the adjustment concerns all sectors and not
onlyEITE sectors), and Indirect (if indirect emissions are taken into account in the
adjustment). Table 2.2 summarizes information about the regression variables.
2.4 Discussion of the results
Interpreting the results, onemust bear inmind that, thoughmeta-regression anal-
ysis is a powerful tool to incorporate all the sources of variability in a singlemodel,
onemust interpret the results with caution. Indeed, the calculated coefficients de-
pendnotonlyonprimarymodels, thatmadedifferent assumptions, but alsoon the
statistical variability of the parameters which is, except for the variable BCAs, far
from being perfect. For example, Abatement is set at 20% for 61% of the cases and
varies within three studies only (Böhringer et al., 2012a; McKibbin et al., 2008;
13In Balistreri and Rutherford (2012) the Melitz structure (Melitz, 2003) is considered equiv-
alent to “very high” Armington.
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Demailly and Quirion, 2008). Indirect is set at the value 1 for 91% of the cases
and varies within two studies only (Böhringer et al., 2012c; Monjon andQuirion,
2011b). This aspect is unavoidable in a meta-regression analysis as we take al-
ready made studies and do not design the scenarios by ourselves. We still include
these “poorly variable” variables in the regression, and interpret the coefficients
in the light of this aspect, knowing that they may be biased or may not appear as
statistically significant as they may have been.
Table 2.3: Meta-regression results. REML estimation
All No BCAs BCAs
GE 0.091*** 0.047 0.124***
(2.74) (1.60) (4.27)
Coasize -0.214*** -0.221*** -0.147***
(12.12) (10.97) (5.94)
Abatement 0.090 0.163* 0.084
(1.04) (1.78) (0.69)
Link 0.003 -0.005 0.002
(0.26) (0.48) (0.13)
GHG -0.029** -0.014 -0.062***
(2.24) (1.04) (2.82)
Armington 0.019*** 0.033*** 0.003
(4.68) (7.75) (0.51)
BCA -0.063***
(14.27)
Exp -0.039***
(2.98)
Foreign -0.020*
(1.90)
Allsect -0.042***
(2.90)
Indirect -0.015
(0.87)
N 294 134 160
Wald χ2 386.13y 192.61y 78.25y
LR test 220.50y 96.95y 42.02y
DW test OLS 0.68 0.52 1.08
y prob = 0:0000
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The results of the meta-regresssion are visible Table 2.3. We recall that three
estimations are performed: one for all the leakage ratio estimates, one for those in
the absence of BCAs and one for those in the presence of BCAs. The quality of
the estimations is assessed through theWald χ2 test and theLR(LikelihoodRatio)
test that compares the results with the linear regression. The presence of within-
studydependence is revealedby theDurbin-Watson test (computed after a simple
OLS estimation), and the LR test confirms that the use of a REML estimation is
appropriate.
The difference between CGE models and other models is statistically signifi-
cant and is positive (except for the “no BCAs” sample). We find that, all other pa-
rameters being constant, the leakage ratio estimate is 9 percentage points higher
in CGE models and 12 percentage points in the case of BCAs implementation,
which is a noteworthy difference. The lack of non-CGE models estimates (non
CGEmodels constitute only one fifth of the articles and even less in terms of leak-
age ratio estimates) remains an impediment for the statistical value of this coeffi-
cient. An explanation could be that CGEmodels include both channels of leakage
ratio, the competitiveness channel and the international fossil fuel channel, which
is recognized to predominate (Gerlagh and Kuik, 2007; Fischer and Fox, 2012;
Weitzel et al., 2012) whereas partial equilibriummodels only include the first one
(except for Mathiesen andMaestad (2004)).
The coefficient for the coalition size is negative and very statistically significant.
Changing the sizeof the coalition fromEurope (15%ofworld’s emissions in2004)
to Annex 1 plus China except Russia (71% of world’s emissions in 2004) would
involve in themodel adecreaseof leakage ratioof about 12percentagepointswith-
out BCAs and 8 percentage points with BCAs.
Theoretically, the bigger is the abatement, the higher is the leakage in absolute
terms (tons of carbon emissions). As the leakage ratio is the leakage in absolute
terms divided by the abatement and the latter increases as well, there is an indeter-
minacy about the relationship between the abatement and the leakage ratio. In the
meta-regression model, the correlation is positive, but the statistical significancy
is weak (a p-value below 0.1 is reached only for the no-BCAs sample), which may
be attributable to the small variability of this parameter. In Alexeeva-Talebi et al.
(2007) (which was not included in our study because there was no BCAs), the
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correlation is negative (leakage of 32%, 29% and 27% for Europe abating respec-
tively 10%, 20% and 30% of its emissions). In Böhringer et al. (2012b) however,
the relationship is positive (leakage of 15.3%, 17.9% and 21% for Europe abating
respectively 10%, 20% and 30% of its emissions).
Concerning the policy parameters, authorizing permit trading (linking) within
the coalition is not statistically significant. In the two studies that change explicitly
this parameter in the different scenarios (Lanzi et al., 2012; Springmann, 2012),
permit trading diminishes leakage to a small extent. It is therefore the lack of vari-
ability between studies that may explain this non-significance (about half of the ar-
ticles have permit trading in all their scenarios and the other half do not in all their
scenarios).
Conversely, extending carbon pricing to all GHG sources is statistically signif-
icant, especially when BCAs are implemented (decreasing the leakage ratio by 6
percentage points). However the poor variability of this parameter diminishes the
confidence we can grant to this econometric estimation (two articles study the
coverage extension to all GHGs in one of their scenarios, but all the other articles
only consider carbon emissions, i.e. there is no variability between studies).
TheArmingtonparameterproves statistically significant (except for the “BCAs”
sample) and is positive as expected. A higher value, meaning a more “flexible” in-
ternational trademodeled, induces more impact of price differentiation across re-
gions on trade flows, and therefore more leakage. In our meta-regression model,
taking high values of Armington elasticities instead of low values would then lead
to leakage ratio estimates about 2 1:9 = 3:8 percentage points higher.
With a very high p-value, we find that the BCA parameter is statistically signifi-
cant and is negative. All other parameters being constant, BCAs implementation
reduces the leakage ratio by 6 percentage points. This statistical finding fits the
data in the descriptive statistics section (figure 2.11).
More specifically, among the BCAs options, export rebates and the inclusion
of all sectors instead of only EITE sectors would have the most important impact
(decrease of 4 percentage points of the leakage ratio for each), roughly the dou-
ble than basing adjustment on foreign specific emissions instead of home specific
emissions. In this meta-regression model it is not the politically and juridically
risky option (foreign carbon content based adjustment) that would be the most
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efficient to reduce leakage but more an option with high administrative costs (ad-
justment to all sectors). The inclusionof indirect emissions iswithout surprise not
statistically significant (there is very little statistical variability for this parameter).
In the two studies where a change of this feature is included in the scenarios, it is
proven to reduce leakage: in Böhringer et al. (2012c), from 0.5 to 2 percentage
points, depending on the adjustment level, and in Monjon and Quirion (2011a),
from 1.5 to 2 percentage points.
Meta-regression results can also be used to make out-of-sample predictions,
which is called benefit transfer (Nelson and Kennedy, 2009; Van Houtven et al.,
2007). This exercise is especially interesting for meta-analysis of empirical stud-
ies as they allow forecast for other locations or commodities which may save the
employed resources to make additional surveys. Here we show as an example the
results of leakage ratio estimations with the meta-regression analysis coefficients
for different abating coalitions and policies (see Table 2.4). The estimated values
of leakage ratio seem reasonable but the 95% confidence intervals are very wide.
2.5 Conclusion
A global climate policy is unlikely to be implemented in the years to come and the
adoption of ambitious national or regional climate policies is hindered by claims
of industry competitiveness losses and carbon leakage. Border Carbon Adjust-
ment (BCAs) has been proposed to overcome these hurdles but its potential ef-
ficacy has been controversial. Moreover some authors argue that BCAs aims at
protecting heavy industries competitiveness rather than at tackling leakage (Kuik
and Hofkes, 2010) while other authors defend that BCAs implementation can-
not be justified only for competitiveness motives (Cosbey et al., 2012). Finally,
BCAs proposals differ by key design choices such as the inclusion of exports re-
bates, indirect (electricity-related) emissions, or the adjustment level, which can
be the domestic or foreign average specific emissions, or best-available technolo-
gies. How BCAs performance would be impacted by these choices remains an
open question.
To shed some light of these issues, wehave gathered andanalysed310estimates
of carbon leakage andoutput loss inEnergy-IntensiveTrade-Exposed (EITE) sec-
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tors from 25 studies dating from 2004 to 2012. Ameta-regression was conducted
to capture the impact of different assumptions on the model results.
Across our studies, the leakage ratio ranges from 5% to 25% (mean 14%) with-
out BCAs and from -5% to 15% (mean 6%) with BCAs. BCAs reduce the leak-
age ratio with robust statistical significance: all parameters being constant in the
meta-regression analysis, the ratio drops by 6 percentage points with the imple-
mentation of BCAs. In most CGE models, some leakage remains after BCAs im-
plementation, which is not the case with partial equilibrium (PE) models. The
most likely explanation is that in CGE models, a part of leakage is due to the in-
ternational fossil fuel price channel which is unaffected by BCAs, while most PE
models do not feature this leakage channel.
Concerning output loss for EITE industries, results are in sharp contrast to re-
sults about leakage: CGEmodels predict loss in a range from0% to4%(mean2%)
without BCAs while PE models foresee more than the double. BCAs corrects for
the output loss in CGE models but less so in sectoral models. The explanation
seems that in PEmodels, a higher output loss is due to a drop in demand forCO2-
intensive materials, loss which is mitigated by BCAs.
Further, the importance of the coalition size is statistically confirmed and quan-
tified, as well as the impact of extending pricing to all greenhouse gases. The latter
reduces the leakage ratio, and the smaller the abating coalition, the bigger the leak-
age ratio. This meta-analysis also confirms the importance of Armington elastici-
ties in the leakage ratio estimation, a result crucial in terms of uncertainty analysis,
which calls for more transparency and sensitivity analyses regarding these param-
eters in future studies.
The features of BCAs (coverage, level of adjustment, etc.) are of the highest
importance for theWTOcompatibility, feasibility, andpolitical acceptability. The
purpose of themeta-regression was also to assess their impact on competitiveness
and leakage. In the meta-regression, the inclusion of all sectors and the presence
of export rebates appear to be the two most efficient features to reduce leakage,
followed by the adjustment level based on foreign carbon content. Yet one can
guess, in the caseof hypothetical BCAs implementation, that political and juridical
aspects will be the more determinant and that only a “light” version (adjustment
based on best available technologies, probably without the inclusion of indirect
74
emissions) is likely to see the light of day.
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2.6 Appendix
2.6.1 Sensitivity analysis
Tables 2.5 and 2.6 present the different sensitivity analyses. Results including or
excluding outliers are very similar. The noticeable differences are a slightly higher
80
impact of BCAs for themodel including outliers (BCAs diminish the leakage ratio
by 7 percentage points instead of 6 percentage points) and less significant coeffi-
cient concerning the BCAs features.
Resultswith theOLS cluster-robust estimation andREMLestimation aremore
diverging. In theOLS cluster-robust model, the impact of extending the coverage
to all greenhouse gases is strongly bigger, the impact of the size of the coalition
is twice less important and the value of the abatement coefficient is twice more
important. Among the BCAs features, the coefficient measuring the effect of cov-
ering all sectors instead of only EITE sectors is also twice larger. Remarkably, the
impact of BCAs on the leakage reduction is the same for the two models.
2.6.2 Summary statistics
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Abating coalition Europe Annex 1 without Russia
Target 15% 30% 15% 30%
No BCA (a) 19% 21% 12% 14%
[3%;33%] [3%;38%] [-5%;28%] [5%;33%]
BCA light (b) 15% 16% 10% 11%
[-5%;34%] [-8%;39%] [-11%;31%] [-13%;36%]
BCA strong (c) 9% 10% 4% 6%
[-16%;33%] [-18%;38%] [-22%;30%] [-24%;35%]
(a) Estimation with the “All” model
(b) Estimation with the “BCAs” model. AllSect = 1 only
(c) Estimation with the “BCAs” model. AllSect = 1, Foreign = 1 and Exp = 1
Table 2.4: Benefit transfer: leakage ratio estimations by the meta-regression
model
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Table 2.5: Sensitivity analysis. Effect of the removal of outliers in the REML
estimation
All No BCA BCA
Originaly All Sample Originaly All Sample Originaly All Sample
GE 0.091*** 0.067 0.047 0.048 0.124*** 0.113**
(2.74) (1.58) (1.60) (1.19) (4.27) (2.54)
Coasize -0.214*** -0.192*** -0.221*** -0.256*** -0.147*** -0.124***
(12.12) (8.22) (10.97) (10.32) (5.94) (4.21)
Abatement 0.090 0.158 0.163* 0.111 0.084 0.203
(1.04) (1.36) (1.78) (0.93) (0.69) (1.41)
Link 0.003 0.004 -0.005 -0.004 0.002 0.013
(0.26) (0.33) (0.48) (0.29) (0.13) (0.78)
GHG -0.029** -0.026 -0.014 -0.010 -0.062*** -0.062**
(2.24) (1.45) (1.04) (0.59) (2.82) (2.35)
Armington 0.019*** 0.019*** 0.033*** 0.032*** 0.003 0.003
(4.68) (3.43) (7.75) (5.85) (0.51) (0.40)
BCA -0.063*** -0.074***
(14.27) (12.40)
Exp -0.039*** -0.040***
(2.98) (2.58)
Foreign -0.020* -0.020
(1.90) (1.55)
Allsect -0.042*** -0.030*
(2.90) (1.75)
Indirect -0.015 -0.019
(0.87) (0.90)
N 294 310 134 140 160 166
Wald χ2 386.13 238.64 192.61 147.17 78.25 42.97
LR test 220.50 216.05 96.95 121.06 42.02 62.14
y Some outliers are removed from the sample
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Table 2.6: Sensitivity analysis. REML versus OLS cluster-robust estimation
All No BCA BCA
Cluster Cluster Cluster
REML robust REML robust REML robust
OLS OLS OLS
GE 0.091*** 0.053 0.047 0.006 0.124*** 0.103***
(2.74) (1.60) (1.60) (0.21) (4.27) (3.07)
Coasize -0.214*** -0.107** -0.221*** -0.067 -0.147*** -0.105**
(12.12) (2.95) (10.97) (1.41) (5.94) (2.69)
Abatement 0.090 0.197 0.163 0.326** 0.084 0.165
(1.04) (0.90) (1.78)* (2.22) (0.69) (1.12)
Link 0.003 0.016 -0.005 0.020 0.002 0.008
(0.26) (0.77) (0.48) (1.23) (0.13) (0.40)
GHG -0.029** -0.083*** -0.014 -0.070*** -0.062*** -0.054***
(2.24) (5.01) (1.04) (4.89) (2.82) (4.51)
Armington 0.019*** 0.022*** 0.033*** 0.034*** 0.003 0.006
(4.68) (3.36) (7.75) (4.36) (0.51) (1.60)
BCA -0.063*** -0.065***
(14.27) (6.63)
Exp -0.039*** -0.039*
(2.98) (2.03)
Foreign -0.020* -0.026**
(1.90) (2.31)
Allsect -0.042*** -0.101***
(2.90) (4.01)
Indirect -0.015 0.001
(0.87) (0.08)
N 294 294 134 134 160 160
Wald χ2 386.13 192.61 78.25
LR test 220.50 96.95 42.02
R2 0.38 0.32 0.59
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3
Carbon leakage and competitiveness
of cement and steel industries under
the EU ETS: much ado about nothing
InChapters 1 and2,wediscussed at lenght the existing evidence about the amount
of carbon leakage and losses in competitiveness that can be expected from a given
climate policy; and showed that it was not conclusive. Among ex ante studies,
general equilibriummodels point to a positive but limited leakage at the aggregate
level (typically from 5% to 25%)while for some carbon-intensive sectors like steel
or cement, a higher leakage rate is sometimes forecast (Oikonomou et al., 2006;
Demailly and Quirion, 2006). However, the few existing ex post studies have not
revealed so far evidence of carbon leakage.
The present chapter contributes to the ex post literature by econometrically as-
sessing the operational leakage1 over the first twophases of theEUETS, in the two
1Adistinction can bemade between leakage that occurs in the presence of capacity constraints
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most emitting manufacturing industry sectors: cement and steel. The methodol-
ogy is to econometrically estimate a relationship, obtained via an analytic model,
between net imports (imports minus exports) and the carbon price, controlling
for other factors that may influence net imports such as economic activity in and
outside Europe. Using two different econometric techniques that provide consis-
tent results, we conclude that net imports of cement and steel have been driven by
domestic and foreign demand but not by the CO2 allowance price, falsifying the
claim that the ETS has generated leakage, at least in the short run.
The remainder of the chapter is as follows. Section 3.1 provides a review of the
literature on empirical studies focusing on environmental regulations and trade.
Section 3.2 gives an overview of the industry contexts of the different studied sec-
tors. Section 3.3 explains the methodology (model and data). Section 3.4 details
the results discussed in section 3.5.
3.1 Literature review
Whereas carbon pricing is relatively new, environmental regulations on local pol-
lutants have a much longer history. For example the Clean Air Act was imple-
mented in theUSduring the 1970s, well before climate changewas on the agenda.
Therefore the first studies empirically assessing the impacts of environmental reg-
ulations on trade dealt with local pollution issues and tested the pollution haven
hypothesis/effect (Kalt, 1988; Tobey, 1990; Grossman and Krueger, 1993; Jaffe
et al., 1995). The migration of dirty industries to countries with lower environ-
mental standards (pollution havens) depends both on the environmental regu-
latory gap and on trade tariffs. In the pollution haven hypothesis (respectively
effect), the first (respectively the second) factor is held constant2. The pollution
havenhypothesiswas amajor concern during the negotiations of theNorthAmer-
ican Free Trade Agreements in the 1990s (Jaffe et al., 1995), but as the decrease
in the short term, termed operational leakage and leakage which occurs in the longer term via
the impacts of the EU-ETS on investment policy, termed investment leakage (Climate Strategies,
2013). Babiker (2005) claimed that investment leakagemay occur evenwith restrictions on inter-
national capital flows, through regional domestic adjustements in investments and savings to take
advantage of the change in terms of trade.
2For a more elaborated presentation and discussion of these notions, cf. Kuik et al. (2013).
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in trade tariffs has seemed to slow down, the pollution haven effect has become a
more relevant concern (and carbon leakage due the EU ETS would be a “carbon
haven effect”, see Chapter 1).
The prevailing conclusion of the pollution haven literature is that environmen-
tal regulations have a small to negligible impact on relocations (Oikonomou et al.,
2006). After a first wave of inconclusive works (Eskeland and Harrison, 2003), a
second generation of studies have statistically demonstrated significant but small
pollution haven effects using panels of data and industry or country fixed effects
(Levinson andTaylor, 2008). Many reasons have been invoked to explainwhy the
widely believed fear of environmental relocations was not observed. Some have
pointed out that environmental regulations are not a main driver of relocations
contrary to economic growth in emerging countries (Smarzynska, 2002), or that
pollution abatement represents a small fractionof costs compared toother costs or
barriers that still favor production in industrialized countries (Oikonomou et al.,
2006) such as tariffs, transport costs, labor productivity, volatility in exchange
rates and political risk. Others highlight that heavy industries are very capital-
intensive and tend to be located in capital-abundant countries, or that their cap-
ital intensity makes them less prone to relocate than “footloose” industries (?).
Finally, the Porter hypothesis (Porter and Van der Linde, 1995), implying that
regulations bring cost-reducing innovations, has also been cited.
The pollution haven literature is mostly related to command-and-control reg-
ulations for local pollutants, whereas the EU ETS is a cap-and-trade system for
carbon emissions. Some studies evaluate policies which are closer to the EU ETS
such as environmental taxation in someEuropean countries. Miltner andSalmons
(2009) studied the impact of environmental tax reforms (ETR) on competitive-
ness indicators for seven European countries and eight sectors and found that, out
of 56 cases, the impact of ETR on competitiveness was insignificant in 80% of
cases, positive in 4% and negative for only 16% of the cases (Miltner and Salmons
2009). However, energy-intensive sectors benefited from exemptions and lower
rates of taxation. Costantini andMazzanti (2012) used a gravity model to analyse
the impact on trade flows of environmental and innovation policies in Europe and
revealed a Porter-like mechanism: when the regulatory framework is followed by
private innovation, environmental policies seem to foster rather than undermine
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export dynamics.
The question of carbon leakagewas also a relevant issue for theKyoto protocol.
Aichele andFelbermayr (2012) assessed the impact of theKyotoprotocol onCO2
emissions, CO2 footprint and CO2 net imports, using a differences-in-differences
approach with the International Criminal Court participation as an instrumen-
tal variable for Kyoto ratification. They concluded that the Kyoto protocol has
reduced domestic emissions by about 7%, but has not changed the carbon foot-
print (CO2 net imports increased by about 14%). Though they do not explicitly
formulate it, their results lead to a carbon leakage estimation of about 100%, con-
trasting with the other empirical studies. However, two caveats are in order. First,
China became a member of the WTO in 2002, just when most developed coun-
trieswere ratifying the protocol. SincemostCO2 net imports are due to tradewith
China, the rise in net importsmaywell be due toChinaWorldTradeOrganization
(WTO)membership rather than to theKyoto protocol. Second, apart from those
covered by the EU ETS, countries with a Kyoto target have not adopted signifi-
cant policies to reduce emissions in the manufacturing industry. Hence, if Kyoto
had caused leakage (through the competitiveness channel), it should show up on
the CO2 net imports of countries covered by the EU ETS rather than on CO2 net
imports of countries covered by a Kyoto target. However, when the authors in-
clude both EUmembership and the existence of a Kyoto target in the regression,
they report that EUmembership does not increase CO2 imports.
Some papers use econometric models to empirically investigate the impact of
climate policies on heavy industries ex ante, using energy prices as a proxy. Ger-
lagh and Mathys (2011) studied the links between energy abundance and trade
in 14 countries in Europe, Asia and America. They found that energy is a major
driver for sector location through specialisation, but they do not quantify reloca-
tions under uneven carbon policies. Aldy and Pizer (2011) focused on theUS but
used a richer sectoral disaggregation. The authors concluded that a $15 price of
CO2 would not significantly affect the USmanufacturing industry as a whole, but
that some sectors would be harder hit with a decrease of about 3% in their produc-
tion.
TheEUETShas constituted a subject of research for a bodyof empirical studies
on different topics: abatement estimation (Ellerman and Buchner, 2008; Delarue
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et al., 2008), impact of investment and innovation (Calel and Dechezleprêtre,
2014;Martin et al., 2014), distributional effects (Sijm et al., 2006; De Bruyn et al.,
2010;Alexeeva-Talebi, 2011), determinantsof theCO2 price (Alberola et al., 2008;
Mansanet-Bataller et al., 2011; Hintermann, 2010), but only a limited number of
ex post studies have investigated carbon leakage in relation to the EU ETS.
So far, these studies have not revealed any statistical evidence of carbon leakage
and losses in competitiveness for heavy industries in the EU ETS. A first strand of
literature is based on firm level data. Zachman et al. (2011), using amatching pro-
cedure between regulated and unregulated firms, found no evidence that the ETS
affected companies’ profits; a result that was confirmed by additional studies: Pet-
rick and Wagner (2014) with German firms and Chan et al. (2013) with cement
and steel firms. (Dechezleprêtre et al., 2014), using data from the Carbon Dis-
closure Project, found no evidence that the EU ETS has induced a displacement
of carbon emissions from Europe towards the rest of the world. A second strand
of literature is based on international trade. Studying the impact of carbon price
on trade flows, several studies foundnoevidenceof competitiveness-drivenopera-
tional leakage for the different sectors at risk of the EUETS: aluminium (Reinaud,
2008; Sartor, 2013; Ellerman et al., 2010; Quirion, 2011), oil refining (Lacombe,
2008), cement and steel (Ellermanet al., 2010;Quirion, 2011). These results con-
trast with ex ante studies, generally with CGEmodels (Böhringer et al., 2012) but
also with sectoral partial equilibrium models (Monjon and Quirion 2011) that
forecast an aggregated carbon leakage ratio in a range of 5% to 25% (Chapter 2)
and even more with studies devoted to the cement and steel sectors, which con-
clude to a leakage ratio in a range of 20% to 60% (BCG, 2008; Oikonomou et al.,
2006; Demailly and Quirion, 2006). In most ex ante studies, leakage is partly due
to operational leakage and partly to investment leakage. However some studies
only assess operational leakage and yet find a significant leakage, including the
study devoted to the cement sector by Demailly and Quirion (2006), who find
a leakage ratio of around 50%.
Our work goes beyond the above-mentioned studies on several points. First,
more data is available as the EU ETS has entered its third phase after eight years
of functioning. Second, we introduce a newvariable as a proxy for demandoutside
the EU, which improves the explanatory power of the econometric model. Third,
93
the estimated equations are based on a structural economic model. Finally, we
use several time-series regression techniques, which improves the robustness of
the results.
3.2 Industry contexts
Cement and steel are both heavy industries affected by the EU ETS. They are the
two largest CO2 emitters among European manufacturing sectors, representing
10% and 9% respectively of the allowance allocations in the EU ETS (Trotignon,
2012). However they rankdifferently along the twodimensions generally retained
for assessing whether a sector is at risk of carbon leakage, i.e. carbon intensity
and openness to international trade (Hourcade et al., 2007; Juergens et al., 2013).
Cement is very carbon-intensive but only moderately open to international trade
while steel features lower carbon intensity but higher trade openness.
3.2.1 Cement
Calcination of limestone and burning of fossil fuel (mainly coal and petroleum
coke) to heat material at high temperature make the cement manufacturing pro-
cess very carbon-intensive (around 0.65 tonnes of CO2 per tonne
3). Cement pro-
duction embodies 5% of worldwide emissions (IEA, 2009).
The raw material of cement, limestone, is present in abundant quantities all
over the world. Moreover, the value per tonne of cement is relatively low. Be-
cause of these two features, cement is produced in virtually all countries around
the world and is onlymoderately traded internationally (only 3.8% of cement was
traded internationally in 2011 (ICR, 2012)). China represents the lion’s share of
cement consumption and production around the world, due to the large scale de-
velopments and infrastructure build-up projects that the Chinese government is
undertaking. In 2011, 57% of the 3.6 billion tonnes of cement were produced in
China, and the second country producer, India, was far behind with 6% of world
production (ICR, 2012).
3source: WBCSD, Getting the Numbers Right database, accessed December 2013
(http://wbcsdcement.org/index.php/key-issues/climate-protection/
gnr-database).
94
Cement is a sector where international competition is low (Selim and Salem,
2010). Because of low value per tonne andmarket concentration, important price
differences remain even within Europe (Ponssard and Walker, 2008). Prices are
higher andproducers havemoremarket power inland thannear the coasts because
transportation costs are much lower by sea than by road.
3.2.2 Steel
Steel is produced either from iron ore and coal using the Blast Furnace - Basic
OxygenFurnaces (BOF) route, for around70%ofworld production, or from steel
scrap in Electric Arc Furnaces (EAF), for 29%ofworld production in 2011 (WSA,
2012). The BOF process is roughly five times more carbon-intensive than the
EAF but the share of the latter is limited by scrap availability. Steel is very carbon-
intensive and accounts for 6% of worldwide emissions (Carbon Trust, 2011b).
Like cement but to a lesser extent, China embodiesmost of theworld steel con-
sumption and production: 45% of the 1,518 million tonnes of 2011 world pro-
duction (followed by the EUwith 12%). Steel has a much higher value-added per
tonne than cement (roughly ten times more) and is thus more widely traded. In
2011, 31% of finished steel products were internationally traded (WSA, 2012).
Steel prices, aremorehomogenous than cement prices and steel futures are sold
even on the LondonMetal Stock exchange. International competition is higher in
steel than in cement (Ecorys, 2008).
3.3 Methodology and data
Our goal is to study the impact of carbon price on competitiveness-driven opera-
tional leakage, at a geographically aggregated level (European Union versus the
rest of the world) for two sectors “deemed to be exposed at risk of carbon leak-
age”: cement and steel. If carbon leakage occurs, it is through the trade of these
carbon intensive products. An indicator of carbon leakage is then a change in in-
ternational trade flows (measured by net imports, i.e. imports minus exports).
The short termdynamics of typical cement and steel plant opens the possibility
of operational leakage. Indeed, although fixed cost are important, they only rep-
resent a minority of total cost: around 11% in the cement sector (BCG (2008) p.
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Table 3.1: Summary characteristics of the two sectors. Sources: (WCA, 2011;
WSA, 2012; ICR, 2012; CWR, 2011; Carbon Trust, 2011a; Holmes et al., 2011)
Cement Steel
% ofWorld GHG emissions 5% 6%
Carbon intensity1 0.6-0.8 2-4 (BOF)
0.2-0.9 (EAF)
World Production2 3,600 1,514
Top Producer (2011) China (57%) China (47%)
Other Main Producers EU27, India EU27, Japan, US
Bulkiness ($/tonne) 45-150 500-800
Trade intensity3 3.8% (2011) 31.4% (2011)
Market concentration4 25% 27.5%
Largest Company Lafarge ArcelorMittal
(2011 - % production) 5% 6.4%
International competition Low Moderate
1 Tonnes of CO2 per tonne of output
2 2011. Million tonnes
3 % of world production traded internationally
4 Top 10 companies’ share in production
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13), 21% for the basic oxygen furnace steel production route and 7% for the elec-
tric arc furnace steel production route (Schumacher and Sands (2007) p. 813).
This allowsmanyplants to be operatedwell below their nominal capacity (in prac-
tice, plants can be operated only during a part of the year and mothballed for the
rest of the year). In 2011, 37% of installations in the cement sector and 28% of
blast furnaces in the steel sector had emissions between 10% and 75% of their his-
torical emissions level4, indicating that they were still in operation, but well below
their nominal capacity.
3.3.1 Analytical model
We build the simplest possible model capable of featuring carbon leakage. Indus-
tries of two regions, e (Europe) and r (rest of theworld) are in perfect competition.
Therefore the price in each region is equal to themarginal cost. This perfect com-
petition may seem a bold hypothesis, especially for the cement sector, which, in
at least some countries, is rather concentrated. However, introducing imperfect
competition would significantly complicate the model without necessarily bring-
ing new insights. For example, Cournot competition may reduce the sensitivity
of net imports to a price asymmetry and thus leakage, but the results would then
become very sensitive to the shape of the demand curve (Demailly and Quirion,
2008).
There is no product differentiation. This assumption, like perfect competition,
is chosen for the sake of simplicity. Moreover, we neglect transportation costs
for two reasons. First, their introduction would hinder the ability to produce a
simple equation to estimate. Second, the estimation of the model with transport
costs causes problems of endogeneity (net imports of cement and steel are drivers
of shipping costs). Finally, we assume fixed demand, i.e. world demand is not
dependent on world price p.
We assume that in region e (Europe), the firm chooses the production level qe
4Capacity utilization rates are not publicly available, but the European Union Transaction
Log (http://ec.europa.eu/environment/ets/napMgt.do) provides, for each installa-
tion covered by the EU ETS, annual emissions and a “historical emissions level” (the median of
emissions over 2005-2008 or over 2009-2010, whichever is the highest). Since short-term abate-
ment is limited for a given plant, these data can be used to proxy the evolution of production at the
installation level, hence of the capacity utilization rate.
97
to maximise its profit i.e. its turnover minus production costs (which we assume
linear-quadratic with cie the intercept and cse the slope) plus the value of the free
emission allowances, allocated in a quantity ae which the form cannot influence.
5
The linear part of the cost function includes an extra cost due to the climate pol-
icy (CO2Cost), assumed strictly proportional to production. CO2Cost includes the
carbon cost times specific emissions plus the abatement cost (if any) per unit pro-
duced.
max
qe
πe = pqe   (cieqe + cse
2
q2e + CO2Costqe) + CO2Costae (3.1)
Taking the first-order conditionand solving forpbrings the inverse supply func-
tion in Europe:
p = cie + CO2Cost + cseqe (3.2)
The free allocation ae does not appear in the supply function. Since firms max-
imise their profit and since allowances are distributed independently of their cur-
rent decisions, their production level is unaffected by the quantity of allowances
they receive for free, if any. More free allowances entail more profit (equation
(3.1)), but not more production (equation (3.2)). Yet, a higher CO2 price yields
to a lower production, for a given output price level.
In the rest of the world (region r), firms follow the same programwithout CO2
price or allowances, and with different cost parameters.
max
qr
πr = pqr   (cirqr + csr
2
q2r ) (3.3)
and the inverse supply function is then
p = cir + csrqr (3.4)
in the rest of the world, where qe and qr are the productions in regions e and r,
CO2Cost the carbon cost times specific emissions plus the abatement cost per unit
5Note that if allocation were proportional to current production (output-based allocation, the
pros and cons of which are discussed in Quirion (2009)), it would enter the supply function, but
this is not the allocation method retained in the EU ETS.
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produced, if any, cie and cse (respectively cir and csr) parameters of the production
cost in Europe (respectively the rest of the world).
Trade occurs between the two regions, and we note qm the net imports from
region r to region e. The demands in regions e and r are :
de = qe + qm (3.5)
dr = qr   qm (3.6)
cse(3.5) - csr(3.6) leads to:
(cse + csr)qm = csede   csrdr   cseqe + csrqr (3.7)
Using (3.2) and (3.4) to substitute cseqe and csrqr respectively, and dividing by
(cse + csr)we finally obtain:
qm =
cie   cir
cse + csr
+
1
cse + csr
CO2Cost +
cse
cse + csr
de +
 csr
cse + csr
dr (3.8)
3.3.2 Estimated equation
A reformulation of (3.8) is:
NImpCement;t = αCCO2pricet 3 + βCConsEU;t 3
+ γCIndBRICS;t 3 + constC + "C;t
(3.9)
for cement, and
NImpSteel;t = αSCO2pricet 3 + βSIndEU;t 3
+ γSIndBRICS;t 3 + constS + "S;t
(3.10)
for steel, where αC, βC, γC, αS, βS, and γS are the coefficients to be estimated while
"C;t and "S;t are the residuals, which we assume to be IID, that is later to be tested.
The variables are (the source of the data will be detailed in section 3.3.4):
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• Net imports (NImp), or imports minus exports, for each of the two sectors,
between the EU27 and the rest of the World. This is the predicated vari-
able, and a proxy for operational leakage. The choice of the geographical
delimitation (EU27) is not trivial. Indeed in 2007, the two new member
states, Bulgaria and Romania, joined the EU ETS. One year later, the EU
ETSwelcomedNorway, IcelandandLiechtenstein, countries not in theEu-
ropean Union. As the purpose of this chapter is to study the impact of the
EU ETS on competitiveness and leakage, another option was to consider
an EU ETS geographical coverage changing over time. This would have
posed econometric problems since it would have introduced shocks in the
time series. Since these five countries do not produce a significant share of
European production, we judge that it was a preferable option not to take
these changes into account.
• CO2 price. This is the main regression variable. In the presence of opera-
tional leakage due to losses in competitiveness, a positive relationship is ex-
pected. Indeed, a high carbonpricewould induce an increase in theproduc-
tion cost of European products, a loss of market share of European indus-
tries vis-à-vis their foreign competitors, and an increase in net imports. We
consider theEUA futureprices (moredetails on the series is given in section
3.3.4) rather than spot prices because due to the banking restrictions im-
plemented between 2007 and 2008 (Alberola and Chevallier, 2009), spot
prices showanon-reliablebehaviorduringPhase I.Creti et al. (2012);Bredin
andMuckley (2011); Conrad et al. (2012) use the future price for the same
reason.
• EUindustrial output,EUconstruction index andBRICS industrial output (IndEU,
ConsEU and IndBRICS). The industrial output is a proxy for the industrial
economic activity and therefore the demand side (either domestic or for-
eign). For cement, we used the European construction index instead of
the European industrial output to proxy the demand as construction is the
main outlet for cement. We did not find a satisfactory construction index
for the BRICS so we used the industrial output for both steel and cement.
An increase in local demand is expected to increase the demand of imports
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and reduce production capacities available for exports. We therefore expect
a positive (respectively negative) relation for the European (respectively
BRICS) industrial output. We chose to focus on BRICS countries instead
of taking an aggregated industrial production index for the rest of the world
because to our knowledge such a global index does not exist. Moreover,
BRICS countries are the engine of global economic growth: from 8% in
1999, they represented in 2011 20% or the world’s GDP. The consump-
tion of cement and steel in BRICS countries (and especially in China) has
soared over the last decade. They are not the major destination of EU27
steel exports; however, they are the origin of a noticeable part of EU27 ce-
ment and steel imports (China andRussia for steel, China for cement espe-
cially between 2005 and 2008) as well as cement exports recently (Russia
and Brazil).
To take into account the fact that the potential effect of carbon price on net im-
ports is not instantaneous but necessitates some time (time between production
and sale), we introduce a lag in the dependent variables. We select a lag of three
months since it brings the best fit,6 as measured by the usual indicators.7
3.3.3 Econometrical techniques
Two aspects are potential barriers to the validity of econometric estimations: en-
dogeneity and the issue of autocorrelation of residuals, since we work on time se-
ries data.
First let us consider the thorny issue of endogeneity. It is necessary that vari-
ables aimed at explaining the variations of net imports be truly exogenous to val-
idate our econometrical modeling. Such would not be the case if the net imports
of cement or steel impacted these explanatory variables. Cement and steel sectors
each stand for less than 10% of the covered emissions in the EU ETS. As most of
the production is consumedwithin the EU, variations in net imports inducemuch
less important production variations. It is therefore highly likely that variations in
net imports do not affect the carbon price.
6The results are robust to a change in the lag (from 1 to 5 months), except for cement in the
ARIMA regressions. These results are available upon request.
7R2 for the Prais-Winsten regression and the AIC for the ARIMA regression.
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Another source of endogeneity would be that an omitted variable would im-
pact both ourmain regression variable, theCO2 price, and the predicated variable.
Among the price determinants of the carbon price one can cite the economic ac-
tivity (which is in the regression with IndEU orConsEU), political decisions, energy
prices (mainly coal and gas8) and unexpected weather variations9 (Alberola et al.,
2008; Hintermann, 2010). It seems unlikely that political decisions related to the
EU ETS and unexpected weather variations would impact net imports of cement
and steel otherwise than potentially through carbon price. Energy prices affect
production costs but we suppose that the effect is the same for production outside
Europe because prices are determined on a global scale for coal and petcoke, the
main energy carriers used for cement and steel production. Therefore, the effect
would be compensated between imports and exports.
A simple linear regression would give spurious results because of a strong auto-
correlation of error terms, as inmany time series data. As the AugmentedDickey-
Fuller test shows, all time series are I(1), as we cannot reject the hypothesis of
a unit root for the time series but we can for their first difference (see results in
appendix 3.6). To treat the question of autocorrelation of residuals, we use two
different methods. The first one is the Prais-Winsten estimation, which is an im-
provement of the Cochrane-Orchutt algorithm.10 The second one is the classi-
cally used model in time series analysis, the ARIMA(p,1,q) model. We identified
the ARIMA(p,1,q) process that suits each dependent variable by following the
Box and Jenkins methodology and found ARIMA(5,1,3) and ARIMA(6,1,4) for
cement and steel respectively. We used the Ljung-Box-Pierce test (which will be
explained in further detail in part 3.4.2) to evaluate the results.
8An increase in coal price (resp. gas price) makes this source of energy less attractive for elec-
tricity production. Therefore the emissions are lower (resp. higher) than expected and the carbon
price decreases (resp. increases).
9Because unexpected cold waves and heat waves generally induce the use of very carbon inten-
sive power plants.
10In a series of recent articles, McCallum (2010), Kolev (2011) and Zhang (2013) have con-
cluded that most so-called “spurious regression” problems are solved by applying the traditional
methods of autocorrelation correction, like the iterated Cochrane-Orchutt procedure (Cochrane
and Orcutt, 1949). However, other authors, including Martínez-Rivera and Ventosa-Santaulària
(2012), Sollis (2011) and Ventosa-Santaularia (2012), have argued that these procedures do not
always avoid spurious regressions and propose to pre-test the data and first-differentiate them if
they appear to be I(1). Hence we apply both methods in this chapter.
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Longer time series givemore robust estimations, but including the carbon price
for the period 1999-2012 would give spurious results, since there is a break in the
time series (this variable is at zero during 1999-2005, then positive). We per-
formed the first regression to have a most robust estimation of net imports de-
pending on local and foreign demand. Then we undertook a second regression
for the period 2005-2012 including the carbon price. Comparing the results al-
lows assessing whether the previous estimation is robust in time and examining
the effect of adding a carbon price.
3.3.4 Data
All the data are monthly from January 1999 to December 2012 (168 points), ex-
cept for the carbon future prices taken from April 2005 to December 2012 (93
points).
• Net imports of cement and steel of EU27. Eurostat international tradedatabase11.
For cement we take clinker into account, as this semi-finished product is
more prone to carbon leakage. For steel, we consider iron and steel in the
broad sense, which includes pig iron and semi-finished steel products. The
original values in100kgare converted intoMt/year (with the formula1Mt/year=833333.3
100kg/month).
• CO2 price. The ICE database
12 provides daily carbon prices beginning on
22 April 2005. To provide a robust price signal, without the effect of bank-
ing restrictions for the year 2007, carbon price data of phase I is excluded
and the December 2008 futures contract is used throughout the phase I of
the scheme until December 14th, 2008. Then, for each day between De-
cember 15th of year X-1 andDecember 14th of year X, we take futures con-
tracts of maturity December 15th of year X. Daily values are then averaged
to obtain monthly values from April 2005 to December 2012.
11EU27Trade Since 1988 byHS2, 4, 6 andCN8 dataset (extracted in April 2013). The respec-
tive codes for cement and steel are 2523 (cement, including clinker, whether or not coloured) and
72 (iron and steel).
12http://data.theice.com
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• EU industrial output and EU construction index. Eurostat database.13 They
are both normalized at 2005=100.
• BRICS industrial output. Several steps were necessary to compute this in-
dex. First, for Brazil, Russia, India and South Africa, the productions in
total manufacturing (normalized at 2005=100), were available on the Fed-
eral Reserve of Saint Louis Economic Research website14 derived from the
OECDMain Economic Indicators database. China’s published industrial
statistics are far frombeing open and the scattered available data are confus-
ing (with changes in variables, in coverage, in measurement, and in presen-
tation). Holtz (2013) reviewed the available official data and constructed
a monthly industrial output series. Monthly industrial output (economy-
wide constant price) was taken from this paper for the years 1999 to 2011,
and extended for the year 2012 thanks to online data15 giving an annual
increase rate of industrial output everymonth. The obtained data are cycli-
cal: the industrial production is at its highest in December and at its lowest
in January and February. We regress the log of this industrial output over
time andmonthly dummies to estimate seasonal factors, then we withdraw
these factors from the original data to obtain a seasonally adjusted Chinese
industrial output (which we normalize at 2005=100). Finally, the BRICS
industrial output is the weighted mean of national industrial outputs (the
weights are the 2005 GDP16).
3.4 Results
3.4.1 Descriptive statistics
Future EUA price (see Figure 3.1) oscillated between 20 and 27 euros from June
2005 to June 2006. Then it fell just below 15 euros in the beginning of year 2007
13Production in industry and Production in construction- monthly data (extracted in April
2013).
14http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/
15http://www.tradingeconomics.com/china/industrial-production
16United Nations (http://unstats.un.org/unsd/snaama/dnltransfer.asp?
fID=2)
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Table 3.2: Summary statistics of the regression variables
Variable Obs Mean Std dev Min (date) Max (date)
NImpCement 168 0.19 7.34 -17.95 Jun 2012 19.57 Mar 2007
NImpSteel 168 -0.35 13.07 -26.56 Aug 2012 35.62 Jan 2007
CO2price 93 16.49 5.47 6.79 May 2012 28.09 Apr 2006
ConsEU 168 97.10 5.83 84.16 Feb 2012 110.44 Feb 2008
IndEU 168 99.86 5.52 89.67 Apr 2009 113.10 Jan 2008
IndBRICS 168 113.38 35.51 63.18 Feb 1999 178.46 Dec 2012
Obs=Observations Std dev=Standard deviation
Figure 3.1: CO2 allowance price used in the regression
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to get back to its original range of values at the end of the same year. In 2008, the
EUA future price rose to exceed 25 euros, then fell during the financial crisis down
to 10 euros in June 2009. The following two years (until June 2011), the carbon
price stabilized between 13 and 16 euros. It fell around 6-7 euros six months later
for several reasons (duration of the economic crisis in Europe due to the sovereign
debt crisis, interaction with other energy efficiency or renewable climate policies
reducing the demand, increasing of allowances), and remained at this price for the
year 2012.
The net imports of cement (see Figure 3.2) increasingly rose from 1999 to
reach a peak in March 2007 at 20 Mtonnes per year then continuously fell with
a recent severe collapse at the beginning of 2012. In 2009, the EU became a net
exporter of cement whereas it was a net importer from 2001 to 2007.
The steel net imports (see Figure 3.3) oscillated at around zero from 1999 to
2005, then the EUbecame a net importer from2005 to 2008. Net imports peaked
in summer 2007, with 33 Mtonnes per year then collapsed the same year. After a
rebound up to 20Mtonnes per year, the steel net imports fell during the economic
crisis. Since then, with the exception of the beginning of 2011, the EU has been a
net exporter of steel.
At first sight, cement and steel net imports and the carbon price do not seem
highly correlated. The twohigh carbon price periods (2005-2006 and 2008)most
of the time did not coincide with high net imports. On the contrary, for these two
products, net imports reached their peak in 2007, while the spot carbon price was
very low. Still, itwas also a timeof intense industrial activity inEurope, aparameter
that is taken into account in the regression.
TheEU industrial output (see Figure 3.4) increased slightly from1999 to 2008,
then collapsed during the economic recession (by about 20% in six months to go
back to its level 10 years before). After a rebound until 2011 without reaching its
pre-crisis level, it fell a second time. The EU construction index is very similar,
except it plummeted less sharply during the financial crisis, though it never recov-
ered. The BRICS industrial output presents some differences. First, contrary to
the EU industrial output, which did not change significantly between 1999 and
2012, the BRICS industrial output almost tripled during the same period. Also
hit by the global financial crisis, it took only a year to get back to its pre-crisis
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(a) Cement net imports in the EU27
(b) First difference of the cement net imports data series
Figure 3.2: Net Imports (Imports minus Exports) of Cement in the EU27
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(a) Steel net imports in the EU27
(b) First difference of the steel net imports data series
Figure 3.3: Net Imports (Imports minus Exports) of Steel in the EU27
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Figure 3.4: Demand indicator variables used in the regression
level. Contrary to its European equivalent, it has grown steadily since then. Year
2011marked adiscrepancy in industrial activities betweenEurope and theBRICS.
Whereas the EU was getting bogged down in a deep economic and industrial re-
cession, the BRICS manufacturing industries were flourishing. For econometric
considerations, as the two series before 2011 were much better correlated, this
outcome is also of interest to prevent an identification problem.
3.4.2 Regression results
The results are visible in Tables 3.3 and 3.5 for the ARIMA estimations,17 and in
Tables 3.4 and 3.6 for the Prais-Winsten estimations. We recall that for each sec-
tor, two estimations are performed, one without the carbon price, for the period
1999-2012, and one with the carbon price for the period 2005-2012 (see section
3.3.3). Comparing the results with the second regression makes it possible to ex-
amine the impact of adding a carbon price.
For the Prais-Winsten estimations, we give the value of R2 and the Durbin-
Watson test (which is close to 2 if there is no autocorrelation in the residuals)
before and after transformation. In all the Prais-Winsten regressions, the Durbin-
Watson tests validate that the residuals are not autocorrelated.
For the ARIMA regressions, the quality of the regressions is assessed with the
17For simplicity we do not display the values of the constant term and the ARIMA terms. More
detailed results are available upon request.
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log-likelihood, the Schwartz and Akaike information criterions (SIC and AIC),
and several diagnostic tests for which we report p-values: the Ljung-Box-Pierce
statistic (Q test) with a maximum number of lags of 40, the Breusch-Godfrey au-
tocorrelation test, the Engle ARCH test, the Chow break test at time 2005M09
(splitting the full-sample in two sub-samples) and the RESET specification test
(against squared estimate alternative).
The null hypothesis in the Ljung-Box-Pierce and Breusch-Godfrey tests is that
the observed correlations in the residuals are just a result of randomness. The crit-
ical region for rejection of the null hypothesis is when the statistics is higher than
the α-quantile of a chi-squared distribution. If we take α = 5%, the model is val-
idated if the p-value is higher than 5%, though a higher p-value indicates that the
model is a better fit. All models (cement and steel) appear to be well specified
in terms of absence of autocorrelation following this inspection of the residuals’
properties. Futher, we accept the null hypothesis of no ARCH effect, the variance
is homoskedastic for both the cement and steel models. There is then no further
need to investigate the volatility dynamics, which is an intuitive result since we
work with monthly data. In addition, the coefficients are stable in all models ac-
cording to the Chow break test. Finally, for both the cement and steel models, the
linear functional form specified in the chapter appears adequate according to the
Ramsey RESET specification test.
For cement, in regression (1) in Table 3.3, bothConsEU;t 3 and IndBRICS;t 3 are
significant, at the 5% and 1% levels respectively. Hence, we verify that indicators
of local and foreign demand carry explanatory power in cement net imports. In-
deed, an increase in local demand is expected to increase the demand of imports
and reduce production capacities available for exports.18 In ourmodel, an increase
of 10 points in local demand19 would induce an increase of about 3million tonnes
of net imports per year. Moreover, we notice that the signs of the estimated coef-
ficients ofConsEU;t 3 and IndBRICS;t 3 conform to the theoretical model (equation
(3.8)). TheLjung-Box-Pierce test validates that the residuals of regression (1) are
18When carrying Prais-Winsten regressions for imports and exports separately instead of just
net imports (results available upon request), we observe that the signs of the demand coefficients
still conform to predictions. An increase in local demand induces an increase of imports and a
decrease of exports (and the other way around for foreign demand).
19The demand was normalized at 100 in 2005.
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not autocorrelated.
The coefficients ofConsEU;t 3 and IndBRICS;t 3 in regression (2) are very similar
to the coefficients of regression (1), and statistically significant at the 5% level.
This similarity indicates that the relationship between the cement net imports and
local and foreign demand is robust. CO2pricet 3 is not statistically significant :
the carbon price has no impact on the cement net import variations. The results
of (1)bis and (2)bis in Table 3.4 are close to the results of (1) and (2), which is
reassuring for the robustness of the results. The coefficients, except for the carbon
price, are all significant at the 1% level.
For steel (regression (3) in Table 3.5), IndEU;t 3 is significant at the 1% level,
but IndBRICS;t 3 is not statistically significant. For the steel sector, only the local
demand carries explanatory power.20 The impact of the local demand is bigger in
the steel industry than in the cement industry21 compared to the cement net im-
ports: an increase of 10 points in local demand would lead to an increase of about
9 million tonnes in net imports per year. As for cement, the similarity between
the results of the two periods implies that the relationship between the steel net
imports, local and foreign demand is robust. Similarly to the cement industry, the
coefficient of the carbon price CO2pricet 3 is not statistically significant.
3.4.3 Robustness and sensitivity analysis
To further assess the robustness of the results presented in Tables 3.3 and 3.5 for
cement and steel, respectively, we conduct a recursive analysis. Consider the cu-
mulative sum of T  τ recursive residuals (Brown et al., 1975):
Wt =
tX
j=τ+1
wj
σ^w
(3.11)
20Except for the 1999-2012 period for the Prais-Winsten estimation.
21The approximate size of cement net imports are a bit more than half as large as steel net im-
ports (see Table 3.2), but the estimated coefficient for local demand (approximated by EU con-
struction or industrial indexes, both around 100) is three times larger.
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Table 3.3: Regression estimations. Cement Net Import. ARIMA regressions
Cement
1999-2012 2005-2012
(1) (2)
ConsEU;t 3 0.298** 0.367**
(0.125) (0.155)
IndBRICS;t 3 -0.344*** -0.288**
(0.0998) (0.125)
CO2pricet 3 -0.0468
(0.141)
N 164 89
Loglikelihood -387.06 -209.61
AIC 798.12 445.22
BIC 835.32 477.57
Ljung-Box-Pierce test for white noise residuals
Ljung-Box-Pierce Test Statistic p-value 0.91 0.86
Breusch-Godfrey autocorrelation test
LMTest Statistic p-value 0.13 0.22
Engle ARCH test
LMTest Statistic p-value 0.61 0.10
Chow test for a breakpoint at 2005M09
Chow Test Statistic p-value 0.33
Ramsey RESET Specification test (against squared estimates alternative)
Ramsey RESET Test Statistic p-value 0.41 0.62
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Table 3.4: Regression estimations. Cement Net Import. Prais-Winsten regres-
sions
Cement
1999-2012 2005-2012
(1) bis (2) bis
ConsEU;t 3 0.580*** 0.432***
(0.102) (0.127)
IndBRICS;t 3 -0.100*** -0.240***
(0.0220) (0.0499)
CO2pricet 3 -0.0402
(0.151)
N 165 90
Adjusted R2 0.25 0.44
R2 0.26 0.46
ρ 0.71 0.71
DW (original) 0.75 0.67
DW (transformed) 2.34 2.19
where t = τ + 1; : : : ;T and
σ^2w =
1
T  τ
TX
j=τ+1
w2j (3.12)
By construction, Wt is a cumulated sum which varies with t. Under the null
hypothesis of stability of the coefficients,Wt belongs to the interval [ Lt; Lt]:
Lt =
a(2t+ T  3τ)p
T  τ (3.13)
with a = 0:948 at the 5% level. The null hypothesis of stability of the coeffi-
cients estimated is rejected graphically ifWt intersects Lt or Lt. When applying
theCUSUMtest to themodels presented inTables 3.3 and3.5,weobtain theplots
reproduced in Figure 3.5. Visual inspection confirms the stability of both coeffi-
cient estimates, which leads us to validate the specifications chosen for the whole
sample of the study. This additional recursive analysis has therefore allowed us to
further harness the goodness-of-fit of the specifications retained in Tables 3.3 and
3.5 for cement and steel, respectively.
We then perform some sensitivity analysis on the Prais-Winstenmodel for both
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Table 3.5: Regression estimations. Steel Net Imports. ARIMA regression
Steel
1999-2012 2005-2012
(3) (4)
IndEU;t 3 1.026*** 0.957***
(0.325) (0.451)
IndBRICS;t 3 0.118 0.132
(0.197) (0.278)
CO2pricet 3 0.444
(0.319)
N 164 89
Loglikelihood -501.15 -278.83
AIC 1022.29 577.66
BIC 1053.29 602.55
Ljung-Box-Pierce test for white noise residuals
Ljung-Box-Pierce Test Statistic p-value 0.10 0.92
Breusch-Godfrey autocorrelation test
LMTest Statistic p-value 0.18 0.28
Engle ARCH test
LMTest Statistic p-value 0.11 0.18
Chow test for a breakpoint at 2005-2012
Chow Test Statistic p-value 0.40
Ramsey RESET Specification test (against squared estimates alternative)
Ramsey RESET Test Statistic p-value 0.99 0.99
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Table 3.6: Regression estimations. Steel Net Import. Prais-Winsten regressions
Steel
1999-2012 2005-2012
(3) bis (4) bis
IndEU;t 3 1.411*** 1.362***
(0.294) (0.386)
IndBRICS;t 3 -0.184*** -0.168
(0.0544) (0.113)
CO2pricet 3 0.553
(0.369)
N 165 90
Adjusted R2 0.13 0.22
R2 0.14 0.24
ρ 0.76 0.75
DW (original) 0.54 0.53
DW (transformed) 2.09 2.11
cement and steel:
• We select a subcategory of cement and steel products which is more prone
to carbon leakage. For cement, we test clinker, the carbon-intensive inter-
mediary product.22 For steel, we test long products23 (in opposition to flat
products which are higher value-added products) and semi-finished prod-
ucts24.
• We use an alternative proxy of foreign demand: the computed China in-
dustrial output.
• We vary the duration of the original lag by testing two months and four
months.
First, a common feature of all these additional regressions is that the carbon
price is never statistically significant. The absence of explanatory power of the
carbon price on net imports is then very robust across all specifications. Second,
variables proxying local and foreign demand remain in most of the cases statisti-
cally significant and with the expected signs.
22Source Eurostat, HS code 252310.
23Source: Eurofer.
24Source: Eurostat and Eurofer.
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(a) Cement (b) Steel
Figure 3.5: CUSUM test for cement and steel
Selecting the subcategories of long and semi-finished steel products givesmore
statistically significant results (higher R-squared), but it is the opposite for clinker.
In addition, semi-finished steel products seem to be more responsive to local de-
mand than long steel products. Further, for both cement and steel, when China
(instead of BRICS) industrial output is used to proxy foreign demand, the abso-
lute value of the foreign demand coefficient is lower, while results are slightlymore
statistically significant. Finally, results remain stable when varying the lag for steel
but for cement, results are only stable when switching to two months.
3.5 Discussion
The relationship between net imports and European or foreign demand that was
predictedby the analyticmodel is confirmedby the empirical analysis. An increase
in local (respectively foreign) demand increases (respectively decreases) net im-
ports. The fit is particularly good for the cement industry and a little less so for the
steel industry. Furthermore, our empiricalmodel does not support the hypothesis
that a high carbon price would induce an increase in net imports. For cement and
steel, the coefficient of the carbon price has no explanatory power on net imports,
even though the CO2 price has exceeded 20 euros for more than two years during
the studied period.
Although based on a longer time series and more elaborate econometric tech-
niques, this empirical work draws the same conclusion as the previous empirical
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literature (Reinaud, 2008; Lacombe, 2008; Sartor, 2013; Ellerman et al., 2010;
Quirion, 2011), which is that the EU ETS has not induced operational carbon
leakage.
Some may argue that, because these industries have benefitted from a large
over-allocation of allowances during this period, the risk of operational carbon
leakage was null. Yet, as long as the allowances are allocated independently of
current output, the operator of an installation may reduce emissions (by increas-
ing the CO2 efficiency of its production process or by reducing the output level)
in order to sell allowances even though he has received more allowances than its
emissions (Montgomery, 1972; Quirion, 2009). This is why, in the simple model
presented in section 3.3.1 and in richermodels aswell (e.g. Goulder et al. (2010)),
the amount of allowances freely allocated (if any) impacts the profit level but not
the output level. Numerous studies in experimental economics validated the the-
oretical equivalence between auctioning and grandfathering (Goeree et al., 2010;
Wråke et al., 2010; Camacho-Cuena et al., 2012; Grimm and Ilieva, 2013). Fur-
ther, evidence of positive pass-through rate of the carbonprice providedby econo-
metric studies (mostly in the power sector (Sijm et al., 2006), but also in some
manufacturing sectors (Alexeeva-Talebi, 2011; De Bruyn et al., 2010)) was an
indirect proof that companies took into account the full cost of free allowances:
when setting their output price, companies included the value of CO2 emissions
in their products’ marginal cost, even though they received for free approximately
enough allowances to cover their emissions.
Hence, if one considers that companies behave as profit-maximisers, the over-
allocation of allowances should not have an influence on operational leakage.25
The outcome of this study (no operational carbon leakage) is then far from trivial.
It involves that in the price range that has been experienced for CO2 (below 30
euros per ton), operational carbon leakage is not a serious threat for the energy-
intensive industries.
This result applies in theory regardless of the allowances balance. In practice,
no shortage of allowances is likely to occur until at least 2020: cement and steel
25As long as the allocation of free allowances is independent from the current production level
(which is the case under theEU-ETS for phases I and II), otherwise itwould impact the production
level of firms.
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companies have banked a significant surplus of allowances,26 and they will still
benefit from over-allocation in phase III unless demand goes back to pre-crisis
levels.27 Thus auctioning a part of the allowances currently freely allocated to
these sectorswouldnot entail carbon leakagewhile itwouldbringpublic revenues,
whichwouldbewelcomeespecially considering thepublic debt facedbymanyEu-
ropean countries.
However, the impact of the EUETSon investment leakage, which corresponds
to changes in production capacities as the result of the EU’s climate policy, is still
an open question. Indeed, since 2013 (the start of the EU ETS third phase), less
allowances are allocated if current production falls through a threshold: 50% (re-
spectively 25% and 0%) of the otherwise planed allocation if production falls be-
low 50% (respectively 25% and 10%) of its historical emissions level. Moreover,
allowances are allocated for newproduction capacities and for capacity extensions
(Chapter 5). Thus free allowances might mitigate carbon leakage through an im-
pact on the production capacity in Europe, rather than through operational deci-
sions. This question could be investigated using foreign direct investment data as
in the original pollution haven literature. Pending such investigation, we cannot
conclude that free allocation should be scrapped, even though carbon leakage is
presented as the main argument to maintain them.
References
Aichele, R. andFelbermayr, G. (2012). Kyoto and the carbon footprint of nations.
Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 63(3):336.
Alberola, E. and Chevallier, J. (2009). European Carbon Prices and Banking Re-
26Based on EUTL data at the installation level, we estimate the allowances surplus in the be-
ginning of year 2014 at respectively two and two and a half years worth of pre-crisis emissions for
the cement and the steel sector. If we suppose that companies have sold half of this surplus to
acquire liquidities, they still have more than one year worth of emissions in banked allowances,
corresponding to ten years facing a 10% allowances shortage.
27Allocation in phase III is based on a stringent benchmark and a cross sectoral correction fac-
tor, but multiplied by a historical activity level (HAL), which corresponds roughly to pre-crisis
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3.6 Appendix
Table 3.9: Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) tests for unit root
1999-2012 2005-2012
Test Statistic p-value Test Statistic p-value
NImpCement -2.527 0.1091 -1.441 0.5627
4NImpCement -18.849 0.0000 -13.185 0.0000
NImpSteel -2.881 0.0477 -1.777 0.3918
4NImpSteel -14.655 0.0000 -10.448 0.0000
IndEU -1.709 0.4266 -0.938 0.7752
4IndEU -11.065 0.0000 -6.793 0.0000
IndBRICS 0.730 0.9904 -0.578 0.8759
4IndBRICS -17.279 0.0000 -12.159 0.0000
ConsEU -1.425 0.5702 -0.739 0.8364
4ConsEU -18.429 0.0000 -13.467 0.0000
CO2price -1.098 0.7158
4CO2price -7.966 0.0000
The ADFmodel specified is model with constant
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4
Reaping the carbon rent: Abatement
and overallocation profits in the
European cement industry, insights
from an LMDI decomposition analysis
Cement is the most widely-used man-made material in the world (Moya et al.,
2010), and also one of the most carbon-intensive products. The manufacture of
cement accounts for approximately 5% of global anthropogenic emissions (IEA,
2009). China has the lion’s share of cement production with 58% of the 3,700
million tons produced in 2012. The European Union is now the third-biggest
producer with 5% of global production, behind India with 7% (U.S. Geological
Survey, 2013).
Since 2005 European cement emissions have been covered by the European
Union Emission Trading Scheme (EU ETS), presented as Europe’s flagship pol-
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icy to tackle climate change (Branger et al., 2015). In this cap-and-trade system,
installations can buy or sell tradable allowances to attain emissions caps. A key fea-
ture of the EU ETS, the question of whether allowances should be auctioned or
received freeof charge (and in the latter case, what shouldbe the allocationplan, or
the number of allowances per installation), has proved to be a very controversial
topic (Boemare and Quirion, 2002; Ellerman and Buchner, 2007). While most
economists favored auctioning, the EuropeanUnion opted for almost completely
free allocation for all sectors (industry and power sector) during phase I (2005-
2007) and phase II (2008-2012); and maintained completely free (but declining
at 1.74%per year) allocations1 in phase III (2013-2020) for sectors “deemed to be
exposed to carbon leakage”, and partly free for the rest of manufacturing industry
(European Commission, 2009).
Indeed, the main argument used to justify free allocation has been the preser-
vation of heavy industries’ competitiveness and the prevention of carbon leak-
age, which is a shift of emissions from carbon-constraint countries to less carbon-
constrainedcountries inducedbyasymmetric carbonpricing (Dröge, 2009). How-
ever, economic theory suggests that free allocation, if independent from current
production, is inefficient at preventing leakage in the short term and would only
provide a disincentive to plant relocation (Wooders et al., 2009). In other words,
in the short run free allocations would compensate firms for profitability losses
without addressing market share losses and carbon leakage (Cook, 2011).
In addition to generous allocation caps, the economic downturn after 2008
led to a decrease in industrial production, which generated a large surplus of al-
lowances in the market. These financial assets have mainly been held by cement
and steel companies, because electricity demand has been much less impacted by
the economic downturn.
1Allocations in phase III are based on a product benchmark (the average of the 10% best per-
forming installations: 766kg CO2 per ton of clinker, the CO2-intensive intermediate product re-
quired to produce cement), multiplied by a “cross sectoral correction factor” (0.9422 in 2013,
declining by 1.74% per year), historical activity level (HAL, a formula leading approximately to
pre-crisis level of production), and an “activity level correction factor” (reducing allocations by
half or four if the plant is functioning below 50% or 25% of its HAL). Completely free allocations
are then maintained though the overall cap of allowances is less generous (it has been reduced by
23% between 2012 and 2013) and declining. However because actual production is much lower
than pre-crisis level, 2013 emissions were 20% lower than the cap.
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Instead of suffering from financial losses, energy-intensive industries seem to
have thrived from the scheme. Sandbag, a non-governmental organization, has
estimated that the ten “carbon fat cats” have reaped billions of Euros in windfall
profits (Sandbag, 2010). However, their analysis, based on the European Union
Transaction Log (EUTL) data, is based upon equivalence between allowances
surplus and overallocation, without considering the fact that some allowances are
obtained by reducing the carbon content of industrial products (Ellerman and
Buchner, 2008). Indeed, apart from financial outcomes, an important question
remains: whether the EU ETS has fulfilled its original purpose which was to trig-
ger a transition towards low-carbon industry.
Studies assessing abatement in themanufacturing industryhaveobtainedmixed
results (Neuhoff et al., 2014). Zachman et al. (2011) find a significant reduction
in carbon intensity for basicmetals (whose emissions occurmostly in the steel sec-
tor) and non-metallic minerals (whose emissions occur mostly in the cement sec-
tor) between 2007 and 2008 compared to 2005-2006. Yet (Kettner et al., 2014)
find very limited reduction in carbon intensity in the cement and lime sector, and
attribute most of it to an increase in clinker imports – which implies carbon leak-
age. Moreover Egenhofer et al. (2011) find almost no decrease in themanufactur-
ing industry’s carbon intensity in 2008, which seems to contradict Zachman et al.
(2011) results.
In this chapter, we propose to shed light on the questions of abatement and
overallocation in the European cement industry, exploiting EUTL data, Eurostat
international trade data, and the detailed and comprehensive Getting the Num-
bers Right (GNR) database from the Cement Sustainability Initiative (CSI). We
performanLMDI (LogMeanDivisia Index) decomposition (Ang, 2004) of emis-
sionsdue to cementproduction inEurope. Wemeasure the impactof seveneffects
on emissions variations, which correspond to different mitigation levers: activ-
ity, clinker trade, clinker share, alternative fuel use, thermal and electrical energy
efficiency, and decarbonisation of electricity. This analysis allows us to identify
the key drivers behind changes in aggregated carbon emissions, in the EU 27 as
a whole and in six major European producers: Germany, France, Spain, the UK,
Italy and Poland.
A distinction can be made between the first two effects (activity and clinker
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trade) that generate non-technological abatement and the others that generate
technological abatement. Making assumptions on counterfactual scenarios, we
estimate the technological abatement induced by the EU ETS and break down its
main factors. Furthermore, our emissions decompositionmodel allows us to iden-
tify which part of the allowances surplus (allocations minus emissions) is due to
technological performance and which is due to a change in activity or clinker out-
sourcing. Weare thenable to computeoverallocation and “overallocationprofits”.
We find that the EU ETS has induced a small but positive abatement of 26
Mtons ofCO2 (16Mtons) from2005 to 2012 (corresponding to a 2.2% 1.3%
decrease),mostly thanks to the reduction in the clinker-to-cement ratio. However
we cannot rule out another explanation, i.e. themassive increase in steam coal and
petcoke prices in the 2000s (?). This aggregate figure hides important differences
at national levels. Whereas technological abatement has been important in Ger-
many (5%  3%) and in the UK (4%  3%), it has been small in France, and
insignificant or negative in Spain, Italy and Poland. In addition, we estimate that
the European cement industry has reaped 3.5 billion Euros of overallocation prof-
its during phases I and II.Most of these profits come from the economic downturn
that has reduced the demand for cement and thus for cement production, in turn
generating a massive surplus of allowances.
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows. Section 4.1 details the cement
manufacturing process and the mitigation options. Section 4.2 explains the emis-
sionsdecompositionmethodology. Section4.3 applies this decomposition to changes
in emissions in the European cement industry from 1990 to 2012. Section 4.4 is
an assessment of technological abatement induced by the EU ETS and of overal-
location profits. Section 4.5 concludes.
4.1 Mitigation options in the cement industry
4.1.1 Cement manufacture at a glance
Cement manufacture can be divided into two main steps: clinker manufacture,
and blending and grinding clinker with other material to produce cement.
Clinker is produced by the calcination of limestone in a rotating kiln at 1450
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degrees Celsius. Carbon dioxide is emitted in two ways. First, the chemical reac-
tion releases carbon dioxide (ca. 538 kgCO2 per ton of clinker
2) which accounts
for roughly two thirds of carbon emissions in clinker manufacture. The remain-
ing CO2 comes from the burning of fossil fuel to heat the kiln. The fuels used are
mostly the cheapest ones, petcoke and coal (the use of gas and oil is precluded by
cost, except in some locations where they are very cheap, which is not the case in
the EU).
Rawmaterial preparation, kiln operation, blending and grinding consume elec-
tricitywhich causes indirect emissions. However, nearly all carbonemissions (around
95%) in cement manufacture come from direct emissions in clinker manufacture.
To reduce emissions from cement production,3 various options are thus avail-
able:
(i) Reduction of cement production, which may be due to reduced activity in the
construction industry, to leaner structures or to the substitution of alternativema-
terials to cement.
(ii)Clinker substitution. Since clinker manufacture is themost carbon intensive
part of cement manufacture, partially substituting some other material for clinker
is an efficient way to reduce emissions per ton of cement produced. The most
common type of cement, ordinary Portland cement, is produced by mixing 95%
of clinker and 5%of gypsum, but the clinker-to-cement ratio is lowered in blended
cements.
(iii) Clinker outsourcing. This is a way to reduce emissions within a given ge-
ographical perimeter, but emissions then occur elsewhere, which causes carbon
leakage.
(iv)Alternative fuel use, which releases less CO2 for the same calorific value pro-
2The process CO2 emission factor is generally considered as a fixed factor. However it is
slightly variable mainly because of the ratio of calcium carbonate andmagnesium carbonate in the
limestone. When process emissions are actually measured, a narrow peak in the distribution can
be observed at 538 kgCO2 per ton of clinker (Ecofys et al. (2009) Figure 2). However, the factor
used in the EU ETSMonitoring and Reporting of Greenhouse gas emissions (MRG) is only 523
kgCO2 per ton of clinker, derived from IPCCmethodology.
3If we consider cement consumption and not cement production, another option can be added:
cement outsourcing. We performed the same analysis for cement consumption with a more com-
plicated decomposition, adding cement trading. As the results barely changed (the cement trading
effect represented less than 3Mtons of CO2 or 2% of emissions), for the sake of simplicity we only
retained the analysis of cement production.
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duced.
(v) Energy efficiency, which can be divided into two parts, thermal energy effi-
ciency and electrical energy efficiency.
(vi)Decarbonisation of the electricity.
(vii) Carbon capture and storage.
(viii) Innovative cements, or carbon neutral cements based on totally different
processes.
Thenext sectiondetails these options, whichdonot have the same status. Lever
(i) is driven by cement demand and is not a direct choicemade by cement compa-
nies. Levers (ii) to (v) are operational options usedby cement companies (though
lever (iii) does not reduce global emissions, it can be a rational choice for a com-
pany covered by an emissions trading scheme). Lever (vi) is beyond the scope of
cement producers, and depends on electricity producers (which have an incentive
to use it when there is a price on carbon). Abatement due to levers (i) to (vi) will
be empirically assessed in this study. Levers (vii) and (viii) are in the research and
development stage. Though promising, these options have not generated abate-
ment yet.
The challenge of a non-global climate policy is to induce all these options (ex-
cept (iii)) without generating clinker or cement imports, which would lead to car-
bon leakage.
4.1.2 Data sources
The work of this chapter is based on the cross-referencing of three databases:
• the Getting the Numbers Right (GNR) database4 (WBCSD, 2009) devel-
oped by the Cement Sustainability Initiative (CSI), operating under the
World Business Council on Sustainable Development (WBCSD).
• the European Union Transaction Log5 (EUTL) which is the registry of the
EU ETS, and provides allocations and verified emissions at the installation
level.
4http://wbcsdcement.org/GNR-2011/index.html. Variables have names we will re-
fer to for data sourcing. For example the clinker-to-cement ratio is variable 3213.
5http://ec.europa.eu/environment/ets/napMgt.do
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• the Eurostat international trade database6 for clinker trading.
TheGNRdatabase covered94%ofEuropean cementproduction in2012 (only
minor producers with small production volumes are excluded), which is remark-
ably high. Data are available7 for 1990, 2000, and 2005 to 2012. Data can be ob-
tained at the EU 28 level and at the national level for big producers (so we have
used data for Germany, France, Spain, the UK, Italy and Poland). Although the
GNR database contains data on production and emissions, we use this database
for its intensity (i.e. rate-based) indicators in the cement industry, for reasons
related to coverage and methodology (see part 4.2.1). A performance indicator
not included in GNR, the electricity emission factor, comes from the Enerdata
database.8
The cement sector is a subsector of the cement/lime EUTL sector (47% of in-
stallations and 90% of allocations). We have collected plant-by-plant information
on 276 cement plants with kilns covered by the EU ETS. Some characteristics of
our cement EUTL database, which are in line with Table 1.2 in European Com-
mission (2010) and Table 4 in Moya et al. (2010),9 are given in Table 4.1. The
match between EUTL emissions and GNR gross direct emissions is good but not
6http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/newxtweb/setupdimselection.do, EU
Trade since 1988byHS2, 4, 6 andCN8dataset (extracted in February 2014). The code for clinker
is 252310 (“cement clinkers”).
7Due to confidentiality reasons, there is aoneyear gapbetweendata collection andpublication.
The latest available data (2012) were published in August 2014.
8http://www.enerdata.net/enerdatauk/knowledge/subscriptions/
database/energy-market-data-and-co2-emissions-data.php
9Their list contains 268 installations in 2006 at the EU 27 level (compared to 270 for us (Nor-
way has two cement plants and Croatia four)). There are some discrepancies for France (33 in
instead of 30 for us), Germany (38 instead of 43), Italy (59 instead of 52), and some other coun-
tries (1 plant difference). In Germany, geolocalization of plants revealed that three plants had
two EU ETS installations and 1 had three. Our list was cross-checked with the Cemnet database
(http://www.cemnet.com/GCR/), Sandbag database, and public reports of major cement
companies.
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perfect.10 In addition, we use the Sandbag database11 for offset credits utilization
at the installation level.
Whereas total imports and exports are directly available in the Eurostat interna-
tional trade database at the EU 27 level, they have to be computed from country-
pairs raw data at the national level. Also, some corrections needed to be made to
take into account the changing geographical perimeter of the EU ETS. Because
they are absent from Eurostat, we used the Comtrade database12 for net imports
in Norway, Iceland, and the EU 27 before 1999.
4.1.3 Clinker substitution
Reducing the clinker-to-cement ratio is a very efficient abatement option since
most of the carbon emissions are produced during clinker manufacturing. The
most-usedclinker-substitutingmaterials are fly ash (a residue fromcoal-firedpower
stations), ground blast furnace slag (a by-product of the steel industry), pozzolana
(a volcanic ash) and limestone. Blast furnace cement offers the highest potential
for clinker reduction with a clinker-to-cement ratio of 5-64%, compared to poz-
zolanic cement (45-89%) and fly ash cement (65-94%) (Moya et al., 2010).
Two barriers are impeding the deployment of blended cements. The first is
the regional availability of the clinker substitutes, or their price (since these prod-
ucts have low value per ton, transportation costs are high). The phasing out of
coal-fired plants triggered by climate policy will make fly ash scarcer. Ground
blast depends on iron and steel production, and pozzolanas are present only in
certain volcanic regions (mainly Italy). Second, the physical properties of these
10GNR emissions are higher in the United Kingdom , Germany and Poland, (3% on average
respectively for all) whereas they are lower Italy and at the EU 27 level (6% and 2% respectively).
France and Spain are perfect matches. Besides data-capture errors, differences in emissions can
occur for different reasons. First, there is amismatch in installations covered. GNR containsmore
plants because it includes grinding or blending plants, but some plants with kilns are not covered,
so emissions at the national level have to be extrapolated. Second, accounting methodologies are
different. Process emissions aremeasured inGNR(there is a peak in thedistribution at 538kgCO2
per ton of clinker see figure 2 in (Ecofys et al., 2009)) whereas a default factor derived from IPCC
methodology of 523 kgCO2 per ton of clinker is used in the EU ETS. Non-kiln fuels are not re-
ported in some countries for the EUETS but are (partially) reported inGNR.The carbon content
of alternative fuels is also accounted for differently.
11http://www.sandbag.org.uk/data/
12https://wits.worldbank.org/WITS/WITS/Restricted/Login.aspx
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Figure 4.1: Clinker-to-cement ratio for the EU 28 and main European countries.
Source: WBCSD GNR Database, variable 3213
alternative cements such as strength, colour andworkability, and their acceptance
by construction contractors, constitute another barrier to their implementation
(IEA, 2009).
Figure 4.1 displays the clinker-to-cement ratio in 1990, 2000 and from 2005 to
2012 for the EuropeanUnion (with 28member states) and the six biggest cement
producers in Europe: Germany, France, Spain, Italy, the United Kingdom and
Poland. The average EU 28 clinker-to-cement ratio decreased from 78% in 1990
to 73% in 2012. The UK is the country for which the clinker-to-cement ratio has
decreased the most dramatically, from 95% in 1990 to 70% in 2012. In 2012 Ger-
manywas the countrywith the lowest clinker-to-cement ratio, 68%,whereas Spain
had the highest, 79%.
4.1.4 Clinker outsourcing
Clinker outsourcing is a drasticmethod to reduce carbon emissions within a given
geographical perimeter, but it does not in general reduce emissions on a global
scale (carbon intensity is approximately the same in Europe and abroad and this
adds emissions due to transportation). The increase in emissions abroad due to a
regional climate policy is called carbon leakage (Reinaud, 2008). In the EU ETS,
free allocation of allowances was presented as a way tomitigate the risk of leakage.
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Figure 4.2: Net imports (imports minus exports) of clinker relative to local
clinker production. Sources: Eurostat for net imports, EUTL and WBCSD GNR
Database for production
Thepurposeof this chapter is to assess the actual emissions reductions in the ce-
ment industry, and not to provide a technology roadmap. Therefore just because
clinker outsourcing is an undesirable option does not mean that it should not be
considered in this context. Under the EUETS, it can be profitable since, provided
that a certain level of activity is maintained, the operator of an installation keeps
receiving free allowances that can be sold on the market. However, logistical dif-
ficulties, high transportation costs and export barriers make clinker outsourcing
less appealing than it appears. Clinker trading primarily occurs in the case of over-
or under-capacity (Cook, 2011). Geography plays an important role: high road
transport costs exclude inland producers from international trade (Ponssard and
Walker, 2008).
Figure4.2 showsclinkernet imports (importsminus exports)dividedbyclinker
production. The EU 27 switched from being a clinker importer to being a clinker
exporter in 2009. We can see that clinker is a poorly traded commodity: since
1990 net extra-EU27 imports or exports have never been more than 7% of its
production. Imports came from Asia (mostly China and Thailand) and the East
Mediterranean regionespecially between2001and2005(mainlyTurkey andEgypt),
and since 2010 European clinker has mainly been exported to the Gulf of Guinea
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Figure 4.3: Origin of the EU 27 net imports. West Mediterranean comprises
Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia and Libya. Source: Eurostat
and Brazil (see Figure 4.3). The European country with the most remarkable tra-
jectory is Spain, which turned into a massive clinker exporter (20% of its produc-
tion in 2012) after being amassive importer (up to 34%of its production in 2007).
This swing can be explained by the boom and burst of the construction bubble.
Further, most of the surge of clinker exports in 2012 compared to 2011 can be
attributed to phase III allocation rules13 (Chapter 5).
4.1.5 Alternative fuel use
The conventional fossil fuels used in clinker manufacture, coal and petcoke, have
a high carbon intensity. Replacing these fuels by alternative, less carbon intensive
fuels generates abatement. The proportion of alternative fuel used in thermal en-
ergy production has increased steadily in the European Union. Fossil and mixed
wastes,14 which are generally less carbon-intensive than coal or petcoke, repre-
13Allowances are cut by half if the plant produces less than half of its historical activity level.
This encouraged plants to overproduce to reach the threshold. Excess clinker production has then
been exported or blended in cement, increasing the clinker-to-cement ratio.
14Mostly plastics, mixed industrial waste, and tyres in 2012 (respectively 43%, 20% and 17%
(source: GNR database, variable 3211detail).
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sented 2% of thermal energy in 1990, 11% in 2005 and 25% in 2012.15 Biomass
represented16 0.2% of thermal energy in 1990, 4% in 2005 and 11% in 2012.17
Most cement companies receive a fee for the burning of waste as part of a waste
management strategy to reduce incineration and landfilling; so using alternative
fuel may be financially advantageous regardless of the carbon price.
The carbon intensity of the fuel mix (shown in Figure 4.4) has decreased from
94 kgCO2/GJ in 1990
18 to 80kgCO2/GJ in 2012. In 2012, Germany had the low-
est carbon intensity of the fuelmix by far (71 kgCO2/GJ),while Italy had the high-
est (89 kgCO2/GJ).
Much higher substitution rates are possible than the currently-used mixes but
several factors limit the potential of alternative fuel use. First, the calorific value
of most organic material is relatively low, and treatment of side products (such
as chlorine) is sometimes needed (European Commission, 2010). Second, the
availability of waste is dependent on the local waste legislation and collection net-
work as well as nearby industrial activity (IEA, 2009). Third, a higher CO2 price
may increase the global demand for biomass, for which cement companies com-
pete with heat and electricity producers. This would increase its price and make
it less appealing as a fuel substitute for the cement industry. Finally, social accep-
tance is of huge relevance as incineration is often viewed with great suspicion by
surrounding inhabitants.
4.1.6 Thermal and electrical energy efficiency
Cementmanufacture requires both thermal energy for heating the clinker kiln and
electrical energy (about 10% of total energy needed) mostly for kiln operation,
grinding (preparing raw materials) and blending (mixing clinker with additives).
The proportion of total electrical energy used for these steps is respectively 25%,
33% and 30% according to Schneider et al. (2011).
15GNR database, variable 3211a.
16Mostly animal meal and dried sewage sludge: respectively 49% and 20% (source: GNR
database, variable 3211detail).
17GNR database, variable 3211a.
18For this value only, we took the average of European country values weighted by their cement
production. Indeed, the originalGNRvalue (91 kgCO2/GJ)was lower than all values correspond-
ing to individual European countries .
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Figure 4.4: Carbon intensity of the fuel mix (in kgCO2/GJ) for the EU 28 and
main European countries. Source: WBCSD GNR Database, variable 3221
New kilns using rawmaterial in powder form (dry production route) are much
more energy efficient than old kilns using raw material in a slurry (wet produc-
tion route) since less heat is needed to dry the raw material19 (3-4 GJ per ton of
clinker instead of 5-6 GJ per ton of clinker in European Commission (2010)). In
modern kilns, part of the heat of the exhaust gases from the kiln is recovered to
pre-heat the raw material (pre-heaters) (Pardo et al., 2011). The state-of-the art
technology is the dry process kiln with pre-heating and pre-calcining, which re-
quires approximately 3 GJ per ton of clinker and accounts for 46% of European
clinker production in 2012 (compared to 23% in 199020).
In addition to kiln technology, kiln capacity also influences energy efficiency.
Bigger kilns have lower heat losses per unit of clinker produced and are therefore
more energy-efficient. Finally, for a given installation, the way the machinery is
operated (minimizing kiln shutdowns and operating near to nominal capacity)
can make a significant difference (about 0.15-0.3 GJ per ton of clinker according
to Hoenig and Twigg (2009)).
Cement producers benefit directly from energy efficiency through lower en-
ergy costs, which represent roughly a third of production costs (Bolscher et al.,
19It is common in the literature to distinguish four routes for cement manufacture: dry, semi-
dry, semi-wet and wet (GNR).
20Source: GNR database, variable Percent315.
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Figure 4.5: Thermal energy intensity in GJ per ton of clinker for the EU 28
and main European countries. Source: WBCSD GNR Database, variable 329.
2013; Pardo et al., 2011). Generally, newmanufacturing plants are equippedwith
the best available technology, but the upgrading of old facilities is a slow process.
Moya et al. (2011) find that the observed rate of retrofitting in the cement indus-
try ismuch lower than the theoretical rate derived from the number of feasible im-
provements with low payback periods, revealing an “energy efficiency gap” (Jaffe
and Stavins, 1994) or “energy efficiency paradox” (deCanio, 1998).
Figures 4.5 and 4.6 show the thermal energy intensity and the electrical energy
intensity, respectively in GJ per ton of clinker and in kWh per ton of cement. The
thermal energy intensity in the EU 28 decreased from 4.1 GJ per ton of clinker in
1990 to 3.7 GJ per ton of clinker in 2005 then stabilized. The electrical energy
intensity in the EU 28, after decreasing from 114 kWh per ton of cement in 1990
to 108 kWh per ton of cement in 2006 increased to 116 kWh per ton of cement
in 2012. The most noticeable change comes from Spain where average electricity
intensity soared from 98 kWh/ton of cement in 2006 to 150kWh per ton of ce-
ment in 2012, probably due to the decrease in production which led to the use of
machinery operating well below nominal capacity.21
21Spanish cement production was divided by three in the same period. To understand such a
dramatic increase, whereas in the same time thermal energy intensity has not evolved, two expla-
nations can be proposed. First, contrary to kiln fuel which is fully variable, there is a higher share of
“non-productive” electric energy (such as lighting, heating, water pumping and compressed air).
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Figure 4.6: Electrical energy intensity in kWh per ton of cement for the EU 28
and main European countries. Source: WBCSD GNR Database, variable 3212.
There are no breakthrough technologies in sight that would allow a significant
decrease in kiln energy consumption (European Commission, 2010), so the po-
tential for abatement is small. In addition, the other abatement drivers can be neg-
atively correlated to energy efficiency. Clinker substitutes (especially blast furnace
slag) generally require more energy for grinding, and alternative fuels may pro-
vide less calorific power ormay needmore energy to treat by-products. Moreover,
more stringent environmental requirements (dust and gas treatment), increased
cementperformance (necessitating finer grinding) andkiln improvements such as
pre-heaters and pre-calciners have led to higher power consumption (Hoenig and
Twigg, 2009). These reasons could explain why energy efficiency has stabilized
or deteriorated in recent years.
4.1.7 Decarbonisation of electricity
For the sake of simplicity in this studywe consider that all the electricity consumed
comes from the grid.22. In this context, this mitigation option does not depend on
Second, some plants have several kilns, so production can be redirected to the most efficient ones
only. Conversely, most plants have only one grinder.
22Thenumber of plants recovering heat for power generation is unknown (Matthes et al., 2008)
Self-generationof power ismore frequent in countrieswhere electricity supply is not reliable (VDZ
(German Cement Association), 2013).
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Figure 4.7: Electricity emission factor (in kgCO2/MWh) for the EU 27 and
main European countries. Source: Enerdata database
the cement industry but on electricity producers. Indirect electricity emissions
represent around 6% of total emissions in the cement industry. Under the EU
ETS framework, these emissions are attributed to electricity producers and not to
cement manufacturers. Cement companies do not receive allowances for these
emissions and neither do they have to surrender allowances for them. However,
theymay face indirect costs through the rise in electricity prices due to thepassing-
through of allowance prices. Though small, this abatement option still has the
potential to decrease total emissions in the cement industry.
Figure4.7 shows the changes in the electricity emissions factor (inkgCO2/MWh).
It has globally decreased in all Europeancountries, and theEU27averagedropped
from 474 kgCO2/MWh in 1990 to 339 kg CO2/MWh. In 2012, the country
with the highest electricity emissions factor was Poland with 680 kgCO2/MWh
(because of the predominance of coal power) and the country with the lowest
was France with 69 kgCO2/MWh (because of the high proportion of nuclear and
hydro-electric power).
4.1.8 Carbon capture and storage
Most carbon emissions from cement manufacturing are process emissions due to
the chemical reaction during limestone calcination. The only way to avoid these
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emissions (apart from alternative cements based on different chemical processes)
would be carbon capture and storage (CCS)using post-combustion technologies.
Emissions due to burning of fossil fuels could also be managed with CCS tech-
nologies. A promising option in this direction is oxyfuel technology where air is
replaced by oxygen in cement kilns to produce a pure CO2 stream that is easier to
handle (Barker et al., 2009; Li et al., 2013).
R&D inCCS is active but these potentially promising technologies are far from
being operational at the industrial scale (Moya et al., 2010). A high carbon price
(estimations vary but an order ofmagnitude is 50e/tonCO2) would be necessary
to trigger investments in this medium-term option. Furthermore, CCS technolo-
gies are energy-intensive andwould increase power consumption significantly (by
50% to 120% at plant level according to Hoenig and Twigg (2009)). Finally,
their large-scale development would necessitate a complete CCS system, includ-
ing transport infrastructure, access to storage sites, a legal framework for CO2
transportation, monitoring and verification, and therefore political and social ac-
ceptance (IEA, 2009).
4.1.9 Innovative cements
Several low-carbonor evencarbon-negative cements are at thedevelopment stage,
such as Novacem (based on magnesium silicates rather than limestone), Calera
or Geopolymer (Schneider et al., 2011). Providing they prove their economic vi-
ability and gain customer acceptance (which is extremely challenging in itself),
replacing existing facilities would require considerable time and investment.
4.1.10 Cement substitution in construction
This option, aimed at reducing the overall quantity of cement produced, depends
on architects and construction companies. Like decarbonisation of electricity, it
depends on other stakeholders. Whereas cement companies are indifferent to the
carbon content of electricity (for a given electricity price), a reduction in quan-
tities of cement used in construction is at first sight against the interests of the
cement industry.
Reducing quantities of cement used in construction would be possible through
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alternative materials and/or leaner structures. Wood would be the most natural
alternative constructionmaterial to cement, provided that its large-scale availabil-
ity could be assured.
4.2 Methodology
Thus far, we have presented the emission abatement options qualitatively or on
the basis of simple indicators. Quantifying their respective contribution in the
evolution of cement CO2 emissions requires a decomposition method, which we
describe in the next section.
4.2.1 Decomposition of carbon emissions due to cement production
In the rest of this section,C stands for emissions,Q for quantities and E for energy
consumption. The definition of all the variables used can be found in Table 4.2.
We distinguish QPRODclinker;t which is the quantity of clinker produced at year t and
QNETclinker;t which is the quantity of clinker actually used for cementmanufacture. The
difference between the two comes from international trade (we neglect stock vari-
ations):
QNETclinker;t = Q
PROD
clinker;t + NIclinker;t (4.1)
NIclinker;t being net imports of clinker. We split emissions into three categories:
emissions due to fuel burning (subscript F), process emissions (subscript P) and
indirect emissions due to electricity consumption (subscript E):
Ct = CF;t + CP;t + CE;t (4.2)
Only direct emissions are accounted for in the EU ETS.
CEUTL;t = CF;t + CP;t (4.3)
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First, emissions due to fuel burning, CF;t, can be decomposed as follows:
CF;t =Qcement;t
QNETclinker;t
Qcement;t
QPRODclinker;t
QNETclinker;t
ET;clinker;t
QPRODclinker;t
CF;t
ET;clinker;t
= Qcement;t  Rt  Ht  IT;t  CEFF;t
(4.4)
where ET;clinker;t is the thermal energy used, Rt the clinker-to-cement ratio, Ht
is the clinker home production ratio (Ht > 1 if more clinker is produced than
used, or, put another way, if net imports are negative), IT;t is the thermal energy
intensity (in GJ per ton of clinker) and CEFF;t is the carbon intensity of the fuel
mix (in tCO2/GJ).
The formulation for process emissions CP;t is:
CP;t =Qcementt
QNETclinker;t
Qcement;t
QPRODclinker;t
QNETclinker;t
CP;t
QPRODclinker;t
= Qcement;t  Rt  Ht  CEFpro
(4.5)
whereCEFpro is the CO2 emission factor for the calcination of limestone which
is considered here time invariant, absent any information on its evolution.
The formulation for CE;t is:
CE;t =Qcement;t
EE;t
Qcement;t
CE;t
EE;t
= Qcement;t  IEl;t  CEFelec;t
(4.6)
whereET;clinker;t is the electrical energy used, IEl;t is the electrical energy intensity
of production (inMWhper ton of cement) andCEFelec;t is the electricity emission
factor (in tCO2/MWh).
Total emissions of cement manufacturing are then
Ct = Qcement;t  (Rt  Ht  (CEFpro + IT;t  CEFF;t) + IEl;t  CEFelec;t) (4.7)
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Abatement levers aremore visible in this formula that is composed only of pos-
itive terms: besides reducing activity (reducing Qcement;t) or outsourcing clinker
(reducing Ht), technological abatement options are reducing Rt (clinker substi-
tution), CEFF;t (alternative fuel use), IT;t and IEl;t (thermal and electrical energy
efficiency), and reducing CEFelec;t (decarbonisation of electricity).
For the data, we have taken directly from GNR the intensity variables Rt (vari-
able 3213), CEFF;t (variable 3221), IT;t (variable 329) and IEl;t (variable 3212).
These data are given at the EU 28 level (whereas we focus on the EU 27 level)
but the error is low since they are intensity variables, and Croatia’s cement pro-
duction accounts for less than 2% of EU 28 cement production (Mikulčić et al.,
2013). CEFelec;t comes from the Enerdata database and CEFpro from Ecofys et al.
(2009) (we take, unless explicitly mentioned otherwise, the measured value from
the GNR database, 538 kgCO2 per ton of clinker, rather than the default factor of
523 kgCO2 per ton of clinker derived from the IPCCmethodology used in the EU
ETS).
Ht andQcement;t are obtained indirectly by computation. The quantity of clinker
produced is obtained by dividing EUTL emissions23 by the clinker carbon inten-
sity (using the EU ETS value of CEFpro):
QPRODclinker;t =
CEUTL;t
CEFpro + IT;t  CEFF;t =
CEUTL;t
CkCIt
(4.8)
where CkCIt is the clinker carbon intensity. ThenHt is given by:
Ht =
QPRODclinker;t
QPRODclinker;t + NIclinker;t
(4.9)
where NIclinker;t comes from the Eurostat international trade database. Qcement;t is
obtained by:
Qcement;t =
QPRODclinker;t + NIclinker;t
Rt
(4.10)
23Sometimes EUTL emissions do not exist (before 2005) or are not reliable: for the EU 27
in phase I, because some countries were not covered, and for the UK in phase I, because of the
opt-out condition, some plants were not part of the scheme. In these cases we use GNR direct
emissions, corrected by a factor to take into account the discrepancy between GNR and EUTL
emissions. The factor is 2005-2010 EUTL emissions divided by 2005-2010 GNR emissions (we
take the period 2008-2010 for the EU 27 and the UK).
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Figure 4.8: Cement production in million tons for the EU 27 (right vertical axis)
and the main European countries (left vertical axis). Source: Computation from
WBCSD GNR Database, EUTL database and Eurostat International Database
Computing indirectly clinker and cement production (whereas they are avail-
able in the GNR database) is a modelling choice. Indeed, equation (4.7) is a per-
fect accounting equality, but in practice there are always mismatches due to data
inaccuracy, and so one variable has to be computed through the equation (instead
of coming from data source). The choice of which variable to compute is deter-
mined by the quality of the data and the use of the decomposition. In our case
we have a choice between using GNR data on clinker and cement production and
compute emissions, or using EUTL emissions data for direct emissions and com-
pute clinker and cement production. We chose the second option for two rea-
sons. First, it allows finding EUTL emissions after recalculation for direct emis-
sions, and EUTL emissions are extremely reliable: the coverage is 100%, and it
comes from a compulsory policy rather than a voluntary program. GNR cover-
age is good but not perfect (some clinker plants are missing and grinding plants
using imported clinker may not be covered). As an example, in Spain in 2007
(the country-year with the highest clinker importation), the GNR database gives
a production of 46.8 Mt of cement, whereas our own computation (with 11.0 Mt
of clinker net imports) gives 55.4 Mt, which are closer to the official figure of the
Spanish cement association: 54.7 Mt (Oficemen, 2013). Second, it allows de-
composing the exact allowances surplus and not an approximation of it (see sec-
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tion 4.4.3). Anyway, the difference between computed clinker production and
reported GNR data at the EU level is small and stable over time.24 So, given the
order ofmagnitude of changes in the overall production, and becausewe aremore
interested in relative changes than absolute values, using one or the other would
have hardly any impact on results of section 4.3.
4.2.2 LMDI method
Index decomposition analysis (IDA) has been widely used in studies dealing with
energy consumption since the 1980s and carbon emissions since the 1990s. Ang
(2004) compares different IDAmethods and concludes that the LogarithmMean
Divisia Index (LMDI) is to be preferred. A comprehensive literature survey re-
viewing 80 IDA studies dealing with emissions decomposition is given in Xu and
Ang (2013), and shows that the LMDI became the standard method after 2007.
The general formulation of LMDI (see Ang (2005)) is the following. When
emissions can be decomposed as Ct = X
1  X2      Xn, the variation of
emissions Δtot = CT   C0 can be decomposed as Δtot = Δ1 + Δ2 +    + Δn,
with
Δk =
CT   C0
ln(CT)  ln(C0)  ln(
XkT
Xk0
) (4.11)
LMDI decomposition is mostly used to study the difference in emissions be-
tween two dates for a given country, but themathematical formulation also works
fordifference in emissions for twocountries at a givendate, or (aswewill see later),
for difference in emissions for a given country between a real and a counterfactual
or reference scenario.
Among the 34 studies since 2002 using LMDI decomposition analysis in Xu
and Ang (2013) literature review, the majority (14) are economy-wide and only
seven focus on industry. But except for Sheinbaum et al. (2010) (iron and steel
24Computed production is higher than GNR data by about 3-4% for clinker and 6-7% for ce-
ment. Two reasons could explain the difference: the coverage (as coverage is around 95%, GNR
underestimate cement production by about 5%) and white clinker. White clinker, which repre-
sents a tiny fraction of clinker production, is more carbon-intensive (by around 30%) than grey
clinker. GNR intensity variables mostly concern grey clinker only, whereas EUTL emissions do
not distinguish grey and white clinker. This introduces an upward bias in computed production.
The higher the proportion of white clinker, the higher the bias; and the bias is stable in time if the
proportion of white clinker production remains stable.
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in Mexico), they are not sector-specific but deal with industry or the manufac-
turing sector as a whole; in China (Liu and Ang, 2007; Chen, 2011), Shanghai
(Zhao et al., 2010), Chongqin (Yang and Chen, 2010), the UK (Hammond and
Norman, 2012)orThailand (Bhattacharyya andUssanarassamee, 2004). For sec-
tor specific studies (not using the LMDI method), one can cite two international
comparisons for cement (Kim and Worrell, 2002a) and steel (Kim and Worrell,
2002b) and a study of the iron and steel industry in Mexico (Ozawa, 2002).
The study closest to ours is Xu et al. (2012), which was not cited in Xu andAng
(2013), focusing on the cement industry in China. They give a decomposition
per kiln type, allowing the energy efficiency effect to be separated into a structural
effect (changeof kiln type) and akiln efficiency effect.25 However theydonot con-
sider clinker trade in their decomposition, which is arguably of little importance
for China, but matters for Europe.
Expanding equation (4.7) leads to the following decomposition:
Δtot = CT   C0
= 4act F +4sha F +4tra F +4fmix +4eff F
+4act P +4sha P +4tra P
+4act E +4eff E +4Celec
= 4act +4sha +4tra +4fmix +4eff F +4eff E +4Celec
(4.12)
performing the appropriate groupings: 4act = 4act F + 4act P + 4act E,
4tra = 4tra F +4tra P and4sha = 4sha F +4sha P.
The precise formulas are all given in the Appendix 4.6.1.
There are then seven factors in the decomposition:
• The activity effect (4act): impact of total cement production on emissions
variations. It corresponds to lever (i) in part 4.1.1
• The clinker trade effect (4tra): impact of the clinker trade on emissions vari-
ations. It corresponds to lever (iii) in part 4.1.1.
25Kiln energy intensity over time per kiln type was not available in the GNR database, so we
opted for a simpler decomposition.
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Figure 4.9: LMDI decomposition analysis of cement emissions compared to
1990. EU 27
• The clinker share effect (4sha): impact of clinker substitution on emissions
variations. It corresponds to lever (ii) in part 4.1.1.
• The fuelmix effect (4fmix): impact of the use of alternative fuel on emissions
variations. It corresponds to lever (iv) in part 4.1.1.
• The thermal and electrical energy efficiency effect (4eff F and4eff E): impact
of thermal and electrical energy efficiency. They correspond to lever (v) in
part 4.1.1.
• The electricity carbon emissions factor effect (4Celec): impact of the carbon
emissions factor on emissions variations. It corresponds to lever (vi) in part
4.1.1.
One can distinguish the first two effects (activity and clinker trade) which are
“non-technological” abatementoptions fromtheothers that are technological abate-
ment options.
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4.3 Changes in carbon emissions in theEuropean cement industry
4.3.1 EU 27
Figure 4.9 shows changes in carbon emissions over time compared to their 1990
level alongside the LMDI decomposition analysis explained above.26
Emissions in the cement industry first decreased in the 1990s and the begin-
ning of the 2000s (-4.7% from 1990 to 2005) then increased sharply to exceed the
1990 level (+3.6% in 2007 compared to 1990). The economic recession led to a
sharp decrease in emissions: in 2009 they were 25.1% lower than in 1990 (which
corresponds to a 29.1% reduction in emissions in two years) and kept decreasing
slowly afterwards.
The LMDI analysis allows us to highlight the fact that most of the emissions
variations in the EU 27 are attributable to the activity effect: cement emissions
have increased or decreased mostly because more or less cement has been pro-
duced. The activity effect was responsible for an increase of 41.5Mtons of CO2 in
2007 compared to 1990 (+22.7%) and for a decrease of 64.5 Mtons of CO2 two
years later (corresponding to a 34.2% decrease).
At the European level, the clinker trade effect partially compensates the activ-
ity effect most of the time: it is negative when the activity effect is positive and
vice-versa. Put differently, a production increase is accompanied by an increase in
clinker net imports and a production decrease by a decrease in clinker net imports,
which can be explained by production capacity constraints (Cook, 2011). Keep-
ing 1990 as the reference level, the clinker trade effect was at its highest in 2007
when clinker net imports reached 14.1 Mtons. At this time, 12.8 Mtons of CO2
(7% of 1990 emissions) were avoided in Europe because of clinker outsourcing.
With the economic downturn and the decrease in overall production, clinker net
imports dropped and Europe became a clinker exporter in 2009. Between 2007
and 2010, while the activity effect led to a decrease of 69.2 Mtons of CO2, the
change in the balance of the clinker trade was responsible for an increase of 13.9
Mtons of CO2 in Europe.
26In the graphic we display variations from 1990 (fixed date) to year i. To compute variations
betweenyears i and j, weonlyhave to take thedifferences, as thedecomposition is linear and4i;j =
Ci   Cj = Ci   C1990   (Cj   C1990) = 4i;1990  4j;1990.
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The twomost important levers of technological emissions reduction are clinker
substitution and alternative fuel use. The clinker share effect led to a reduction of
5.4 Mtons of CO2 in 2005 compared to 1990 (-3.0%) and an extra 5.9 Mtons in
2012 compared to 2005 (-3.4%). Alternative fuel use led to a reduction of 1.9
Mtons of CO2 in 2005 compared to 1990 (-1.0%) and an extra reduction of 5.1
Mtons between 2005 and 2012 (-2.9%).
Thermal energy efficiency was the most important driver of emissions reduc-
tion in the 1990s: between 1990 and 2000, it induced a decrease of 5.7 Mtons of
CO2 (-3.2%). Since then, thermal energy efficiency in Europe has stagnated, gen-
erating no extra emissions reduction. The electrical energy efficiency effect has
by far the least influence. It led to 0.5 Mtons of CO2 of emissions reduction be-
tween 1990 and 2005. Then a deterioration in electrical energy efficiency led to
an increase of 0.7 Mtons of CO2 between 2005 and 2012. There are two possible
explanations for the stagnation of thermal energy efficiency and the deterioration
of electrical energy efficiency in the 2000s. First, kilns were operating below ca-
pacity and thus below their optimal efficiency level. Second, the two other main
abatement options (clinker reduction and alternative fuel use)may reduce energy
efficiency (see part 4.1.6).
Finally, the electricity carbon emissions factor effect has had a progressive im-
pact in reducing cement emissions, globally small but not negligible. This chan-
nel of emissions reduction, which has the particular characteristic of depending on
other stakeholders than the cement industry itself, was responsible for a decrease
of 2.5Mtons ofCO2 between1990 and2000 and0.9Mtons ofCO2 between2000
and 2012 (-1.4% then -0.5%).
These observations can be summarised as follows. Clinker substitution, alter-
native fuel use, and to a lesser extent decarbonisation of electricity, have brought a
continuous decrease in carbon emissions over the past twenty years (respectively
11.3, 7.0 and 3.3Mtons of CO2 between 1990 and 2012, i.e. 6.2%, 3.8% and 1.8%
reduction). Together they are responsible for a 11.9% decrease in carbon emis-
sions. Energy efficiency induced a decrease in emissions in the 1990s (5.7 Mtons
of CO2 or -3.2% between 1990 and 2000) then a small increase, probably because
of clinker share reduction and alternative fuel use. Overall it was responsible for
4.7 Mtons of emissions reductions between 1990 and 2012 (-2.6%). Apart from
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Figure 4.10: LMDI decomposition analysis of cement emissions compared to
1990. Germany
this long-time slow trend of emissions reduction, most of the emissions fluctua-
tions are explained by the activity effect, which is partially compensated for by the
clinker trade effect.
4.3.2 Main European producers
Figures 4.10 to 4.15 show information, using the same graphical format, for the
biggest European cement producers: Germany, France, Spain, the UK, Italy and
Poland. We do not give such a detailed analysis for each country as for the EU 27
but only highlight the most salient facts.
• Germany. Germany shows that it is feasible to decrease significantly emis-
sions intensity. Clinker substitution and alternative fuel use have allowed
significant emissions reductions (-23% between 1990 and 2012). More-
over, Germany was exporting clinker at the peak of economic activity in
2007 while EU 27 as a whole was importing it. It is the only big Western
European country which did not have a sharp decrease in cement produc-
tion. Cement production was only 2% lower in 2012 than in 1990, while
carbon emissions were 27% lower.
• France. France reduced emissions while making virtually no technological
improvement between 2000 and 2012. In the 1990s the cement French
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Figure 4.11: LMDI decomposition analysis of cement emissions compared to
1990. France
market got consolidated (only four companieswere in activity in 2005, con-
trary to Germany, Italy and Spain where the market is more fragmented),
which involved many plant closures. This could explain why the activity
effect and the clinker trade effect did not move in opposite directions be-
tween 1990 and 2000 (the decrease in cement production, around 20%, by
far more important than its European counterparts, was accompanied by
a rise in clinker net imports). The clinker share effect, after being respon-
sible for an increase in emissions until 2006, brought emissions reductions
afterwards, returning approximately to its 1990 level, whereas inmostEuro-
pean countries (except Italy ) it has been a continuous source of significant
emissions reductions. Energy efficiency, which was the best among the big
Western European countries in 1990, has deteriorated continuously and
led to an increase in emissions. The biggest source of emissions reduction,
alternative fuel use, was only applied in the 1990s: hardly any improvement
was achieved afterwards.
• Spain. Spanish cement emissions are overwhelmingly affected by the activ-
ity effect and the clinker trade effect. At the highest point of the housing
bubble in 2007, the activity effect would have doubled emissions (+105%)
compared to 1990, but was partially compensated for by the clinker trade
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Figure 4.12: LMDI decomposition analysis of cement emissions compared to
1990. Spain
effect (-42%). The bursting of the housing bubble led to a massive reduc-
tion in cement production and therefore of emissions through the activity
effect, which was partially offset by a massive reduction in clinker net im-
ports, and an increase in the clinker-to-cement ratio. Still, some emissions
reductionwas achieved by alternative fuel use (especially since 2010), ther-
mal energy efficiency, and electricity decarbonisation, bringing altogether
7.8% of emissions reductions in 2012 compared to 1990.
• UK. In 1990 the UK cement industry was themost CO2-intensive inWest-
ern Europe. However, twenty years later it was one of the best perform-
ers. The reduction of the exceptionally high clinker-to-cement ratio (94%
in 1990) down to 70% in 2012 led to massive emissions reductions (a 18%
decrease compared to 1990). Other levers of emissions reduction such as
energy efficiency and alternative fuel use were applied to a significant ex-
tent. On top of all these factors, the economic downturn led to a consid-
erable decrease in emissions in 2008 and 2009 with a small rebound after-
wards (whereas the activity effect was responsible for a small increase in
emissions in 2005-2007). Overall, the UK is the major European country
with the biggest fall in emissions in 2012 compared to 1990 (-58%, com-
pared to -25% in Germany, -34% in France, -40% in Italy, -23% in Spain
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Figure 4.13: LMDI decomposition analysis of cement emissions compared to
1990. the UK
and -6% in Poland).
• Italy. Like France, Italy had good environmental indicators in 1990 such as
the lowest clinker-to-cement ratio and a relatively low carbon intensity of
the fuel mix. While being a major source of emissions reductions in other
countries, the clinker share effect led to an increase in emissions in Italy,
because of the increase in the clinker-to-cement ratio in the 1990s and its
stabilization in the 2000s. Moreover, since 2000, barely any progress has
been made in energy efficiency and alternative fuel use. The activity effect
has had a qualitatively similar impact as in the UK (as Italy produces ap-
proximately twice as much cement, the effect is twice as small in percent-
age terms). Overall, the 40% emissions reduction compared since 1990 is
almost entirely explained by the activity effect.
• Poland. Unlike the other European countries, Poland has had a sustained
increase inproduction (only slightly hit by the recession). In2012 the activ-
ity effectwas responsible for a 27% increase in emissions compared to 1990.
Most of this increasewas compensated for by other sources of emissions re-
ductions, explaining why emissions decreased by 6% in 2012 compared to
1990. The biggest contribution to emissions reduction was from energy ef-
ficiency, mostly in the 1990s, but clinker substitution and alternative fuel
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Figure 4.14: LMDI decomposition analysis of cement emissions compared to
1990. Italy
have had a significant impact.
4.4 Impact of the EU ETS on the cement industry
4.4.1 Overview
Figure 4.16 shows the results of theLMDIdecompositionbefore (2000 and2005)
and after (2005-2012) the launch of the EU ETS.
Between2000and2005, cement industry emissions increasedby0.7%,whereas
between 2005 and 2012 they dropped by 24.9%. This gives the impression that
the EU ETS was extremely efficient at reducing emissions. However, the LMDI
analysis shows that the activity effect itself accounts for 25.9% of emissions reduc-
tion between 2005 and 2012, compensated for by a 7.2% increase in the clinker
trade effect. This decrease in clinker net imports is essentially due toweak domes-
tic demand leading to production overcapacity.
Among the technological abatementoptions, between2005and2012, the clinker
share effect, the fuel mix effect and the decarbonisation of electricity led to emis-
sion reductions of 3.8%, 2.9%, and 0.4% respectively, compensated for by a 0.4%
increase due to the energy efficiency effect. Before the beginning of the EU ETS,
between 2000 and 2005, the clinker share effect, the fuel mix effect, the carbon
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Figure 4.15: LMDI decomposition analysis of cement emissions compared to
1990. Poland
Figure 4.16: LMDI decomposition analysis of cement emission variations in
the EU 27, before and after the beginning of the EU ETS (2000-2005 and
2005-2012)
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emissions factor effect and the energy efficiency effect led to emissions reductions
of 2.0%, 1.2%, 0.3%, and 0.4% respectively.
It would thus seem that the introduction of the EUETSmay have, to a small ex-
tent, accelerated the use of clinker substitution, alternative fuel use and decarbon-
isation of electricity,27 while these mitigation options may have led to a decrease
in energy efficiency.
Figure 4.16 does not show abatement but simply changes in emissions over time.
Abatement is the difference between actual emissions and counterfactual emis-
sions, which would have occurred if the EU ETS had not existed. Quantitative
estimation of the abatement due to the EU ETS therefore necessitates the con-
struction of a counterfactual scenario. The methodology and results are given in
the next section.
4.4.2 Abatement
Themethodhas three stages. First, we produce two counterfactual scenariosmak-
ing assumptions about the different parameters of the emissions decomposition
detailed in section 4.2.1. Second, we compute the difference Crealt   Ccounterfactt for
each year, then decompose it through an LMDI decomposition analysis. Third,
we add the different yearly effects and analyse the different levers of abatement.
In this section and the next one, we consider the geographically changing EUETS
perimeter28 instead of the EU 27, as we study the impact of the EU ETS on the
cement industry.
For the counterfactual scenario, we assume that both the quantity of cement
produced (Q
counterfact
cement;t = Qcement;t), and the home production ratio (H
counterfact
t =
Ht) remain unchanged. The EUETSmay have led to greater levels of production
after the economic recession because of the allowance allocation method (which
discourages plant closure); or conversely to lower levels of production because
27Though most of the decarbonisation of electricity may be due to renewable subsidies rather
than the EU ETS itself (Weigt et al., 2013).
28The EU 27 minus Romania and Bulgaria until 2007, plus Norway, Lichtenstein and Iceland
after 2008. However, data for Cyprus and Bulgaria are not available until 2008, and UK data are
inaccurate for phase I because of the opt-out condition. The geographical perimeter considered at
theEuropean level is guided by the available EUTLdata coverage (so only a part ofUKproduction
is considered in phase I). The production of clinker and cement as well as net imports have been
modified to take into account the changing geographical perimeter.
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of cement substitution (lever (i)), loss of competitiveness and leakage incentives
(which have not been empirically proven so far, see Chapter 1); but these effects
are likely to be small.
For the other variables,Rt, the clinker-to-cement ratio,CEFF;t the carbon inten-
sity of the fuel mix, IEn;t, the thermal energy intensity of production, IEl;t, the elec-
trical energy intensity of production and CEFelec;t, the electricity emission factor;
we consider two counterfactual scenarios. In the “Freeze” scenario, the variables
keep their 2005 values from 2005 to 2012. In the “Trend” scenario, the variables
decrease (or increase) at the same rate as the average yearly variation between
2000 and 2005.29
As an example, let us consider a given country for which the clinker-to-cement
ratio is 80% in 2000 and 77% in 2005 (which corresponds to an average decrease
of 0.8% per year). In the “Freeze” scenario, the clinker-to-cement ratio will stay
at 77% from 2005 to 2012. In the “Trend” scenario, the clinker-to-cement ratio
will start at 77% in 2005 and decrease by 0.8% per year, to finish at 73.5% in 2012.
In this case, the estimated abatement will be higher in the “Freeze” scenario, since
the counterfactual scenario is more pessimistic (higher emissions).
Estimating what would have happened in the absence of an event (here the in-
troduction of the EUETS) is in itself very challenging. Suggesting that parameter
values would have ranged between the “Freeze” and “Trend” scenarios is a rule of
thumb that is admittedly simplistic, but has the virtue of avoiding the setting of
arbitrary values for the parameters. Table 4.3 displays results when this method is
applied for predicting 2005 values in the EU 28. Except for the clinker-to-cement
ratio and the carbon intensity of the fuel mix, slightly out of the interval, the order
of magnitudes are fairly correct.30
Figure 4.17 shows the results of the abatement estimates. Values shown corre-
spond to the average of the two scenarios, andwith the original values of scenarios
29Ideally we would have used the 2004 values if they had been available in theGNRdatabase as
in thismethod technological abatement is necessarily zero in 2005. However some timewas prob-
ably needed for cement companies to adapt and take the EUETS into account in their operational
decisions.
30Our counterfactual is likely to be more precise for two reasons. First, the trend is based on a
shorter term (5 years instead of 10). Second, 1990 was the first year for which data is collected,
which was done in 2005. Then the level of assurance of 1990 details is not to the standard of later
years.
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(a) Absolute abatement (left axis for the EU ETS perimeter, right axis
for the others) in millions of tons.
(b) Relative abatement as a percentage of total emissions
Figure 4.17: “Technological” abatement between 2005 and 2012. The bars
correspond to the “Freeze” scenario estimates (the top bar except for France)
and the “Trend” scenario estimates (the bottom bar except for France).
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Table 4.3: Verification. Do the “Freeze” and “Trend” scenarios provide a good
interval for changes in variables over time? Application on year 2005 for the EU
28 using 1990 and 2000 values. In this case, 2005 “Freeze” values are equal to
2000 values, and the trend rate is the one between 1990 and 2000.
2005 2005 2005
Variable Unit 1990 “Freeze” Real “Trend” Observation
Rt % 78.4% 77.5% 75.9% 77.1% Overestimation
IEn;t GJ per ton of clinker 4,07 3,73 3,69 3,57 Interval OK
IEl;t kWh per ton of cement 114 110 109 108 Interval OK.
CEFF;t kgCO2/GJ 90.9 91.3 88.3 91.5 Overestimation
CEFelec;t kgCO2/MWh 474 381 363 342 Interval OK
as the error interval. We find that between 2005 and 2012, the European cement
industry abated 26Mtons ( 16Mtons) of CO2 emissions, which corresponds to
a decrease of 2.2% ( 1.3%) in emissions. However, this abatement could be due
to an external cause - energy prices - rather than to the EU ETS. Indeed the prices
of steam coal and petcoke (the twomain energy sources used to produce clinker)
roughly doubled from 2003-4 to 2010-11 as the graphs on p.31 of ? show.31 In-
creasing “conventional energy” prices reinforce the profitability of using substi-
tutes rather than clinker, alternative fuels, and increasing energy efficiency.
Germany is the European country that has abated the most in absolute terms
(9Mtons 5Mtons) and in percentage terms with the UK32 (-4.9% 2.7% and
-4.3%  2.7%). The abatement in France is small but positive (-1.5%  0.5%)
while the abatement in Italy is small but negative (+0.6%  0.4%). The uncer-
tainty in the evaluationof abatement in Spain andPoland is high (but both average
values are negative).
The results described above come from a simple difference between actual and
counterfactual emissions. An LMDI decomposition analysis allows us to inves-
tigate what levers have been used to provide actual abatement. The results are
shown in Figure 4.18. Almost all of the technological abatement in the EU ETS
perimeter comes fromclinker share reduction (between16 and32Mtons ofCO2)
31Steam coal and petcoke prices have fallen since 2011, due, among other reasons, to the shale
gas boom in the US. If the downward trend persists, a degradation of the cement performance
indicators would support this explanation.
32For the UK at the national level, we use corrected GNR data for emissions for phase I as in
the previous section because of the inaccuracy of EUTL data.
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Figure 4.18: Technological abatement in the EU ETS perimeter. The curves on
the left side show the abatement due to the different effects under the “Freeze”
scenario (dotted line) and the “Trend” scenario (dashed line). The histogram
on the right gives the sum of abatements over the years, in full color for the
“Trend” scenario, and in full color plus faded color for the “Freeze” scenario.
followedby alternative fuels (between2and12MtonsofCO2), while thedecrease
in energy efficiency led to negative abatement (between 4 and 7Mtons of CO2).
The detailed results, country by country, are given in the Appendix 4.6.2 and a
summary of the results is given in Table 4.4. Clinker reduction is the main lever
of technological abatement and led to actual abatement in Germany, France, the
UK, and Poland but negative abatement in Spain and Italy. In all countries except
France, abatement due to clinker substitution decreased (being negative in some
countries) after the economic downturn. This could be explained by overcapacity
and excess clinker production. Alternative fuel led to positive abatement in Spain,
theUKandPoland andnegative abatement in other countries (in France andGer-
many it could be because decarbonisation of the fuel mix had already started be-
fore the beginning of the EU ETS, so the “Trend” scenario gives lower emissions
and actual abatement is harder to achieve). The thermal energy efficiency effect
brought positive abatement in Germany, was neutral in the UK and brought neg-
ative abatement in France, Italy, and Poland. The electric energy efficiency ef-
fect brought positive abatement in the UK and Poland, was neutral in France and
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brought negative abatement inGermany, Italy and Spain. Electricity decarbonisa-
tion led to positive abatement in France, Spain, the UK and Italy and was insignif-
icant in Germany and Poland.
Table 4.4: Impact of different technological options on technological abatement
EUETS Germany France Spain UK Italy Poland
Clinker reduction + + +   +   +
Alternative fuel +     + + = +
Thermal Energy Efficiency   +   = =    
Electric Energy Efficiency     =   +   +
Elec Decarbonisation + = + + + + =
Note: a+ in clinker reduction means that clinker reduction indeed provided positive
technological abatement. = stands for indeterminate (when the error interval overlaps zero in
the decomposition)
4.4.3 Overallocation profits
Numerous studieshavedemonstrated that electricity companieshave reapedwind-
fall profits by passing through the allowance price to their consumers while they
had received the allowances for free (Sijm et al., 2006). Indeed, even allocated free
of charge, allowances can be sold and therefore have an opportunity cost.
The ability to pass through the allowance price to consumers has not beenwell-
established for cement companies. Economic theory suggests that for linear de-
mandcurves, pass-through rates are higher in competitivemarkets than inmonop-
olies (because prices are more directly linked to marginal production costs), and
formarketswith elastic supplies and inelastic demands (Sijmet al., 2008;Wooders
et al., 2009). The cement industry is an oligopoly with moderately elastic supply
and inelastic demand (Selim and Salem, 2010), which would suggest moderately-
high pass-through rates (75-80%) (Oxera Consulting, 2004). To our knowledge,
theonly twoempirical studies of pass-through rates in theEuropeancement sector
are to our knowledge an old study fromWalker (2006), which unveils positive but
moderate pass-through rates for 2005 (25-35%, depending on the country), and
Alexeeva-Talebi (2010) for the German cement, lime and plaster sector finding a
higher pass-through (73%).
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In this chapter, we focus on another source of “windfall” profits obtained from
theEUETS:overallocationprofits. Theprincipleof overallocationprofits is straight-
forward. When the number of EUAs,33 given free of charge to cement companies,
is higher than emissions necessary to manufacture the amount of cement really
produced; a surplus of EUAs is automatically generated. These allowances can
then be sold and will generate profits.
If we eliminate emissions due to electricity consumption from equation (4.7),
which are not accounted for by cement companies in the EU ETS, we have the
equation:
CEUTL;t = Qcement;t  Rt  Ht  (CEFpro + IEn;t  CEFF;t) (4.13)
where CEUTL;t are direct emissions, Qcement;t is cement production, Ht the clinker
homeproduction ratio,CEFpro the process emissions, IEn;t the energy intensity and
CEFF;t the carbon intensity of the fuel mix.
With the given state of technology in the EU 28 in 2005, and no clinker trade
(H = 1), an allocation cap At allows the production of a certain quantity of ce-
mentQAtcement without buying or selling allowances:
QAtcement =
At
REU282005(CEFpro + IEn;EU282005CEFF;EU282005)
=
At
CeCIEU282005
(4.14)
with the cement carbon intensity of the EU 28 in 2005 (CeCIEU282005) being 656
kg of CO2 per ton of cement.
34 In the rest of the chapter we will call QAtcement the
“production equivalent associated with the cap At”.
We compute the difference between actual emissionsCt (associatedwith values
Qcement;t, Rt, Ht, IEn;t and CEFF;t) and the reference situation corresponding to the
33for the EuropeanUnion Allowance, the “standard” allowance. Allowances from offset credits
are CER (Certified Emission Reductions) for Clean Development Mechanisms and ERU (Emis-
sions Reduction Units) from Joint Implementation.
34Calculated with the EU 28 values in 2005 of R, CEFpro, IEn and CEFF which are respectively
75.9%, 0.538 tCO2/ton of clinker, 3.69 GJ/ton of clinker and 0.0883tCO2/MJ.
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capAt (associatedwith valuesQ
At
cement,REU282005 ,H = 1, IEn;EU282005 andCEFF;EU282005);
and decompose it35 using the same LMDI decomposition method as in section
4.3. We then keep the activity effect, the clinker trade effect, and group the other
effects under the name “technology” effect.
The technology effect gives the proportion of the EUAs surplus due to techno-
logical performance, while the activity and clinker trade effects give the propor-
tions of the EUAs surplus due to underactivity and clinker outsourcing. Overal-
location is then defined as the sum of the activity and clinker trade effects. The
computed overallocation can be seen as the difference between actual allocation
and output-based allocation, based on current clinker production with a certain
level of technology (European average in 2005).
We choose to base the reference situation for technological performance on
the 2005 European average values so that the reference situation brings zero ex-
tra costs on average at the European level. The estimation of overallocation is then
rather conservative, another option could have been to take the technological per-
formance of the best-performing installations, as in the phase III benchmarking
(Ecofys et al., 2009).
Figure 4.19 shows the decomposition of the EU ETS allowances surplus over
time. The EUAs surplus is the sum of the activity effect, the trade effect and the
technology effect; which are positive respectively when production is lower than
the production equivalent associated with the cap (QAtcement), when net imports are
positive, and when cement carbon intensity is lower than the 2005 EU 28 level.
Overallocation, the sum of the activity and trade effects, can be negative (in this
case there is underallocation) when cement production is high and/or the region
is exporting clinker. It can also be higher than the EUAs surplus if the technology
effect is negative (high cement carbon intensity). The activity and trade effect can
cancel each other out, leading to no overallocation, for example when a region is
producing a high quantity of cement but importing clinker.
We also add to the EUAs surplus the offset credits used by the cement indus-
try to show the “real” allowances surplus. Indeed, European authorities allowed
companies to use offset credits (CERs or ERUs) to meet emissions caps during
35We use the EU ETS value of CEFPRO in this section, as the heart of the question is the EUAs
surplus and not “real” emissions.
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Figure 4.19: Overallocation over time in the EU ETS perimeter.
phase II. The offset limit as a share of allocations was not harmonized at the Euro-
pean level but differed among member states: 22% for Germany for example but
only 8% in the UK (Vasa, 2012). Companies could directly finance projects and
receive offset credits or purchase offset credits in the secondarymarket (including
pure swapping of EUAs to exploit the spread and maximize trading profits).
The first year that the EU ETS came into force, the overall cap was slightly too
generous with an overallocation of 12million EUAs (roughly 8% of the cap). The
increase in production in the following two years because of economic growth,
and a housing bubble in certain countries, while the cap was unchanged, led to a
reduction in the overallocation. Given European production levels at that time,
there would have been underallocation had net imports not been so massive. In
2005, 2006 and2007, roughly 30millionEUAswere saved thanks to the outsourc-
ing of 9, 11 and 14Mt of clinker respectively.
The economic downturn after 2008 led to a sharp decrease in production and
therefore a massive surplus of EUAs. We estimate that the low level of activity
brought 47, 52, 50 and 56 million of overallocated EUAs in 2009 to 2012 respec-
tively (between 25% and 32% of the annual cap). After 2009, Europe became a
net exporter of clinker (up to 6 Mt of clinker in 2012), so the clinker trade effect
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brought negative overallocation (e.g. underallocation) of 10 million EUAs (1.5%
of the cap). Of the EUAs surplus for phases I and II, 45 million EUAs (3% of the
cap) can be attributed to the technology effect.36 For phase II, 84% of the surplus
of 248 million EUAs was due to overallocation.
While having an excess of allowances, companiesmade intensive use of project-
based credits. Sandbag data at the installation level reveals that virtually all ce-
ment installations used offset credits, and that the overwhelmingmajority of them
surrendered credits up to a fixed share of allocation, which can be inferred at the
maximum amount authorized for cement installations in each country:37 22% in
Germany, 13.5% in France, 7.9% in Spain, 8.0% in the UK, 7.5% in Italy and 10%
in Poland. In total, 89 million offset credits were used, representing 10% of the
cap. The total surplus for phase II was then 337 million allowances, representing
almost the equivalent of two years of allocation.
Figure 4.20 displays the decomposition38 of the phase I and II allowances sur-
plus at the EUETS level and for themain European producers.39 A complete year
by year decomposition (as in Figure 4.19) is available in the Appendix 4.6.3 for
each country.
The cumulated overallocation at the EU ETS level for phases I and II is esti-
mated at 224 million EUAs (89% due to the activity effect and 11% due to the
trade effect). The country with by far the highest overallocation is Spain (65 mil-
36This corresponds to a “Freeze” scenario for which cement production would have been equal
to the production equivalent associated with the cap, which was higher than actual production,
which is why this figure is higher than the “Freeze” scenario of the previous section (42 million).
37For Spain (20.6%) and Italy (15%), there is a discrepancy between the share of allocation
authorized at the national level in Vasa (2012) and the one we found at the cement installation
level. An explanation could be that in these two countries the proportion of offset was probably
differentiated among sectors at the installation level.
38For computing overallocation per country we chose to consider a European average bench-
mark rather than a national benchmark to put each country on an equal footing. However as the
guiding principle of allocations in phase I and II was grandfathering, we also performed compu-
tations with national carbon intensities of cement (respectively 618, 637, 672, 710, 644 and 660
kgCO2 per ton of cement in Germany, France, Spain, the UK, Italy and Poland). For a given cap,
a lower carbon intensity of cement will correspond to a higher equivalent quantity of cement, and
thus to ahigher surplus andhigher overallocationprofits due to activity. Theonlynoticeable differ-
ence is for Germany: because of its high technological performance, the alternative computation
led to a smaller technology effect and a greater (and positive) activity effect, and thus no underal-
location. For the other countries the differences are not significant.
39In this section, for UK at the national level we use EU ETS data rather than GNR corrected
data though the coverage is incomplete, because the key question is the EUAs surplus.
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(a) Decomposition of the allowances surplus (left axis for the EU
ETS perimeter, right axis for main European countries)
(b) Decomposition of the allowances surplus, in years worth of allo-
cations or relative to average annual cap
Figure 4.20: Decomposition of the allowances surplus
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lion EUAs) followed by Italy (27 million EUAs), because of massive clinker im-
ports in phase I and large falls in production in phase II.
In these two countries, while the overallocation in phase II is overwhelmingly
dominated by the activity effect, the impact of the trade effect on cumulated over-
allocation for phases I and II is significant (33% for Spain and 42% for Italy). In-
deed therewas anegative activity effect in phase I (higher production than thepro-
duction equivalent associatedwith the cap)which cancels out someof the positive
activity effect (underproduction) in phase II. Conversely, there was no significant
negative trade effect in phase II to cancel out the positive trade effect in phase I.
Italy continued to be a clinker importer in phase II while Spain’s net exports after
2009 were much smaller in magnitude than its net imports before the crisis.
Overallocation was also positive in France (9 million EUAs, more than half of
it due to trade) and Poland (6 million EUAs, with a negative trade effect), while
there was actually underallocation in Germany (minus 9 million EUAs, due to
high production after 2008 and clinker exports). In relative terms, overallocation
was also the highest in Spain and theUK (2.2 years worth of allocations) followed
by Italy (0.9).
The technological performance varies significantly across countries and sodoes
the share of the technology effect in the EUAs surplus (which is 45 million EUAs
at the EU ETS level). Germany ranks first with 25million EUAs earned thanks to
low cement carbon intensity, followed by France (5million EUAs). The technol-
ogy effect is very small in the UK, Italy and Poland (0, 2, and 2 million EUAs re-
spectively) and even negative in Spain (minus 4 million EUAs). In relative terms,
Germany is also first (1.2 years worth of allocations) followed by France (0.3).
As mentioned above, because the thresholds vary from country to country, the
number of surrendered offset credits varied significantly among member states.
During phase II, they represented 21.1%, 13.3%, 7.4%, 6.7%, 7.2% and 8.4% of an-
nual EUAs cap in Germany, France, Spain, the UK, Italy and Poland respectively.
These differences raise concerns about equity between member states, that add
to concerns about the equity of national allocation plans. Fortunately, member
states with the most stringent allocation plans were generally the most generous
regarding the use of offset credits (see Table 4.5). The use of offset credits has
madeGermany’s allowances surplusmore than double the EUAs surplus (38mil-
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lion allowances compared to 16million EUAs, representing an increase of 140%).
The impact of offset credits on the surplus was also relatively significant in France
(+72%) and Poland (+55%) but less so in Italy (+34%), Spain (+18%), and the
UK (+17%).
Table 4.5: Decomposition of phase II allowances surplus
EUETS Germany France Spain UK Italy Poland
EUAs Surplus (millions) 248 7 14 58 19 34 5
EUAs Surplus (% cap) 28% 7% 18% 39% 39% 25% 9%
Technology Effect (MEUAs) 38 17 3 -3 1 1 2
Activity Effect (MEUAs) 215 -7 8 62 17 28 3
Trade Effect (MEUAs) -5 -3 3 -1 1 6 0
Overallocation (% Surplus) 84% -138% 77% 105% 93% 97% 54%
Offsets (millions) 89 22 10 11 3 10 5
Offsets (% cap) 10.4% 21.1% 13.7% 7.4% 8.0% 7.3% 8.5%
After havingdecomposed the allowances surplus and computedoverallocation,
let us turn to overallocation profits and offset savings. To estimate overalloca-
tion profits, wemultiply yearly overallocation by the yearly average allowance spot
price.40 If negative, overallocation profits correspond to underallocation profit
losses. If overallocation can be estimated with a high degree of accuracy, overal-
location profits are more difficult to estimate because carbon prices vary within
a year and, more importantly, allowances can be banked except from phase I to
phase II. It iswell-known that companieshavekept a significant shareof allowances
as a hedge against a future scarcity).
To estimate a lower limit of savings brought by offset credits, wemultiply yearly
surrendered offset credits by yearly EUA-CER spread values given by Stephan
et al. (2014) (4.05e, 1.54e, 2.06e, 3.34e and 4.87e from 2008 to 2012 respec-
tively). Actual savings are higher for two reasons. First, if companies originate
the projects, actual costs of project-based credits are much lower and savings are
thus higher (for example a HFC gas project can bring offset credits less than a few
Euros per ton of CO2, bringing more than ten Euros of savings per allowance be-
fore 2012). Second, the use of offset credits increased the global cap and therefore
40Obtained by Tendances Carbone of CDC Climat (http://www.cdcclimat.com/-
publications-.html), from 2005 to 2012 respectively: 18.04e, 17.3e, 0.7e, 22.2e, 13.1e,
14.3e, 13.0e and 7.4e).
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Figure 4.21: Overallocation profits and offset savings in the EU ETS perimeter
(left axis) and main European countries (right axis)
decreased the EUA price (Stephan et al., 2014).
Results are shown in Figure 4.21. We estimate overallocation profits at the EU
ETS level at 3.5 billion Euros. Overallocation profits would have been higher
with higher EUA prices, but the latter dropped precisely because of a surplus of
allowances, which was the main cause of the overallocation profits. However the
EUApricewould have beenhigher had the offset credits not been authorized. The
country with by far the highest overallocation profits is Spain (824Me) followed
by Italy (324 Me) and the UK (275 Me). Then come France (120 Me) and
Poland (103Me). Germany has 100Me of underallocation profit losses. A low
bound of offset savings is assessed at 342 Me at the EU ETS level, and Germany
is the country that benefits the most with 83Me.
Cumulated overallocation profits for the six countries reported is around 1.5
billion Euros, i.e. slightly less than half of overallocation profits at the EU ETS
level, whereas they account for two thirds of allocations. We can surmise (based
on EUTL data of EUAs surplus) that overallocation profits were particularly high
because of the activity effect in Romania, Bulgaria, Greece, Cyprus, Hungary and
Irelandwhere the accumulated EUAs surplus in phase II roughly corresponded to
two years of allocations.
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Discussing overallocation profits by company and not by country is also rele-
vant as the European cement market is dominated by a fewmultinational compa-
nies (see Table 4.6). In the case of the EU ETS, we find that the five and fifteen
biggest firms account for 56% and 86% of emissions in phase II respectively. Un-
fortunately, the GNR database only distinguishes countries and not companies,
so the only information we can obtain is the EUAs surplus through the EUTL
database and the offset credits used through the Sandbag database. A rough esti-
mate (considering that among the total 3.5 Ge of overallocation profits, compa-
nies’ overallocation profits are proportional to their EUAs surplus) leads to over-
allocation profits of 679Me, 436Me, 370Me, 364Me and 328Me for Lafarge,
HeidelbergCement, Holcim, Cemex and Italcementi respectively.
Table 4.6: The major European cement producers were present in many differ-
ent countries in 2012
%Emissions Countries
Phase II EUETS Germany France Spain UK Italy Poland
Lafarge 15% 11 X X X X X
Heidelberg 14% 11 X X X
Holcim 10% 10 X X X X
Italcementi 11% 6 X X X
Cemex 7% 5 X X X X
Buzzi 7% 5 X X X
Lafarge declared in its annual reports,41 from 2008 to 2012, 605 Me of gains
due to excess rights over actual emissions. This figure is not directly comparable to
our estimation of overallocation profits, because an unknown (but small) fraction
is due to technological performance (not considered as overallocation profits in
our estimation), and more importantly because allowances can be banked.
Furthermore, our definition of overallocation profits leaves out offset credits.
However, surrenderingoffset credits allowsmoreEUAs tobebanked(almost 40%
41Lafarge annual reports for the years year 2008 to 2012 (Lafarge, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012) in
pages F29 for 2009 to 2011 and F31 for 2012. The gains are 85 Me, 142Me, 158Me, 136Me
and 84 Me from 2008 to 2012 respectively. The same sentence is also copied and pasted into
each annual report in yearX: “For yearX+1, basedonour estimate of allowances to be received and
based onour current production forecasts, whichmay evolve in case ofmarket trends different that
from those expected of today, the allowances granted should exceed our needs on a consolidated
basis.”
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more at the European level for phase II), and therefore increases gains due to ex-
cess rights over actual emissions which are reported by companies.
Based on all these points, we can estimate than the biggest European producer
has sold at least half of theEUAs surplus, andwe can infer a similar situation for the
whole cement industry. Indeed, companies faced cash constraints because of the
economic recession and selling EUAs provided an easy access to liquidity. These
EUAs transfers have added to the downward trend of the carbon price (IETA,
2012), in turn decreasing the value of overallocation profits.
4.5 Conclusion
We have analysed and quantified the key drivers of carbon emissions from 1990
to 2012 in the European cement industry using an LMDI decomposition analysis.
Most of the emissions changes in the EU27 can be attributed to the activity effect.
The clinker trade effect has counterbalanced approximately one third of the high
activity effect in 2005-2008, because of high clinker imports at that period when
production capacities were fully employed. In addition, since the 1990s there has
been a slow trend of emissions reductions mostly due to the clinker share effect,
but also to the fuel mix effect and the electricity emissions factor effect. Next,
we have estimated technological abatement induced by the EU ETS. Because of
a small acceleration in clinker reduction and alternative fuel use after 2005, 26
Mtons of CO2 (16 Mtons) of emissions have been abated from 2005 to 2012,
corresponding to a 2.2% ( 1.3%) decrease. However these effects could have
been due to the rise of energy prices rather than the EU ETS. Finally, decompos-
ing the allowance surplus allowedoverallocation and thus overallocation profits to
be assessed. The cement industry reaped 3.5 billion Euros of overallocation prof-
its during phases I and II, mainly because of the slowdown in production, while
allowance caps were unchanged.
European cement companies have been suffering from the economic downturn
through reduced sales, low return on investment (BCG, 2013) and a decline in
profits (Bolscher et al., 2013). However, their financial situationwould have been
far worse had the EU ETS not been implemented. During phase II, the scheme
was tantamount to a subsidy of 3.5 Euros per tonne of cement produced in Eu-
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rope,42 which significantly increased the profitability of the sector.43 Presented
as a threat to competitiveness, the EU ETS has paradoxically boosted European
cement industry competitiveness, when defined as a company’s ability to earn
(Quirion, 2010).
Since 2013 and the beginning of phase III, the EU ETS conditions have been
less favorable for the cement industry, because of an increased stringency of the
allocation methodology. The allocation is now based on the average of the 10%
best-performing installations, corresponding to 766 kgCO2 per tonof clinker (Eu-
ropeanCommission, 2011), anddeclines at a rateof 1.74%per year. However, this
benchmark is then multiplied for each installation by the historical activity level
(HAL), which is generally based on pre-crisis levels.44 Overallocation occurred
in 2013 (emissions were 20% lower than the cap) and will go on for the years to
come unless production significantly increases.
Because of high levels of uncertainty concerning future production levels, the
difference between HAL and actual production can be very large. The choice of
HAL thus has deep financial repercussions on companies: too high a HAL au-
tomatically brings overallocation profits while one that is too low induces losses
of profit. Output-based allocations, which consists in linking directly allocations
to production, have the desirable benefit of by-passing the determination of HAL
and the potential overallocation profits or underallocation profit losses that ac-
company it. Given the order of magnitude of financial values at stake that have
been reported in this analysis, this advantage outweighs by far potential draw-
backs.45 Such a dynamic allocation (?) would lead to fewer economic distor-
423.5 billion Euros of overallocation profits divided by 1 billion tonnes of cement produced.
43Based on financial data (including reported sales of allowances), Boyer and Ponssard (2013)
find that the EBIDTA/sales ratio (Earnings Before Investment, Depreciation, Taxes and Amor-
tization) of the Western European cement industry for phase II would have been 26.3% without
sales of allowances, instead of 32.9%. Furthermore, the impact would have been more significant
had cement companies sold all these financial assets instead of banking a significant share.
44TheHAL is, except for changes in capacity, themedian value of the annual activity during the
period 2005-2008 or 2009-2010 (whichever is the highest) (European Commission, 2011).
45These drawbacks include fluctuating cap, administrative complexity, or providing little incen-
tive to reduce the consumption of polluting goods (Quirion, 2009). However, these defaults can
be mitigated with an appropriate design and additional policies. An extended discussion of op-
timal design for output-based allocations and complementary policies, as well as the comparison
between other anti-leakage policies is beyond the scope of this chapter. For more information we
recommend Chapter 1, Dröge (2009), Meunier et al. (2014) and Neuhoff et al. (2014).
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tions and more incentives to reduce carbon emissions than the current allocation
methodology. An alternative option would be full auctioning with the inclusion
of importers (Neuhoff et al., 2014).
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4.6.1 Formulas
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Figure 4.22: Technological abatement in Germany. The curves on the left side
show the abatement due to the different effects under the “Freeze” scenario
(dotted line) and the “Trend” scenario (dashed line). The histogram on the
right gives the sum of abatements over the years, in full color for the “Trend”
scenario, and in full color plus faded color for the “Freeze” scenario.
Figure 4.23: Technological abatement in France.
4Celec = CE;T   CE;0
ln(CE;T)  ln(CE;0) ln(
CEFelec;T
CEFelec;0
) (4.25)
4.6.2 Technological abatement country by country
4.6.3 Overallocation country by country
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Figure 4.24: Technological abatement in Spain.
Figure 4.25: Technological abatement in the UK.
Figure 4.26: Technological abatement in Italy.
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Figure 4.27: Technological abatement in Poland.
Figure 4.28: Overallocation in Germany.
Figure 4.29: Overallocation in France
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Figure 4.30: Overallocation in Spain
Figure 4.31: Overallocation in the UK
Figure 4.32: Overallocation in Italy
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Figure 4.33: Overallocation in Poland
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5
EU ETS, Free Allocations and Activity
Level Thresholds: The devil lies in the
details
Starting from Phase 3, the EU Emissions Trading System introduced a new rule
which links the level of free allocation to the activity level of an installation–known
as activity level thresholds (ALTs). Whilst put in place with the intention to re-
duce excess free allocation to low-activity plants, the new rule creates incentives
for installations to “game” output levels in order to maximise free allocation. This
chapter measures the distortionary effects resulting from ALTs, by exploiting the
natural experimentof the introductionof thenewrule in2012, anddiscusseswhether
the disadvantages of ALTs outweigh the advantages.
The justification forusing free allocations in emission trading schemeshas evolved
over time. Historically, in schemes such as the U.S. acid rain program, it was in-
troduced as a compensationmechanism for the owners of existing industrial assets
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for a change in the rules of the game (Ellerman et al., 2000). A lump sum trans-
fer would be made to existing assets through a predetermined amount of annual
free allocations for a given number of years. Such methods are termed “grandfa-
thering”, “historic”, “lump-sum” or “ex-ante” allocation. New assets would not be
allowed free allocations and thus would have to pay for all their permits on the
market. As long as the free allocations are predetermined, all assets (old and new)
would compete on the same playing field, the price of permits would provide the
same opportunity cost for mitigating pollution, and in theory, the output price of
the goods sold would incorporate the price signal for consumers.
More recently, free allocations have been explicitly used (or have been pro-
posed to be used) as a way to strategically alleviate the risk of offshoring produc-
tion and emissions (so-called “carbon leakage”) for Energy-Intensive and Trade-
Exposed (EITE) sectors such as cement, chemicals and steel. Economists gener-
ally agree that, in a world of unequal carbon prices, full auctioning together with
some formof border levelling of priceswould be the second best approach to tack-
ling leakage (Hepburn et al., 2006; Monjon and Quirion, 2011). However, the
required degree of international cooperation to achieve such a system has not yet
been forthcoming. Thus, a number of papers suggest that, from an economic ef-
ficiency standpoint, “output-based” allocation (OBA) would be a preferred third-
best option (Fischer and Fox, 2007; Quirion, 2009; Fischer and Fox, 2012; Meu-
nier et al., 2014b). Under OBA, the volume of free allocation is directly propor-
tional to actual production, hence it acts as an implicit production subsidy and thus
provides little incentive to reflect the carbon price in the final product price, or to
reduceproductionof thepolluting goods. Theoutput reduction is then lower than
the social optimum, inducing higher overall costs for a given emissions reductions
target. However, these cost inefficiencies may be balanced out by the reduction
in windfall profits and carbon leakage compared to grandfathering, if applied to
targeted sectors. An OBA scheme has been implemented within the Californian
ETS which began in 2012 (California Air Resources Board, 2013). In contrast
the EU ETS Phase 3 is unique in using a complex system. It combines an ex-ante
calculation1 of an allocation and subsequent lump-sum transfer based on historic
1Note that ex-ante and ex-post refer to whether the calculation of the freely allocated amount
of allowances occurs prior to or following the production and emissions for which allowances are
194
output (and multiplied by an emissions intensity benchmark) with a possible ex-
post calculation and adjustment of this lump-sum according to rules related to ac-
tual capacity and activity levels as defined inDecision (2011/278/EU)(European
Commission, 2011). Situations in which ex-post adjustments occur include the
arrival of new entrants into the market, plant capacity extension/reduction, plant
closure and partial cessation or recommencement of activity at an existing plant.
These latter rules are governed by the activity level thresholds (ALTs).2
Qualitatively, ETS schemes with ALTs approximate OBA: the amount of free
allocations will vary with the activity level, and the over allocation profits3 associ-
ated with ex-ante schemes will be reduced.4 The advantage of ALTs rules is that
they allow for a fixed cap (in fact a cap which will not exceed a predetermined
amount for existing installations and the reserve for new entrants). One disadvan-
tage is that they introduce an element of complexity in the scheme. Under these
non-linear rules, the lump sum transfer of allowances to EITE sectors is reduced
by 50%, 75%or 100% if the annual level of production of the plant falls below50%,
25% or 10% respectively, of the historical activity level (HAL) of production that
is used to determine the ex-ante allocation (European Commission, 2011).
A second disadvantage is that the ALTs introduce distortions, which is the fo-
cus of this chapter. A recent study on the EU ETS impacts on the cement sector
2005-2013 (Neuhoff et al., 2014) found preliminary evidence through data anal-
ysis and comprehensive interviews with industry executives, that newALTs intro-
duced in 2013 provided cement installations the incentive to adjust output levels.
The rationale is as follows. Since the free allocation in year t+ 1 is directly linked
to output in year t, if output levels lie below the threshold levels, there may be an
to be allocated.
2Newentrant provision and closing ruleswere already in place inPhases 1 and2of theEU-ETS
but they differed amongMember States. A closure rule is also used in the Californian ETS.
3Overallocation profits come from the allowances surplus automatically generated when the
number of free allowances received is higher than emissions necessary tomanufacture the amount
of cement produced (Chapter 4). Overallocation profits can be distinguished from windfall prof-
its, which refer to the profits from free allocation where emitters additionally profit from passing
on themarginal CO2 opportunity cost to product prices, despite receiving the allowances for free.
overallocation profits can occur even in the absence of cost pass through, if output fall short of
historic levels.
4Windfall and overallocation gains have been a persistent shortcoming of the use of ex-ante
free-allocation mechanism in the EU ETS (e.g. Laing et al. (2014); Sartor et al. (2014); Sandbag
(2012).
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incentive to increase output in year t to achieve the relevant threshold (.10, .25,
.50) and receive higher free allocations in year t+1. In this chapter, such strategic
adjustments of output motivated by ALTs is termed “gaming” behaviour, in line
with themanagement literature (e.g. Jensen (2001)). Neuhoff et al. (2014) report
that in interviews, company executives consistently confirm these practices where
the regional cement market demand is insufficient to reach the minimum activity
level. They identify three channels to marginally increase production in a plant
which is producing below the threshold:
• Production shifting among local plants, i.e. reducing the production at a
plant which is well above the threshold to increase the production at the
plant which is below; this generates some transport costs5 so that it can be
too costly to be undertaken at a large scale;
• Exports of clinker to other markets so as not to perturb the local market
while increasing production; this generates some cost in terms of export
price rebate, since these exports would not naturally occur;
• Increase the clinker to cement ratio, i.e. incorporate within limits more
clinker in cement instead of using less costly cementitious additives such
as slag or flying ashes; this directly generates some cost.
In this chapterwe revisit the existence and themagnitudeof the distortions, and
ask whether or not the installation outputs and trade flows in 2012 affected by the
free allocation policy change for year 2013. Our analysis is conducted in a unique
context of low demand induced by a severe economic downturn. The construc-
tion of a counterfactual requires some assumptions, the most significant of which
considers that consumption and price levels for cement are independent of the
allocation scheme. This assumption is consistent with the observations made in
Neuhoff et al. (2014). We discuss in detail how our results would be affected if we
had adopted the more standard assumption in which grandfathering and output
based allocation would lead to different cement and price levels.
5McKinsey&Company (2008) estimate that transport costs for a tonneof clinker fromAlexan-
dria to Rotterdam are roughly e20/tonne, and that inland shipping costs are approximately
e3.5/tonne per 100km and inland road transport was aboute8.6/ton per 100km.
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Empirical studies on the impact of ALTor similar rules remain limited. Most of
these studies have examined the distortive effects of combined ex-ante allocations
with ex-post new entrant and plant closure provisions. Pahle et al. (2011); Eller-
man (2008); Neuhoff et al. (2006) compared the new entrant provision relative
to auctioning. These papers argued that new entrant provisions distort via their
impact on investment decisions in the electricity sector (essentially by acting as a
subsidy). Meunier et al. (2014b) compared this same provision with an output-
based schemewhenever firms face an uncertain demand in the EU cement sector.
They showed the entrant provision could induce excessive new investments while
offering limited protection against leakage. Fowlie et al. (2012), this time for the
US cement sector, compare ex-ante schemes with closure rules with an output-
based scheme and show that the lifetime of old inefficient plants would be unduly
extendedwith the former while temporarily reducing leakage. Only this last paper
has discussed the impacts of the possible distortions associated with the (limited)
addition of “non-linear” ex-post adjustments to ex-ante allocation via the use of
ALTs, such as introduced in the EU ETS Phase 3 (2013-2020).
The findings in this chapter could be potentially relevant to other EITEs with
similar characteristics. Altogether, we argue that the benefits of implementing
ALTs in terms of reduced overallocation profits will not necessarily outweigh the
significant costs in the form of distortions. Hence it may be preferable to aban-
don ALTs for OBA for some sectors in the short run. We discuss some broader
questions if such a change were adopted.
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 5.1 discusses the EU ETS Phase
3 allocation rules, the predicted gaming behaviour from thresholds and the alter-
native allocation rules. Section 5.2 describes our conceptual framework for eval-
uating the effects of ALTs, the methodology, data sources, as well as the key as-
sumptions involved in our analysis. Section 5.3 presents the results. Section 5.4
concludes and discusses policy recommendations.
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5.1 ETS free allocation rules and gaming of ALTs
5.1.1 The EU-ETS Phase 3 free allocation rules
In Phase 3 of the EU ETS, installations in sectors “deemed to be exposed to car-
bon leakage” are eligible to receive free allocation of emission allowances. The
determination of the free allowances for each installation combines an ex-ante cal-
culation, based on the historic output for existing installations (known as the “his-
torical activity level” or “HAL”6) or the initial capacity for new installations, with
an ex-post calculation based on the ongoing activity level of this installation as de-
fined in Decision (2011/278/EU) (European Commission, 2011). The ex-post
calculation provides step wise adjustments intended to reflect changes in market
volumes. These adjustments follow complex procedures.
For existing installations, theprecise relationship thatdetermines thenext-period
allocation from ex-ante and ex-post values is summarised by Equations (5.1) and
(5.2) below. The amount of free allocations to an installation, i, at period t + 1,
for an eligible product, p is denoted Ai;p;t+1.
Ai;p;t+1 = CSCFt  Bp  HALi;p  ALCFt+1( qi;p;t
HALi;p
) (5.1)
In equation (5.1) CSCFt is the uniform cross-sectoral correction factor,
7 Bp is
the benchmark for product p,8 HALi;p represents the historical activity level, qi;p;t
represents the output of the eligible product in year t; and ALCFt+1(
qi;p;t
HALi;p
) is
the activity level correction factor. The latter factor defines a step wise function
6The benchmarked product-related historical activity level (HAL) is defined as maximum of
the median annual historical production of the product in the installation (or sub-installation)
concerned during either 2005-2008 or 2009-2010. (cf. Decision (2011/278/EU)).
7This is determined by comparing the sum of preliminary total annual amounts of emission
allowances allocated free to installations (not electricity) for each year over the period 2013-2020.
In 2013 the CSCF is equal to 0.9427, then declines at 1.74% per year.
8Product benchmarks in general reflect the average performance of the 10%most efficient in-
stallations in the sector or subsector in the years 2007-2008.
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for the thresholds. It is defined as:
ALCFt+1(
qt
HAL
) =
8>>>>>>><>>>>>>>:
1; if
qt
HAL
 0:5
0:5; if 0:25  qt
HAL
< 0:5
0:25; if 0:10  qt
HAL
< 0:25
0; if 0  qt
HAL
< 0:10
(5.2)
For new installations, the historic activity level is replaced by the capacity, to be
precisely determined according to the rules.9
5.1.2 Gaming and thresholds
Gaming behaviour refers to artificially increasing production to attain thresholds,
in order to obtain more allowances. Consider a plant for which the “business as
usual” activity level for year 2012 would be at say 40% of its historic activity level.
Increasing production up to 50% of its historic activity level allows doubling the
free allocation received. A rough calculation with a clinker plant illustrates the po-
tential benefit of gaming. Suppose HAL refers to 1 Mt/year (millions of metric
tons per year), the business as usual is 0.4 Mt in 2012 so that the plant needs to
increase production by 0.1 Mt to achieve the 50% threshold. At 7.95e/tCO2 in
2013 (average future price of December 2013 during year 2012), if the firm gets
100%of free allowances relative toHAL it isworth5.8Me(0.94271Mt0.766
tCO2/t 7.95e/tCO2, numbers being respectively CSCF, HAL, clinker bench-
mark and carbon price); losing 50% allowances implies a loss of 2.9Me. Suppose
the emission intensity is say 0.8 tCO2/t of clinker. The increase in emissions is
then equal to 0.080 tCO2 which at 7.95e/tCO2 amounts to 0.64Me.
In the presence of activity level thresholds, the allowances net benefit of gaming
is the difference between the increased free allocations and the certificates needed
to cover the increased production (in our case 2.26Me=2.9Me-0.64Me). The
net benefit depends on the price of CO2, the benefit rising with the price. How-
ever, this artificial increase of production involves cost inefficiencies, which can
be assumed increasing function of the extra production, independent of the CO2
9Guidance document number 7 in European Commission, 2011.
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Figure 5.1: The value of gaming. The installation engages in gaming when
ΔX < ΔX0. I refers to the carbon intensity of the plant. Benefits are increased
free allocations minus extra emissions.
price but dependent on the plant. These cost inefficiencies can up to a point can-
cel out the gains from increased free allocation. This is shown in Figure 5.1, where
gaming is undertaken only if the increased production to attain the threshold is
less than ΔX0. In our case, if the extra production of 0.1 ton of clinker does not
involve cost inefficiencies of more than 2.53Me, gaming is profitable.
Evidenceof strong responses to thresholds –where small changes inbehaviours
lead to large changes in outcomes – has been found in the recent literature. Sallee
and Slemrod (2012) find evidence that the automakers respond to notches in the
GasGuzzler tax and tomandatory fuel economy labels bymanipulating fuel econ-
omy ratings in order to qualify for more favourable treatment. The management
control literature also finds that managers tend to react strongly to the existence
of a threshold. This is the case, for example, when bonuses depend on the achieve-
ment of a given level of sales for a sales manager, a given productivity indicator for
a plantmanager, a given return on investment for a businessmanager, a given level
of the total shareholder return for a CEO, etc (Locke, 2001). In a well-known ar-
ticle, Jensen (2001) points out that such “gaming” behaviour is perfectly rational
under threshold rules. He argues that these rules imply an agency cost which is
largely underestimated and suggests that linear bonus schemes should be prefer-
able.
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5.1.3 Alternative free allocation rules
The EU ETS Phase 3 rules can be compared with an ex ante allocation without
ALTs or an output-based allocation scheme. Under OBA, the next period alloca-
tion is determinedaccording to anequation similar to equation(5.1) (withqi;p;t  !
HALi;p  ALCFt+1( qi;p;t
HALi;p
)). The scheme therefore has no thresholds, and the
historic activity level HAL is replaced by the previous year activity level qi;p;t so as
allocations are altered on a continuous yearly production basis. In this chapter,
we will evaluate the impact of the ALTs by contrasting four scenarios, with their
respective acronym:
• Ex-ante free allocation with ALTs (Phase 3 allocation rules) and gaming
(EXALTG);
• Ex-ante free allocation with ALTs (Phase 3 allocation rules) without gam-
ing (EXALTNG);
• Ex-ante free allocation without ALTs (EX);
• Ex-post output based allocation (OBA).
Scenario EXALTG corresponds to what was observed in Phase 3. Scenario EX-
ALTNG applies the same rules but it is a hypothetical scenario where no gaming
behaviour is observed (every variable is identical as in EX, except the allocation,
which follows a different rule). EXALTNG, EX andOBA represent counterfactu-
als.
5.2 Methodology and data
Since 2013 is the first year the threshold rule is in place, the 2012 activity level
directly determines the allocation allowances for 2013. The preliminary analysis
in Neuhoff et al. (2014) provided evidence of distortions arising from the ALTs
rule. The present study quantifies these distortions.
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5.2.1 The cement sector
Our analysis focuseson the cement sector10 for three reasons. First, it ranks amongst
the highest in terms of carbon intensity per value added thus the effects of free al-
location rules are magnified. The cement production process can be divided into
two basic stages: production of clinker and the subsequent grinding and blend-
ing of clinker with other mineral components to produce cement. The first stage
(clinker production) accounts for the bulk of carbon emissions in cement produc-
tion. Allocation under the EU ETS is based on a benchmark on clinker. The rele-
vant output involved in the threshold rule is then the quantity of clinker produced.
However cement is the final product and is traded as well, so that the analysis has
to be done simultaneously for both products. Industry characteristics (economies
of scale, sunk cost, high land transportation cost) suggest that the relevant market
be defined at the regional level, which we define as EUmember states.11
Second, as the sector experienced a demand collapse in the order of 50% or
more between 2007 and 2012 in severalmember states, the ALTs rules were likely
to have been a relevant factor for operational decisions during the period stud-
ied. Indeed we suspect that themost important differences between scenarios EX
and EXALTG will occur in countries in which cement and clinker consumption
in 2012 fell well short of historical consumption level and hence ALTs rules are
relevant. For convenience our results obtained for each member state will be ag-
gregated. The 26 EU ETS member states12 with ETS-participating clinker pro-
duction plants will be divided into two groups (see Table 5.1). The first group in-
cludes countries where the average domestic cement consumption in 2011-2012
was less than 70%of 2007 levels.13 Wename this group “lowdemand” (LD) coun-
tries. Of the LD countries, we present some of the results for Greece and Spain, as
these twomember stateswere particularly affected by the downfall. TheLDcoun-
10For an overview of the European cement sector see Boyer and Ponssard (2013).
11Somesmall countries are regrouped into larger entitieswhich are coherent in termsof regional
market (see Section C.1).
12Note that Iceland, Liechtenstein, Malta have no listed clinker plants in the EUTL database,
while data for Cypriote plants was not able to be exploited due to missing data.
13The average of 2011 and 2012 was taken since both years are relevant to the analysis that
follows here. 2007 is taken as the reference year since this was the year in which demand peaked
in most EUMember States prior to the economic crisis of 2008.
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LowDemand (LD) Countries Moderate Demand (MD)Countries
Ireland, Spain, Greece, Bulgaria, Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic,
Hungary, Denmark, Portugal, Italy, Finland, France, Germany, Netherlands,
Slovenia and Baltic countries Norway, Poland, Romania, Slovakia,
Sweden and United Kingdom
Table 5.1: Moderate (MD) and low demand (LD) countries in terms of cement
consumption in 2012 relative to 2007 levels
tries represented 51%of EUETS cement emissions in 2008 and 40% in 2012. The
remaining countries are classified as “moderate demand” (MD).
Third, the cement sector is characterised by relatively homogeneous products
andproductionprocesses, unlike chemicals and steel for examplewithmanyprod-
uct categories and differentiated impacts. This aspect does not make distortions
due to ALTsmore likely to occur; but facilitate their quantifications. Indeed, allo-
cation is determined with activity levels (
q
HAL
, in the cement sector, q being the
quantity of clinker), but data on output is not publicly available at the installation
level. However, data on emissions is, thanks to the EuropeanUnion Transactions
Log (EUTL). Because of the very strong and direct relationship between produc-
tionof clinker, a highly homogeneous product, and emissions, it is possible to infer
production (activity) from emissions.14
5.2.2 Conceptual framework and main assumptions
The quantification of distortions due to the thresholds necessitates the elabora-
tion of a counterfactual scenario for 2012 (what would have happened had the
threshold rule not been implemented) for each relevantmarket. A simple compar-
14Weuse the observed ratio of publically-reported verified emissions (E) relative to theHistor-
ical Emissions Level (HEL), to proxy the share of unobserved activity level relative to Historical
Activity Level (HAL) i.e. E=HEL  q=HAL. This approximation is possible because the emis-
sions intensities of clinker production have changed only verymarginally in the EU in recent years
between 2005 and 2012 (WBCSD, 2009). At first sight, the approximation E=HEL  q=HAL
may turn problematic for precisely distinguishing between installations that are above or below
thresholds (25% and 50% of q=HAL). However, as detailed in Appendix 5.5.1, we ensure that
installations are correctly identified using 2013 allocations data. This reveals whether or not the
installation had seen its allocation reduced because of 2012 activity levels. Further, 2013 alloca-
tion data also allowed us to obtain clinker carbon intensity at the plant level, and then to assess
production through emissions (see Appendix 5.5.1).
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ison between 2011 and 2012 would give inaccurate results because of underlying
market trends e.g. cement consumption fell by 13% at the EU level between 2011
and 2012. Comparing with a counterfactual enables us to understand the mag-
nitude of the excess output due to ALTs, and the corresponding excess emissions
andoverallocationprofits. A straightforward caveat is that our results are then very
dependent on the counterfactual, which is developed by combining historical data
at the country and plant level using a panel data model. We also conduct Monte
Carlo analysis to assess confidence intervals and conduct a number of robustness
tests to limit this caveat.
Data at the plant level (246 clinker plants operating in 2010, 2011 and 201215)
from the EUTL are used to obtain the distribution of plant activity level for 2011
and 2012 EXALTG. To construct the value of counterfactual plant activity level
for the other 2012 scenarios, we suppose that cement consumption and price are
independent of the allocation method. We discuss this assumption in two steps.
The first step assumes that EX and OBA give identical cement consumption
and price (H1). This appears at odds with the economic literature (Fischer and
Fox, 2007;Demailly andQuirion, 2006)whichwould clearly distinguish between
ex-ante free allocations and ex-post OBA. Ex-ante free allocations would ordinar-
ily not provide any protection against leakage (they are a lump sum transfer and
firmsmarginal cost fully support the cost of carbon)while ex-postOBAallocations
would (with OBA, firms receive free allocation proportional to their output the
marginal cost is unchanged and there are no competitive impacts with respect to
imports; this is the usual argument in favour of OBA). Cement consumption and
price would then differ depending on which of these two allocation schemes is
used: cement price would be higher in EX thanOBA as firms would pass through
some of the opportunity cost of allowances, and then consumption lower through
a price effect. This chapter departs from this view. Rather, it assumes that firms
adopt exactly the same pricing and production decisions in their home market in
OBA and ex-ante allocation.
This assumption is supported by a series of in depth interviews with cement
15For this purpose, we rely heavily on the work carried out in Chapter 4, which have developed
an installation level dataset for the EU cement sector with clinker producing installations identi-
fied.
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sector actors (Neuhoff et al. (2014) p.26) to explicitly show why there has been
no price change. These interviews point out three reasons for such behaviour: (i)
The ex-ante free allocations have been obtained precisely to mitigate leakage thus
a risk of losing future free allocations if regulators observe the ability to pass on the
cost of carbon without observing leakage; (ii) long term strategic considerations
– such as maintainingmarket share and good client relationships – could partially
balance the incentive to pass the carbon price; (iii) the risk of drawing the atten-
tion of competition authorities due to abnormal profit levels if the carbon cost was
indeed passed through.16 However it is important to note that these empirical ob-
servations have been made in a context of low carbon price. We certainly do not
claim thatH1 would prevail at all times.
The second step assumes that EX (or EXALTNG since these only differ in
terms of allowances) and EXALTG give identical cement consumption and price
(H2). This means that cement consumption and price would not be affected by
gaming. Since the clinker production is likely to increase through gaming the
question is what happens to the excess production. Neuhoff et al. (2014) identify
three channels: reshuffling of production among plants (this may be quite easily
done since many cement companies are multi-plants), exports to non EU coun-
tries and increase in the clinker to cement ratio. From an economic point of view
one needs to rationalize why a player would use these channels rather than sim-
ply pour its excess production directly into its regionalmarket. Our answer comes
from the oligopolistic nature of competition and the low price elasticity in the ce-
ment market.17 Increasing the regional supply would most certainly depress the
price substantially, and induce strong reactions from competitors. While we can-
not exclude that a small fraction of the excess production does actually go into the
regional market, the data will by and large support the extensive use of the other
three channels.
These two hypothesesH1 andH2 suppose that cement consumption and price
are independent of the allocation method, and allow us to construct a counter-
factual plant activity common to the counterfactual scenarios (EX, EXALTNG
16The EU cement industry faced and continue to face investigations from EU and
national competition authorities; see for instance https://www.gov.uk/cma-cases/
aggregates-cement-and-ready-mix-concrete-market-investigation
17For estimates see Meunier et al. (2014a).
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and OBA) in the absence of data or models to directly assess the effects of alloca-
tionmethodologies on consumption and prices. We argue the empirical evidence
reported in Neuhoff et al. (2014) is persuasive and support these assumptions.
However, given the discrepancy with the literature, it is important to see how our
results would stand ifH1 orH2 were relaxed. This is done in Section 5.3.7, where
we show that results remain mostly unchanged (especially relaxing the more con-
troversial assumption H1). Moreover, qualitative assessment suggests that our
estimations would be biased in the conservative direction (underestimating the
effect of gaming on production and profits).
We now proceed on our methodology. Having estimated counterfactual pro-
duction levels by installation,18 we estimate the number of free allowances (EUA
for EUAllowance, which is the official name of pollution permits traded in the EU
Emissions Trading Scheme) received at the plant level under the various scenar-
ios. As an example, let us consider a plant, which is functioning at 50% E/HEL
and receiving 1 million EUAs.19 Suppose that our econometric model finds that
the counterfactual activity level of this plant is 40%. This plant would have re-
ceived 0.4million EUAs underOBA, 1million EUAs under EX and EXALTG, 0.5
million EUAs under EXALTNG.
In this short example, we see that gaming from40% to 50% allows obtaining 0.5
MEUAsmore allowances, but involves 0.11Mt CO2 of additional emissions,
20 so
that the net gain in terms of allowances is 0.39MEUAs. To convert the various ef-
fects into monetary value, we assume a CO2 price at 7.95e/t, which corresponds
to the average future price (December 2013) during year 2012.21 In our quantifi-
cation of the net financial impactwe consider that the increased production is sold
atmarginal cost, and so has no impact onprofits. We refer to this hypothesis asH3.
In practice plants may actually sell their excess production at a different price, the
18Aswe perform aMonteCarlo analysis, there is not “a” counterfactual but 10,000. For simplic-
ity, we will explain the reasoning as if there was just one (these different steps are simply repeated
for each sample of counterfactual).
19Caution, in order to make computations easier, this plant does not have the same character-
istics as the one in Section 2.2. They both have a clinker carbon intensty of 0.8 tCO2 per ton of
clinker, but the latter had aHAL at 1Mt per year, this one receives 1million EUAs, which is equiv-
alent to a HAL of 1.38Mt per year.
20Assuming that the plant has a clinker carbon intensity of 800 kg CO2 per ton of clinker.
21Source: ICE database (http://data.theice.com/MyAccount/Login.aspx).
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Scenarios Allocations Production
OBA Proportional to Activity Counterfactual
HAL ALCF ! q in Eq (5.1)) (explained in section 5.2.3)
EX Independent of Activity
Same as OBA
(ALCF = 1 in Eq (1))
EXALTNG Hybrid
Same as OBA
(Eq (5.1))
EXALTG Same as EXALTNG Actual 2012 Production
Table 5.2: Scenarios
important point being that the associated revenue be higher than the associated
inefficiency costs (see Section 2.2). The precise financial impact is bound to de-
pend on circumstances specific to each plant which are unobservable. H3 allows
for an estimate of the financial impact.
In summary, for the fourdifferent scenarios, we computeproduction, emissions
and allocation. The net allowances (allocations minus emissions) are compared
for the scenariosEX,EXALTNG,EXALTGandOBA.Comparingother scenarios
to OBA gives an estimation of overallocation profits (in MEAUs or Me). The
difference between EXALTG and EXALTNG gives the impact of gaming. Table
5.2 summarises how allocations and production are obtained under each scenario.
Comparing counterfactual net exports to real net exports gives the part of the
excess clinker production which is destined for clinker exports and cement ex-
ports. If no stockpiling is assumed, the remaining part can be attributed to the
change in the clinker ratio.
5.2.3 Estimation strategy
We calculate counterfactual clinker production levels of a plant in 2012 and char-
acterise output behaviour of firms conditional on national and plant level vari-
ables. As noted, the unobserved level activity of plant i in year t is approximated by
the observed level of emissions PlantActivityi;t  Ei;t
HELi
the activity level of plant i
in year t (ratio of emissions divided by historic emissions level). As noted also, we
assume that cement consumption is independent of allocation rules. Therefore,
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cement consumption would have been the same in 2012 had the ALTs rule not
been implemented.
Weuse amultiplicative panel datamodel to estimate the following specification
of clinker production level in plant i at time t to obtain parameters used to calculate
counterfactual activity level in 2012:
4lnPlantActivityi;t = α0 + β14 lnCementConsumc3i;t
+ β24 lnGDPc3i;t + γ1lnRelativeCO2Intensityi
+ γ2lnRelativePlantsizei + γ3Coasti + "i;t
(5.3)
In order to accommodate the autoregressive nature of plant activity, we define
all country-level variables (source of the data is in Table 5.3) including the depen-
dent variable in first differenced terms. This allows us to difference out the time-
invariant country specific heterogeneity, using adjacent observations. The depen-
dent variable is the (first differenced) natural log of the activity level of plant i in
year t. Cement consumption andGDP are also expressed in first differenced natu-
ral log terms. In addition, we include time invariant22 plant-level variables: the rel-
ative average carbon intensity of a plant;23 relative plant size;24 and a dummy vari-
ables for coastal plants.25 In order to minimize measurement errors which would
bias the regression, we regroup some small countries into larger entities which are
coherent in terms of regional market: Baltic countries, Benelux, Norway-Sweden
andSlovenia-Italy. As theBreush-Pagan test reveals the presence of heteroskedas-
ticity,robust standard errors clustered at the country level are used.
22Some variables such as the clinker carbon intensity of the plant may not be strictly time in-
variant but it is the case in the first approximation.
23The relative carbon intensity is defined as the natural log of carbon intensity at the plant
level divided by the average carbon intensity in the country it is located (RelativeCO2Intensityi =
ln(
IHAL;i
IHAL;c3i
), where IHAL;c3i is the average carbon intensity of plants (in tons of CO2 per ton of
clinker) in the country where the plant i is located).
24This is defined as the natural log of the historical activity level of the plant divided by the
averagehistorical activity level in the country it is located (RelativePlantsizei = ln(
HALi
HALc3i
), where
HALc3i is the average carbon intensity of plants (in tons of CO2 per ton of clinker) in the country
where the plant i is located).
25The dummy Coasti is equal to one if the plant is located near the coast (less than 50km, this
was done thanks to the geolocalization of the plants in the EUTL data). It concerns 61 plants out
of 246.
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Variable Source
Emissions and HEL EUTL
Clinker net exports (NEK) Eurostat International Trade
Data is originally given by country pairs.
Total net exports are re-computed.
Product category: “Cement Clinker” (252310)
Cement net exports (NEC) Eurostat International Trade
Product category: Difference between
“Cement, incl. cement clinkers” (2523)
and “Cement Clinker” (252310).
Cement consumption (CC) 1) Cembureau (2013) for the main
European countries
2) VDZ (Table C10) for Baltic countries
and Norway
Country GDP (GDP) World Bank Development Indicators Database
They are in billion current US dollars
Clinker production (QK) 1) EUTL-derived estimation (through estimated
clinker carbon intensity and emissions, see
section 5.5.1)
2) For checking, supplementary data were
obtained from several sources e.g.:
a) National cement association data when
reliable and exploitable:
- Spain (Oficemen, p90)
- Germany (VDZ, table A2)
- France (Infociments, Table p7)
b) Getting the Numbers Right database,
indicator 311a for available countries
(UK, Italy, Poland, Czech Republic, Austria)
Table 5.3: Data Sources
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(1)
Log Cement Consumption 0.819***
(0.113)
Log GDP 0.235
(0.180)
Log Relative Carbon Intensity -0.333***
(0.0128)
Log Relative Historical Activity Level 0.0125
(0.0114)
Coastal dummy -0.037***
(0.0128)
Constant -0.003
(0.00872)
Observations 737
Plant level fixed effects No
R2 0.21
Notes: * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. Robust standard errors in parenthesis clustered at the
country level. The dependent variable is the first differenced natural log of plant activity level.
The sample includes 246 clinker producing plants identified as operating between 2010 and
2012, across 26 EUMember States, for the years 2008-2011.
Table 5.4: Regression results of corrections at the plant level
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Table 5.4 column (1) shows the results for the period 2008-2011 (post-crisis).
Cement consumption has a statistically significantly effect on clinker production,
with an estimated elasticity of 0.819 (hence if the demand at the country level de-
creases by 10%, the production at the plant level decreases by 8.19%). GDP is
not statistically significant with an estimated elasticity of 0.235. The relative plant
size is not significant. Conversely, the carbon intensity of the plant has a negative
effect, suggesting that production is lower in themost carbon intensive plants. Fi-
nally, the parameter Coastal is statistically significant and also negative. Produc-
tion in coastal plants is lower by 4% in average than in inland plants. We could also
have expected the opposite (coastal plants producing more, e.g. their production
declining less, in order to export). This could reflect a strategy of cement compa-
nies to diminish production in coastal plants in the long run.
As a robustness check, we also estimate a fixed effects model which include
plant level fixed effects to control for time invariant unobserved heterogeneity of
clinker production behavior. Parameter estimates from the fixed effects regres-
sions are similar suggesting that the combinationof country-level fixed effects (im-
plemented by first differencing) and time invariant plant level variables do a good
job at controlling for heterogeneity in our random effects estimation. A number
of further robustness tests were conducted. For example, we additionally ran the
same specificationusing the correlated randomeffectsmodel (Wooldridge, 2010)
and also tested the influence of other obtainable variables to predict clinker output
including year dummies, lagged values, square terms. We found that the results
were stable across the various estimators and specifications.
These parameters from column (1) are thus used to estimate counterfactual ac-
tivity level. In order to give results robust to uncertainty, we use a semiparametric
approach (Powell, 1994) by specifically modelling the multiplicative error. The
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counterfactual plant activity level is then not fixed but is a random variable:
^PlantActivityCF 2012i = PlantActivity2011i  exp(α^0)
 (CementConsumc3i;2012
CementConsumc3i;2011
)β^1  (GDPc3i;2012
GDPc3i;2011
)β^2
 RelativeCO2Intensityγ^1i  RelativePlantsizeγ^2i
 exp(γ^3Coasti) exp(e")
(5.4)
Extending the smearing estimate of Duan (1983), we first fit the distribution ofe" with a kernel density estimation like in Horowitz and Markatou (1996) which
gives us its piecewise linear cumulative distribution function. The latter allows us
simulating e" (which has a standard deviation of 14%) via inverse transform sam-
pling. We perform aMonte Carlo simulation with 10,000 samples and report the
average and the 95% confidence interval in Tables 5.5, 5.6 and 5.7.
5.3 Results
5.3.1 Impacts of ALTs on the plant distributions
Figure 5.2 displays the distribution of plant activity levels for 2012 (EXALTG),
the counterfactual26 production (EX, EXALTNG,OBA) and also the distribution
in 2011 for comparison. In LD countries, there is a marked jump in installations
operating around the 25% and 50% activity level thresholds in 2012, whereas the
counterfactual distribution for these countries is not skewed at the thresholds. We
find that in LD countries where 117 of the 246 cement installations are located,
ALTs should have reduced free allocations in 50 of them, but due to gaming, only
in 20 installations was it reduced in reality. Thus, in line with preliminary findings
ofNeuhoff et al. (2014), these results showclearly that cement companies have in-
deed altered plant production levels in response to ALTS rules. InMD countries,
this response is noticeable but to a much less degree. The contrast between LD
and MD shows the importance of the demand collapse in triggering this gaming
26There is not “a” but 10,000 versions of the counterfactual. The distribution displayed here
corresponds to the central scenario (with average activity level for each plant).
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LD MD All Spain Greece
countries countries countries
Production (CF) 47.2 80.2 127.4 12.4 3.6
in Mtons [45.2,49.4] [76.9,83.7] [123.6,131.5] [11.5,13.5] [3.0,4.3]
Production (observed) 54.4 79.4 133.8 16.0 5.6
in Mtons
Increased Production +7.2 -0.8 +6.4 +3.5 +2.0
in Mtons [5.0,9.2] [-4.2,2.5] [2.3,10.2] [2.5,4.4] [1.3,2.6]
p=1.00 p=0.33 p=1.00 p=1.00 p=1.00
Increased emissions +6.4 -0.6 +5.8 +3.1 +1.8
in Mtons CO2 [4.5,8.2] [-3.6,2.2] [2.2,9.1] [2.2,3.8] [1.2,2.3]
p=1.00 p=0.34 p=1.00 p=1.00 p=1.00
Note: Reported values are the average of the 10,000 simulations and the 95% interval. p is the
probability that the value is above zero.
Table 5.5: Production and Emissions for the observed (EXALTG) and counter-
factual (EX, OBA, EXALTNG) scenarios
behaviour.
5.3.2 ALTs impacts on clinker production and emissions
Table 5.5 gives the clinker production and the emissions for 2012 (EXALTG)
and the counterfactual (EX, EXALTNG, OBA). The excess clinker production
due to the introduction of thresholds rule is quantified. It represents an increase
of 15% (+7.2Mt) in LD countries, 28% (+3.5Mt) for Spain and 56% (+2.0Mt)
for Greece. These increases are extremely large, even if the global impact at the
EU level is more modest (5%). The increase in the clinker production translates
into increases in emissions. Altogether we estimate that an additional 5.8MtCO2
(+5% for the sector as a whole) have been emitted by EU cement firms as a con-
sequence of the strategic behaviour of cement companies.
5.3.3 Impact of gaming on plant distribution on the free allowances
Table 5.6 gives the amount of EUA’s that are allocated to cement installations un-
der the four scenarios (EX, EXALTNG, EXALTG,OBA). If installations received
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(a) 2012 LD (b) 2012 MD
(c) 2012 Counterfactual LD (d) 2012 Counterfactual MD
(e) 2011 LD (f) 2011 MD
Note: An appropriate use of 2013 allocation data enables us to indirectly distinguish installations
that have been in 2012 above or below thresholds (25% and 50% of q/HAL). We find that
whenever E/HEL is superior to 45% (respectively 22%), the corresponding installation is above
the first (respectively second) activity level threshold (see appendix 5.5.1 for more explanations).
Figure 5.2: Distribution of installations according to their activity level (ap-
proximated by E/HEL) in 2012 for observed and counterfactual production.
2012CF stands for counterfactual of 2012. Red bars indicate categories just
above thresholds
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LD MD All Spain Greece
countries countries countries
EXALTNG 55.1 68.1 123.2 14.9 4.3
[52.8,57.3] [67.2,68.9] [120.8,125.6] [13.5,16.3] [3.5,5.1]
EXALTG 68.4 69.6 138.1 20.7 7.3
(observed)
OBA 36.1 62.2 98.2 9.5 2.7
[34.5,37.7] [59.6,64.9] [95.2,101.5] [8.7,10.2] [2.2,3.2]
Allowances +13.3 +1.5 +14.8 +5.8 +3.0
Gaming Gain [11.1,15.6] [0.7,2.4] [12.5,17.3] [4.4,7.2] [2.2,3.8]
p=1.00 p=1.00 p=1.00 p=1.00 p=1.00
Net Gaming +6.9 +2.1 +9.0 +2.8 +1.2
Gain (minus [4.9,9.0] [-0.5,5.0] [5.7,12.5] [1.7,3.8] [0.6,1.8]
Emissions) p=1.00 p=0.94 p=1.00 p=1.00 p=1.00
Note: Reported values are the average of the 10,000 simulations and the 95% interval. p is the
probability that the value is above zero.
Table 5.6: The Free Allowances (MEUAs) under the four scenarios
100% of their allowances regardless of their activity (i.e. the allocation under the
EX scenario), then LD countries andMD countries would have received 74.5 and
70 million EUAs respectively. OBA allocations would lower allocations to 36.1
and 62.2 million EUAs respectively. The decrease in allocations is more signifi-
cant for LD countries because the average activity is much lower.
As explained, the scenario EXALTNG can be seen as an imperfect approxima-
tion of theOBA rule. If there hadbeenno gaming, it would have set the allocations
at 55.1 and 68.1 million EUAs. Thus for the cement sector as a whole, ALTs re-
duced overallocation in 2012 by 6.4 MEUSs compared to the scenario without
ALTs. HadOBA been implemented instead, overallocation would have been fur-
ther reduced considerably by 40 MEUAs, which corresponds to 29% of the total
cement sector free allocation in 2012. The effect for the MD countries is negli-
gible, as most of installations have an activity level superior to 50%. However for
LDcountries the theoretical effect of the threshold rule as an approximation of the
OBA rule would have been more significant: a 50% (that is (74.5 – 55.1)/(74.5
– 36.1)) reduction should have been obtained. With gaming (EXALTG) a re-
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duction of only 16% prevails (that is (74.5 – 68.4)/(74.5 – 36.1)). For Spain the
percentages would respectively be 61% and 20%; and for Greece 73% and 24%.
Further, we estimate the allowances gaming gain at 14.8 MEUAs, located almost
exclusively in LD countries, and a net gaming gain (deducing extra emissions) of
9.0 MEUAs.
5.3.4 Financial potential gain associated with gaming
In the calculation of the potential gain we assume that the increased production is
sold at marginal cost, and so has no impact on profits. This gives an upper bound
for the profits that could be achieved with gaming since it does not take into ac-
count the possible inefficiency costs: logistics cost for production shifting, extra
sales expenditures and rebates for increased exports, opportunity cost for increas-
ing the clinker to cement ratio). That there are inefficiency costs can be seen from
the fact that not all plants achieved the 50% threshold, but some gaming was cer-
tainlyworthwhile since a large proportion of plants didmanage to get to the target.
To convert the increase in free allowances and the increase in emission rights into
monetary value, weneed to assumeaCO2 price. It shouldbe clear that the amount
of profitable gaming is dependent on the CO2 price. We shall come back to this
point in our discussion of the results. Table 5.7 gives the potential profit associ-
ated with gaming for a CO2 price at 7.95e/t, which corresponds to the average
future price (December 2013) during year 2012. Then it reflects more expected
gains than actual gains, which may be lower or higher (the CO2 price decreased
the following year, but firmsmay have banked these extra allowances and theCO2
price may rise in the future).
For LD countries, the potential gain of EX relative toOBA is estimated through
thenet increaseof allowanceswhich is 74.5–36.0MtCO2 andaEUAprice7.95e/t
which makes 306 Me. With the introduction of the threshold rule this increase
would have been only 158 Mehad the firms not gamed the scheme. The reduc-
tion is coming from the reduced amount of free allocations due to the downfall
in market demand. The gaming increases the amount of free allocations but in-
creases emissions, bringing a potential gain at 213 Me, which represents an in-
crease of 35% (+55Me) relative to 158 Me. For Spain the per cent increase is
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Millions ofe LD MD All Spain Greece
relative toOBA countries countries countries
EX 306 62 368 113 48
[292,318] [40,83] [342,392] [107,119] [44,52]
EXALTNG 158 49 207 50 13
[145,170] [27,69] [181,231] [44,55] [9,16]
EXALTG 213 66 278 72 23
[209,216] [65,67] [276,281] [69,74] [22,24]
Note: Reported values are the average of the 10,000 simulations and the 95% interval.
Table 5.7: Quantification of the monetary value of excess free allocations for
the various scenarios.
44% (+22Me) and for Greece it is 77% (+10Me). These figures are substan-
tial even though the carbon price was low at that time. This explains why firms
undertake the various inefficiencies described earlier to capture part of this gain.
5.3.5 Where does the excess clinker end up? Indirect evidence revisited
This section revisits the indirect evidence of excess clinker production proposed
by (Neuhoff et al., 2014). As noted, three channels have been identified, produc-
tion shifting, exports increase and clinker ratio increase.
Production shifting in multi-plants companies
Cement company executives in interviews reported that subsequent to the intro-
ductionofALTs, itwas frequentpractice to arrangeproduction levels acrossplants
to ensure being above the threshold at as many units as possible (Neuhoff et al.,
2014). We observe output behaviour consistent with these statements in several
cement companies which have a number of plants producing close to the thresh-
olds. Table 5.8 presents four examples. 27 In each of these firms in 2012, pro-
duction (within the same geographical country) simultaneously falls in one plant
27Weonlydisplay here groupsof installations belonging to a country-company that are themost
consistent with production shifting, but avoid cherry-picking individual installations. For the four
cases, all installations of a certain country-company are displayed.
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Country-Company Installation E/HEL 2011 E/HEL 2012
Greece-W 1 34% 49%
Greece-W 2 77% 66%
Greece-W 3 11% 0%
Spain-X 1 42% 50%
Spain-X 2 57% 46%
Spain-X 3 68% 56%
Hungary-Y 1 41% 46%
Hungary-Y 2 68% 50%
Portugal-Z 1 34% 64%
Portugal-Z 2 55% 51%
Portugal-Z 3 71% 60%
Note: An appropriate use of 2013 allocation data enables us to indirectly distinguish installations
that have been in 2012 above or below thresholds (25% and 50% of q/HAL). We find that
whenever E/HEL is superior to 45% (respectively 22%), the corresponding installation is above
the first (respectively second) activity level threshold (see appendix 5.5.1 for more explanations).
Table 5.8: Evidence of within-firm-country production shifting to meet thresh-
olds.
(which produced well above the threshold in 2011), and rises in another plant
above the threshold (which was previously operating below the threshold).
Exports
Table 5.9 gives net exports of clinker and clinker embedded in cement from 2010
to 2012 for LD andMDcountries. We observe a surge in clinker net exports in LD
countries: 6.21 Mt in 2012, compared to 2.03 Mt and 1.94 Mt in 2010 and 2011
respectively. In contrast MD countries remained small net importers of clinker
and no significant shift was observed in their trade patterns. Further analysis re-
vealed that these clinker exports in2012weredestinedmainly to countries inLatin
America andAfrica, includingBrazil, Togo, Ghana, Cameroon, Côte d’Ivoire, and
Mauritania and Nigeria.
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LDCountries 2010 2011 2012
Clinker 2.03 1.94 6.21
Clinker in Cement 5.49 4.58 6.37
MDCountries 2010 2011 2012
Clinker -0.93 -0.74 -0.71
Clinker in Cement 2.24 2.46 2.02
Note: Source: Eurostat. We use a common clinker ratio of 75% to compute clinker embedded in
cement.
Table 5.9: Clinker net exports in 2010, 2011 and 2012 in LD and MD countries
in millions of tonnes.
Clinker Ratio 2010 2011 2012
MDCountries 76% 76% 77%
LDCountries 74% 72% 74%
Spain 79% 76% 82%
Greece 76% 71% 75%
Table 5.10: Clinker-to-Cement Ratio in selected areas (source: authors’ anal-
ysis).
Clinker ratio
Another way excess clinker production might materialise is in a higher clinker-to-
cement ratio. That is, firms could use more clinker to produce the same amount
of cement. The clinker ratio can be recomputed at themacro level (state of group
of states) with the formula R =
QK   NEK
CC + NEC
, where QK is the clinker production,
NEK andNEC net exports of clinker and cement, andCC the cement consumption
(see Appendix 5.5.2 for explanation and Table 5.3 for data source). Table 5.10
shows the clinker ratio for the MD countries, LD countries, Spain and Greece.
The historical declining trend in the clinker-to-cement ratio has reversed in 2012.
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Total 2012 2012
Clinker Ratio
Increase Clinker Net Exports Cement Net Exports
Region
in Clinker
CF
Obse
Diff CF
Obse
Diff*R Effect Relative
Production rved rved
All LD 7.2 4.6 6.2 +1.6 6.1 8.5 +1.7 3.9 6%
All MD -0.8 0.4 -0.7 -1.1 3.3 2.7 -0.4 0.7 1%
All 6.4 5.0 5.5 +0.5 9.4 11.2 +1.3 4.6 3%
Spain 3.5 2.2 3.4 +1.2 2.2 2.6 +0.3 2.0 12%
Greece 2.0 0.5 1.8 +1.3 1.5 1.7 +0.2 0.5 9%
Table 5.11: Routes of excess clinker production decomposition.
5.3.6 Decomposing the channels for clinker disposal
In order to better understand the effects of the distortions that arise from ALTs,
we attempt to decompose the excess clinker output28 into themain destinations to
which they are channelled through: changes to clinker ratio of domestic cement
and increase in exports (clinker or cement). Although it is likely that there is some
stockpiling, the lack of datamakes it difficult to attribute excess production to this
channel.
Thisdecomposition requires that actual net export volumesof cement andclinker
are compared to counterfactuals levels (seeAppendix5.5.3 for the estimationmethod
and data used). Assuming no stockpiling, we can attribute the remaining excess
clinker output to clinker ratio increase. Table 5.11 gives the results. Figure 5.3
provides a graphical representation. For LD countries, net exports of clinker in-
creased by 6.2 Mt while our counterfactual is 4.6 Mt (+1.6 Mt); the net export of
cement increased by 8.5Mt while the counterfactual is 6.1 Mt (+1.7Mt of clinker
embedded); this implies that 2.4 Mt of clinker went into the increased content of
clinker in cement. This latter figure represents an increase of 6% relative to our
counterfactual for the clinker to cement ratio as defined in the previous section.
The values of clinker ratio effect are higher here than the estimates in Section 4.6
suggesting that stockpiling of excess clinker output may be occurring, as well as
increased clinker ratio of cement exports.
28Production shifting in multiplant companies, which does not generate excess clinker output,
is not quantitatively assessed.
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Figure 5.3: Routes of excess clinker production decomposition.
5.3.7 Discussing the impact of hypotheses H1 and H2 on results
In this section we will discuss how results (mainly Tables 4 to 6) are modified if
H1 orH2 does not hold.
Scenario EXALTG corresponds to real observations, so emissions and alloca-
tions are never modified. However, changes in hypotheses potentially modify the
counterfactual scenarios EX, EXALTNG (which by construction corresponds to
EX with only a different allocation rule) and OBA.
If H1 does not hold (H1), it implies there is a carbon price pass-through in
EX/EXALTNG, but not inOBA. Then, inH1, clinker production (and thus emis-
sions) would be higher in OBA compared to EX/EXALTNG, because consump-
tion is higher due to a price effect and also because of a better protection against
carbon leakage. Several papers showed that OBA acts as a production subsidy
(Fischer, 2001; Fischer and Fox, 2007). Let us call+δE1 the corresponding emis-
sions increase, which depends on many factors (including the price of carbon,
price elasticity and regional competition).
Second, if H2 does not hold (H2), a part of the excess clinker production due
to gaming would flood the local market. This positive shock in supply would
lower prices and increase consumption. Then the observed consumption (EX-
ALTG scenario) would be higher than if the threshold rule had not been imple-
mented (EX, EXALTNG andOBA). Since we base our estimation of production
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Table 5.5 Table 5.6 Table 5.7
ΔEmissions ΔProfits1 ΔProfits1
EXALTG vs. EXALTG vs. EXALTG vs.
EXALTNG OBA EXALTNG
(Extra Pollution (Overallocation (Extra Profits
due to Gaming) Profit) due to Gaming)
H1: Pass-through 0 pEUA 0
in OBA vs. [δE1   δAOBA1 ]
EX/EXALTNG (& 0)
H2: Surplus of +δE2 pEUA pEUA
production due to [δAOBA2   δE2] [δAT2   δE2]
gaming poured into (. 0)
local market
1 Only related with allowances surplus, not with margins
Explanations: inH1 for the OBA scenario, emissions are increased by+δE1 compared to our
estimates, involving an increase in allocation+δAOBA1 (proportional to the increased production
and the clinker benchmark). InH2, for the EX, EXALTNG and OBA scenarios, emissions are
decreased by δE2 compared to our estimates, involving a decrease in allocation δAOBA2 in
OBA and+δAT2 in EXALTNG.
Table 5.12: Change in main results with H1 and H2
on consumption, using this reduced consumption level instead of the observed
one would involve that in H2, the estimated clinker production level in EX, EX-
ALTNG and OBA would be lower than in our results. Let us call δE2 the cor-
responding decrease in emissions, which is highly differentiated among regions
(more important in low demand countries).
Table 5.12 sums up how three main results are modified withH1 andH2: extra
pollution due to gaming, overallocation profits and extra profits due to gaming.
First, extra pollution due to gaming is not modified by H1 but is increased by
H2. That is, wewould have underestimated extra production due to gaming in our
main results, because our estimated counterfactual production would have been
overestimated, being basedon toohigh a consumption level (the “true” onewould
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have been lower because no cement would have been flooded the local market
driving down the prices).
Second, overallocationprofits aremodified but only at themargin (they slightly
increasewithH2, and slightly decreasewithH2).
29 Thus, when both assumptions
are relaxed, the total effect is even smaller becausedirectional effects go inopposite
directions.
Third, extra profits due to gaming are not modified inH1 but potentially inH2.
Results would never bemodified significantly, the nature of the change being am-
biguous but more likely to be upward in countries where gaming occurred.30 Our
figureswould thenbring a lowboundestimationof theprofits increasedue togam-
ing. The main idea is that because clinker production in EX is lower inH2 than in
H2, we may have underestimated among plants above the threshold in EXALTG
the number of plants that were below the threshold in EX.
In summary, our results are robust in relaxing H1 or H2. The most controver-
sial assumption,H1, in particular, has limited impact on the results. Furthermore,
qualitative assessment suggests that if anything, our results would be biased in the
conservative direction (underestimation of extra production and extra profits due
to gaming).
5.4 Conclusions and policy options
An important change in the EU-ETS phase 3 for EITE concerns the introduction
of the activity level threshold rule (ALTs). The underlying rationale for its intro-
duction is that it would reduce the overallocation profits in case of downfall in the
29Indeed, δE  δAOBA  (IA   IB)δQ (where (IA   IB) is the difference between the average
and the benchmark clinker carbon intensity), which is at least anorder ofmagnitude lower than the
original overallocation profits. As an example, let us consider a country producing 18Mt of clinker
(30 Mt in HAL), so if δQ = 0:1 or 2, δE   δAOBA = 0:01 or 0.2 EUA with (IA   IB)  0:1. In
comparison, original overallocation profits are at least 5 MEUAs.
30δAT2   δE2 = δAT2   δAOBA2 + δAOBA2   δE2. δAOBA2   δE2 is negative and small (cf previous
remark). Further, at the plant level, δAT2   δAOBA2 is negative and small if the shock in production
does not cross an activity level threshold and positive and big when it does (which ismore likely to
happen in lowdemandcountries). At the aggregated level, the change is then likely tobepositive in
countries where gaming occurred (lower reference of production and bigger production shock).
However, if we suppose that the majority of the production surplus is not poured into the local
market, the change is still significantly lower than the original value (which is roughly ΔAT   ΔE,
e.g the same but with a bigger shock in production).
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demand: whenever the activity level of an installation falls below some threshold
(50%, 25%, 10%) relative to its historic activity level used to allocate free alloca-
tions, the allocation would be reduced accordingly (50%, 25%, 0%).
Our ex post analysis of year 2012, the first year in which the threshold rule ap-
plies, focused on the cement sector, a sector in which approximately half the EU
countries had experienced a significant downfall in consumption (LD countries).
It provides a natural experiment to evaluate the consequences of this rule.
Our main conclusion is that while ALTs did reduce to some extent overallo-
cation profits, it also created operational distortions which lead to outcomes in-
consistent with the low carbon transition of EU energy intensive industries. The
reduction in overallocation profits is less than expected because of the gaming be-
haviour of the industry to achieve the thresholds, during periods of lowmarket de-
mand. Thanks to the elaborationof a counterfactual, wehavebeenable toquantify
that after the introduction of ALTs: the potential overallocation profit with gam-
ing is 278 Me(2 e/t clinker) and 207 Mewithout gaming, while it would have
been 368 Mein the absence of ALTs. The expected reduction in windfall prof-
its due to the ALTs is 44% while the actual reduction is 24%. The incentives are
magnified in low demand countries, where profit with gaming is 213Me(3.9e/t
clinker) and 158 Mewithout gaming, while it would have been 306 Mewithout
ALTs. We examined three ways in which firms’ operations are altered in response
to ALTs: shifting production among plants, increasing net exports of clinker and
cement, increasing the clinker to cement ratio.
In the2000’s topmanagement attentionon the issuesof climate changeemerged
as an important dimension of corporate social responsibility and a large number
of companies got involved in proactive strategies to limit their own emissions (Ar-
jaliès et al., 2011). The EU-ETS positively contributed to turn this strategy into
operational practise by putting a price on carbon. To put it simply, we observed a
progressive alignment all through the firm between corporate social responsibil-
ity (CSR) and the carbon mitigation objectives of the EU-ETS. The operational
distortions reported in our study due to the introduction of ALTs are particularly
detrimental in this respect: the production shifting goes against the restructuring
of the assets to achieve scale economies, a key factor of cost efficiency in cement;
the increased exports induce some relocation of foreign cement production in the
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EU, generating cost inefficiencies and extra emissions due to transportation; the
increase in the clinker to cement ratio goes against one of themain drivers to limit
emissions in cement production (see Chapter 4). In short, distortions generated
by the introduction of the ALT have hindered the progressive alignment of incen-
tives away from the low carbon transformation in this sector.
Our results have beenobtained in a context of low carbonprice, severe downfall
inmarket demand, and large free allowance allocations. However, a higher carbon
price would make our results even more relevant; the higher the carbon price the
higher the incentive to achieve the thresholds.31 Had we observed growth, the
threshold rule may have been less relevant. Anecdotal evidence32 suggests that
instead, the reserve for new entrants may have been a more important source of
distortions .(there would have been an incentive to have a artificially high produc-
tion during the period used to fix the equivalent of HAL for new entrants)
These considerations suggest that the activity level thresholds may need to be
reconsidered for sectors such as cement for which carbon costs represent a sig-
nificant share of production costs. This raises the question of what to put in its
place instead. As mentioned in the introduction economists generally agree that,
in the absence of global carbon prices, replacing free allocation with full auction-
ing and using border carbon adjustments offers the most efficient solution. This
is because it helps in levelling the carbon costs between domestic and foreign pro-
ducers while also allowing for carbon costs to be passed along the value chain to
incentivise demand side abatement. Politically this solution has not yet gained
serious traction. This is largely due to concerns that border-levelling may be per-
ceived as protectionism disguised as environmentalism and hence not conducive
to building trust in international climate negotiations. However, the situation
may change. If one looks forward to the post-2020 period, a larger number of na-
tions are expected to have begun implementing carbonprices. More countrieswill
face similar challenges related to designing appropriate anti-leakagemeasures that
31Take a EUA price at 20e/t a simple extrapolation for LD countries would bring up the po-
tential wind fall profit to 236*20/9 = 524 Me. However if we assume that all plants achieve the
50% threshold, a reasonable assumption for a EUAprice at 20e/t, it would go up to 583Me. The
expected reduction remains at 42% but the actual one drops to 22%. Note however that a high
carbon cost might endanger the validity of assumption H1 and could possibly lead to a result in
which EXALTGwould be preferred to EX, but still worse than OBA.
32Ref. private conversation with industry representatives.
225
the EU now faces and thus there may be more scope for cooperative approaches.
Border-levelling via international cooperationwould, however, take time to nego-
tiate and design. This raises the question as to the interim solution.
One option is to increase the number of activity level thresholds to reduce the
incentive to game output. For example, a threshold at 50%, 60% and 70% for ce-
mentmay incentivise a larger number of installations to increase their clinker pro-
duction to the next highest threshold. Since thresholds create an allocation sys-
tem that falls between an ex-ante and ex-post scheme, it would be much simpler
to implement full output-based allocation for sectors like cement where the risk
of distortions arising is high, because carbon costs are high relative to production
costs in the absence of free allocation. The analysis in this chapter suggests that
this optionwould outperformboth ex ante allocationwith andwithout thresholds
in terms of reducing distortions and overallocation profits.
However, a number of issues must be carefully considered before going in that
direction. A central drawback of a move to OBA is that little can be expected in
terms of carbon price pass-through to product prices and hence demand side sub-
stitution towards lower-carbon goods. For sectors where carbon costs are high as
a share of production costs, such as cement, this would significantly limit the EU’s
potential to reduce emissions cost-effectively and to decarbonise these sectors.
Unlike ex ante allocation, OBA implies the loss of an absolute cap for free alloca-
tions and thismaybepolitically contentiouspoint. Further, the implementationof
OBA to select sectors but not all may also raise political difficulties. There are on-
going discussions on how to circumvent these issues. For example the loss of de-
mand side substitution incentives could perhaps be restored with a consumption
charge on downstream products (Neuhoff et al., 2014). Output based scheme
with hybrid benchmark has been implemented in California in 2012. An ex post
study on this implementation would be welcome to see if, again, the devil lies in
the details.
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5.5 Appendix
5.5.1 EUTLData computations
Determination of the Activity Level Correction Factor of 2013 at the plant level
The key challenge is to correctly distinguish installations that are above or below
thresholds (25% and 50% of q/HAL), despite the limitation that activity levels
have to be approximated using emissions data (E/HEL). To do so, we exploit the
observations from the 2013 allocation data, which revealed whether or not the
installationhad seen its allocation reducedbecause its 2012 activity level fell below
a threshold. Allocations in 2013 are equal to (cf equation (5.1)):
Ai;2013 = CSCF2013  IB  HALi  ALCFi;2013 (5.5)
WhereCSCF2013 is the 2013 Cross Sectoral Correction Factor (0.9427), IB the
clinker carbon intensity benchmark (766 kg CO2 per ton of clinker), and HALi
the Historical Activity Level of installation i (in tons of clinker). Transforming
the previous equation, where bothHALi and ALCFi;2013 are unknown, we obtain:
CSCF2013  IB
IA
 HELi
Ai;2013
=
1
ALCFi;2013
 Ii;HAL
IA
(5.6)
Noting Ii;HAL =
HELi
HALi
(corresponding approximately to the clinker carbon in-
tensity for theHALproducing years), and IA is the average clinker carbon intensity
(863 kg CO2 per ton of clinker, GNR, indicator 321) in 2008.
The ratio at the left part of the equation can be computed with available data.
On the right part, we have ALCFi;2013, which we want to find, and the ratio,
Ii;HAL
IA
, which is unknown as well but bounded and likely to be close to 1. Indeed, Ii;HAL
varies in an extreme range from 720 kg CO2 per ton of clinker to 1300 kg CO2
per ton of clinker (and for the very large majority of the plants from 780 to 950 kg
CO2 per ton of clinker), which translates into a ratio
Ii;HAL
IA
varying from 0.83 to
1.51 (andmost likely from 0.90 to 1.10). Then, if the ratio, is comprised between
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0.83 to 1.51 (respectively between 1.67 and 3.01, and between 2.64 and 4.8033),
we infer that ALCFi;2013 = 1, (respectively 0.5 and 0.25).
This enabled catchingout situations inwhich imperfections in theE/HELmea-
sure as a proxy for the q/HALwould have led to a false conclusion about whether
an installation was truly above or below its activity threshold in 2012. We found
that the actual thresholds for the E/HEL measure that matched the 2013 allo-
cation data were slightly lower in practice, at 22% and at 45%, rather than 25%
and 50%. Discussion with industry experts revealed that there was a logical expla-
nation for this systematic bias: clinker producers often have more than one kiln
inside an installation that is treated as a single unit for free allocation purposes.
When demand falls, it is common to concentrate production in the most efficient
kiln(s). Thus emissions may fall by slightly more than overall clinker production,
creating a slight downward bias in E/HEL as a measure of q/HAL in low demand
countries. This bias could also be explained by the clinker carbon intensity im-
provement between HAL years and 2012.
Determination of clinker carbon intensity and production at the plant level
Once the ALCFi;2013 has been determined at the plant level i (see previous sec-
tion), the plant clinker carbon intensity forHALyears, Ii;HAL, can thenbe obtained
with the previous equation. For 20 plants (out of 246), we found an unusual num-
ber (below 700 kg CO2 per ton of clinker), possibly due to a capacity increase,
and put instead a default value equal to IA. We also set the default value IA when
Ai;2013 = 0 (meaning ALCFi;2013 = 0 or plant closure), making the computa-
tion impossible (15 plants). We then correct the first approximation of clinker
carbon intensity so as weighted average34 clinker carbon intensity in big countries
corresponds to GNR data in 2008 (818, 831, 832, 797, 847, 858, 849 and 842 kg
CO2 per tonof clinker for respectivelyAustria, CzechRepublic, France,Germany,
Italy, Poland, Spain and theUnitedKingdom). Finallywe correct values of clinker
carbon intensity in plants of other countries in the same way, so as the European
33In our data there is actually a gap between 2.14 and 4.01 so no case of overlapping.
34The weights are production, as multiplying plant emissions by this first approximation
of clinker carbon intensity gives a first approximation of clinker production at the plant level
(eQK;i;2008 = Ii;HAL  Ei;2008).
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weighted average clinker carbon intensity (IA). Once clinker carbon intensity is
estimated for each plant, clinker production can be obtained through emissions
(QK;i;t = Ei;t  Ii;HAL). We assume that clinker carbon intensity does not evolve
over time.
5.5.2 Macro data consistency at the national level
If we denote the six different variables:
• QK clinker production
• QC total cement production
• NEK clinker net exports
• NEC cement net exports
• CC cement consumption
• R clinker-to-cement ratio
We have two equations translating the conservation of cement on the one hand
and the conservation of clinker on the other hand (neglecting stockpiling):
QC = CC + NEC (5.7)
QK = R QC + NEK (5.8)
These equations must be verified for each country every year (for real of coun-
terfactual scenario). In this chapter for real data, QK, NEK, NEC and CC are ob-
tained through different sources (see Table 5.3), and QC and R are re-computed
(we have R =
QK   NEK
CC + NEC
).
5.5.3 Counterfactual country level net exports of clinker and cement estimation
Counterfactual net exports of clinker and cement for each country are necessary to
assess the channels of clinker disposal. A comprehensive analysis was not possible
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given the available data, and instead we use a simple first differenced estimation
to control for country-level fixed effects and include cement consumption as the
main explanatory variable. 35 This enables us to essentially extrapolate historic
next export trends, whilst accounting for the influence of annual variation in ce-
ment consumption. The parameters are obtained from the following regression
using data for the years 2008-2011 and 20 countries:
ΔNEK;c;t = λ0 + λ1ΔCementConsumc;t + "c;t (5.9)
ΔNEC;c;t = μ0 + μ1ΔCementConsumc;t + "c;t (5.10)
For clinkernet exports, the coefficient on λ1 is -0.162 and this is significant at the
5% level. Hence on average, if cement consumption decreases by 1Mt, clinker net
exports increase by 0.16 Mt. The negative sign on λ1 is inline with expectations.
The fit is good for the clinker net exports (R2=0.41). For net cement exports, the
coefficient on the cement consumption term is 0.025 and is not statistically signif-
icant at conventional levels. Changes in cement consumption thus do not predict
changes in cement net exports and in this case the counterfactual is an extension
of historic trends only. For a region c, we then compute counterfactual net exports
as follows:
NEK;c;CF 2012 = NEK;c;2011 + λ^1ΔCementConsumc;2012 (5.11)
and counterfactual next exports of cement as:
NEC;c;CF 2012 = NEC;c;2011 + μ^1ΔCementConsumc;2012 (5.12)
35As suggested by the Hausman test (if p-value are low, fixed effects are preferred), we used a
fixed effectmodel. As themodifiedWald test reveals the presenceof heteroskedasticity, wepresent
robust standard errors.
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Conclusion
The first part of the thesis helped to clarify the significant research undertaken on
carbon leakage and competitiveness, especially the modelling literature numeri-
cally assessing carbon leakage and the effectiveness of BCAs. The main message
is that though positive, carbon leakage remains low and would not justify post-
poning action for the sake of environmental efficiency. Further, BCAs would be
efficient to level the carbon playing field, but some leakage would remain because
of the channel of international fossil fuel prices.
The second part of the thesis makes an important finding that the EU ETS has
not induced operational carbon leakage in its first seven years of functioning. The
interpretation of such a result remains problematic in terms of policy making. If
one believes that companies consider the full opportunity costs of allowances, it
means that carbon leakage is irrelevant for the observed range of carbon price; but
it also means that free allocation was inappropriate to protect these sectors from
carbon leakage in the first place (itwouldhave only be useful to increase their prof-
itability). However industry executives in their interviews (Neuhoff et al., 2014b)
go against the economic theory thatwould predict an internalization of the carbon
costs in the decisions of companies. Themain reason would be strategic: to avoid
killing the goose that lays golden eggs, the industry would have avoided actions
contradicting the narrative that free allocation was necessary for leakage protec-
tion.36
This thesis cannot conclude on the effectiveness of free allocation to prevent
carbon leakage. However, the last part of the thesis demonstrated that potential
36Such a narrative is credible only for an oligopolistic sector (to counteract free-riding incen-
tives) and under low carbon price.
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adverse effects on competitiveness were overcompensated at the expense of the
credibility of thewhole system. We showed that the EUETShas not triggered sig-
nificant abatement in the cement sector, but this could be true for most industrial
sectors. Other studies suggest that it would have not induced significant innova-
tion and low-carbon investments either (Laing et al., 2014). Generous free allo-
cation and the authorization of offset credits for cost-containment purposes have
helped build up amassive allowance surplus. This surplus, combined with the un-
certainty of the future of the ETS, has depressed the carbon price to a worrying
point. The economic downturn, which has been the main source of the surplus
of allowances, could not have been predicted in the first place. However, con-
cerns about adverse effects on competitiveness have gone against any attempts to
fix the EU ETS after it entered into a crisis. The EITE industries obtained that
the reference production giving the amount of free allocation for phase III would
be the pre-crisis production level instead of a more realistic one.37 Furthermore,
out of the six options to fix the EU ETS presented in 2012 at the beginning of the
crisis (European Commission, 2012), the less ambitious one was finally adopted
(restricted use for international credits), while other options intended to raise the
ambition of the EU ETS before 2020, such as an auction price floor or measures
permanently removing allowances from the market, were discarded.
After criticizing the current design of carbon leakage provisions in the EUETS,
wepresent in the rest of the conclusionpossible reforms. An adequate policy pack-
age forEITE sectorswouldpromote lowcarbon transitionwithout generating car-
bon leakage, avoid distortions among plants or sectors, and remain at low admin-
istrative costs. We believe that full auctioning should remain the reference for rea-
sons of efficiency, fairness, transparency and simplicity (Zetterberg et al., 2012).
Auctioning avoids the elaboration of complex rules in which companies exploit
the asymmetry of information with the regulator to obtain the highest rent possi-
ble. All installations are treated equally and public revenues are maximized. Full
auctioning for the electricity sector, which is not exposed to carbon leakage,makes
common sense. It is unfortunate that it took seven years for the European Com-
37InCembureau (2011) 2010 activity report we can read in p.2: “Cembureau and other Energy
Intensive Industries were helped byDGEnterprise in securing that the recession years – 2009 and
2010 – will not be taken into account [...] to determine, ex ante, the number of allowances to be
allocated for free. [...] This was another achievement.”.
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mission to enforce it, allowing in the meantime the power sector to reap colos-
sal windfall profits by passing through the cost of allowances (Sijm et al., 2006;
Fabra and Reguant, 2014). For the EITE sectors however, the unevenness of cli-
mate policies in the post-2020 regime would call for some type of adjustments in
case of full auctioning. We do not consider that the difficulties of implementa-
tion are a good reason to discard BCAs prima facie. However, because a failure of
implementation would undermine the system, a robust policy should be set for a
transitory period. To prepare for the implementation of BCAs, an information-
based policy displaying the carbon footprint of products to consumers could be
launched to build expertise in carbon content measurement methods and raise
awareness among consumers.
Because of the massive distributional issues generated by pure ex ante alloca-
tion, we favour output-based allocation despite some shortcomings (which will
be adressed below). A straightforwardway of implementationwould be tomodify
at the margin the current allocation methodology by using the actual production
instead of the historical activity level multiplied by the activity level threshold. In
practice, actual production can only be known one or two years after the year for
which the allocation is needed. A prior estimation of productionwould have to be
made with the latest verified data, followed by a correction one or two years later
once the production is verified. Such recalculation is not a serious impediment as
it is a common practice in other fields, such as taxes or energy and water bills.
This marginal change would leave unfixed other problems from the current al-
location methodology. First, the carbon leakage list is exclusive: a sector is either
in or out of the list. This approach has generated accrued lobbying from sectors to
be on the list, and resulted in a levelling-down of the rules of inclusion.38 Second,
indicators for the inclusion on the carbon leakage list for 2012-2020 are based on
a quantitative analysis that seems obsolete. Carbon costs are computed with the
assumption of a carbon price of 30 euros per ton (which was based on a forecast
38In phase III, 162 sectorswere on the list (out of 258), representing 95%of industrial emissions
(Ecofys et al., 2013). The third criteria of inclusion (trade intensity superior to 30% regardless of
carbon costs) was the most controversial as it is a poor indicator of leakage risk (Clò, 2010; Mar-
tin et al., 2014). It added 117 sectors, including “manufacture of wines”, “manufacture of weapon
and ammunition”, “manufacture of perfumes and toilet preparation”, “manufacture of jewelry and
related articles”, “striking of coins” or ”manufacture of musical instruments” (European Commis-
sion, 2009).
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of the EU ETS market in 2008), and with sectors assumed to buy 75% of their
allowances.39 (Juergens et al., 2013). Since 2012, the carbon price has never ex-
ceeded 10 euros, and in the cement sector, average unit emissions are on average
10% higher than the benchmark in 201240. With these modifications, computed
carbon costs of 60% with the first analysis would shrink to 2.5%.
Based on these two shortcomings, we recommend two guiding principles in the
carbon leakage provision. First, the auctioning factor could be (i) continuous in-
stead of discrete (in or out), and (ii) dynamic and corrected ex post (like produc-
tion). Data used to compute it would be updated as often as possible depending
on administrative costs (every year for the carbon price, but every three or four
years for data on gross value added, international trade or unit emissions). The
detailed elaboration of such a policy are beyond the scope of this thesis.41
Output-basedallocationpresents somedrawbacks, reviewed inQuirion(2009).
First, incentive problems can appear with intermediary products. One prominent
issue with OBA applied to the cement sector is the so-called “clinker dilemma”
(Demailly andQuirion, 2006),whether the consideredoutput is cementor clinker.
We recall that almost all emissions in the cement sector are due to themanufactur-
ing of clinker. If allowances are distributed in proportion of cement production,
there is an incentive for the producer to import clinker, and sell allowances corre-
sponding to saved emissions. Conversely, if allowances are distributed in propor-
tion of clinker production (clinker benchmark), the incentive to reduce the share
of clinker in cement, which has been the main driver of abatement in the cement
industry (see Chapter 4), is neutralized. In this specific case, a hybrid benchmark,
39Production is implicitly supposed tobe equal to thehistorical activity level in the computation
of the European Commission. In practice, production was much lower and many sectors such as
cement faced negative carbon costs when taken into account the amount of free allocation.
400.841kg CO2 per ton of clinker , compared to 0.766 (source: GNR).
41We only give a draft of what such rules could look like in this footnote. Another factor would
be added to the formula, the free allocation factor, FAF, which would be computed such as (i)
FAF would be comprised between 0 and 1 (ii) if possible with FAF  1, carbon costs would not
exceed a certain threshold CCmax, the latter decreasing with trade intensity (as it would be harder
to pass these additional costs to consumers). In such a system, sectors with high TI but very low
CCwouldhave an auctioning factor close to 0. For example, let us chooseCCmax to be equal to 10%
ifTI=0%, 5% ifTI>15%, and linear in-between. In the case of the cement sector, we compute with
Eurostat data a trade intensity of TI=10% (so CCmax=7.5%). Exploiting data from the previous
European Commission assessment, we find that a carbon price of 10 euros (respectively 5 euros
and 20 euros) would lead to an free allocation factor of 0.8 (respectively 0.5 and 0.95).
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where distributed allowances depend also on the clinker-to-cement ratio, could
solve this dilemma (Branger and Sato, 2015).
Second, economic modeling has shown that OBA entails a higher overall eco-
nomic cost because it gives too little incentive to reduce the production of pol-
luting goods. In such a system, emission reductions come essentially from the
reduction of emissions intensity, not from the output level. To ensure consump-
tion efficiency through the recovery of carbon costs to consumers, some authors
(Acworth et al., 2015) have proposed to add to the EUETS a consumption-based
charge.42
UnderOBA, indirect emissions could also be taken into account for electricity-
intensive industries. The same methodology would be used, but a benchmark in-
cluding indirect emissions would be introduced in place of the benchmark using
direct emissions, combined with an electricity emissions factor to be determined
(Ecofys, 2014). This would make obsolete the current legislation in which finan-
cial compensation for indirect emissions are left to Member States’ discretion.43
Another issue is to make OBA compatible with a fixed cap declining over time.
The variations of dynamic free allocation could be immediately compensated by
an adjustment of the number allowances auctioned, or as Ecofys (2014) proposes,
managed by an ambition-neutral Allocation Supply Reserve. In order to provide
a signal towards the long term scarcity of allowances, the California ETS, which
is based on OBA, includes a “cap adjustment factor” declining over time. Ecofys
(2014) rather suggests differentiated declining benchmarks based on technology
roadmaps.
OBA offers a desirable solution for the short and medium term, but a chal-
lenge remains in the long term to close the emissions gap between what technol-
ogy roadmaps enable, and the emissions trajectories needed to avoid detrimental
climate change. Providing free allocation may not promote radical innovation,
and the ability of the EU ETS to trigger the necessary research efforts to deploy
42The charge, based on theEUETSpermit price and the allocation benchmark, would be levied
when carbon intensive goods are released for consumption. Such a schemewould be inspired from
excise duties on alcohol and tobacco, except that the levywould be assigned to national trusts, sep-
arated from national budgets in order to avoid the charge to constitute a tax requiring an unani-
mous vote in theCouncil. As all productswouldbe treated equally regardless of origin, themeasure
would beWTO-compatible.
43http://www.emissions-euets.com/carbonleakage
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breakthrough technologies has been questionable. In 2004, following the mo-
mentum of the EU ETS creation, the European Ultra Low Carbon Steel Making
(ULCOS) consortium was launched . Regrouping all major steel companies in
Europe and research institutes, it aimed at investigating ways to cut carbon emis-
sions by at least 50%, with a total budget of 75 million euros for the period 2004-
2010 (Neuhoff et al., 2014a). With a tenfold estimated budget, the upscaling of
the project was finally abandoned because of the low carbon price and the lack
of will from the steel industry. In the meantime, an examination of EUTL data44
reveals that the allowances surplus of the steel sector amounted to 100 million
EUAs in phase I and 592 million EUAs in phase II (including 148 million EUAs
from offset credits). Making the reasonable assumption that most of this surplus
was not earned by technological progress but came from overallocation like in the
cement sector, a low bound estimation of the carbon rent obtained from the EU
ETS comes to 1.5 billion euros for phase I and 5 billion euros for phase II. It seems
clear that only aminusculepart of overallocationprofits, if any,was routed towards
innovation in low-carbon production processes.
The EU ETS must then be completed with ambitious policies correcting the
innovation market failure (Jaffe et al., 2005; Fischer and Newell, 2008). A criti-
cal phase is to bring research programs and demonstration projects to industrial
viability, referred to as the “valley of death” in management literature (Weyant,
2011). The NER300 program (basically routing the revenues from the sale of
300 million allowances for subsidizing installations of innovative renewable en-
ergy technology and CCS) goes towards a good direction. But important chal-
lenges lay ahead in terms of governance to ensure that these funds allow the de-
ployment of breakthrough low-carbon technologies in the long run. In addition, a
price floor rising over time, as in the California ETS, would help investors secure
the viability of low-carbon projects.
A new literature is emerging on the benefits of implementing emissions pric-
44We established a plant by plant database of the steel sector (544 installations, including 35
installations suspected to use recycled blast furnace waste gases), but a thorough examination like
in Chapter 4 was impaired by the complexity of the sector (different products such as coke, sinter
and hot metal that are sometimes integrated in one installation) and the lack of GNR-type data.
The computed estimation of allowances surplus depends at the margin of hypotheses regarding
waste gases power installations.
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ing even in the absence of international binding climate agreements (Edenhofer
et al., 2015). These include internalization of national emissions to avoid climate
change damages (IPCC, 2014), co-benefits such as air quality and energy secu-
rity (Parry et al., 2014), building new competitive industries for the “green race”
(Fankhauser et al., 2013) andpublic financeopportunities (Siegmeier et al., 2015).
Further research is needed in that direction, because the initiatives of countries
will help to close the “emissions gap” between current emissions and trajectories
that limit the global temperature increase of more than 2 °C. In this decentralized
climate regime, smart policies will be needed to address carbon leakage and com-
petitiveness in order to avoid a levelling down of countries’ climate ambitions.
In addition to the issues linked with the implementation of BCAs or OBA that
were discussed earlier, several topics deserve a particular attention for future re-
search. First, little is known about investment leakage or changes in production
capacities due to climate policies. The challenge is to find appropriate investment
data and econometric techniques to single out the effect of climate policies from
themany other factors influencing the construction or shutting down of industrial
facilities, such as prospects of future demand or energy prices.
Moreover, the field of “negative” leakage induced by technological spillovers,
which is only emerging in models (Gerlagh and Kuik, 2014), needs to be devel-
oped. Many studies have explored induced innovation and the diffusion of envi-
ronmental technologies (Popp et al., 2009), but additional research is needed to
quantify this effect in terms of avoided emissions in order to close the gapwith the
carbon leakage literature.
Furthermore, the evaluation of the capacities of different sectors to pass on car-
bon costs to consumers is key in determining potential adverse effects on prof-
itability. This evaluation is made difficult by the challenges of micro data col-
lection and requirements for advanced econometric techniques. Alexeeva-Talebi
(2010, 2011), Oberndorfer et al. (2010) and De Bruyn et al. (2010) find prelim-
inary evidence that industrial sectors are able to pass through additional costs to
consumers, but further research is needed to provide more robust conclusions.
The increasing carbon constraint in Europe will potentially make pass-through
more apparent.
Finally, under the pledge and review approach of the future climate regime, the
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comparison of climate policies will be a great task to achieve. Metrics assessing
climate change mitigation efforts and effectiveness remain basic and unsatisfac-
tory (Aldy and Pizer, 2011), despite significant improvements on data availability
regarding domestic policies.45 Progress in this field is a prerequisite for building
border adjustments, linking carbon markets (Ranson and Stavins, 2014), or sim-
ply learning which policy designs are the most efficient. In the end, a polycen-
tric climate regime (Ostrom, 2010) gives the opportunity of learning and experi-
mentation, allowing the improvement of the design and implementation of future
commitments.
References
Acworth, W., Haussner, M., Ismer, R., and Neuhoff, K. (2015). Including con-
sumption in the EU ETS – Administrative implementation of a consumption
based charge. Forthcoming.
Aldy, J. E. and Pizer, W. A. (2011). The Competitiveness Impacts of Climate
Change Mitigation Policies. Working Paper 17705, National Bureau of Eco-
nomic Research.
Alexeeva-Talebi, V. (2010). Cost pass-through in strategic oligopoly: Sectoral
evidence for the EU ETS. Technical report.
Alexeeva-Talebi, V. (2011). Cost pass-through of the EU emissions allowances:
Examining the European petroleum markets. Energy Economics, 33, Supple-
ment 1:S75–S83. doi: 10.1016/j.eneco.2011.07.029.
Branger, F. and Sato, M. (2015). Solving the Clinker Dilemma with Hybrid
Benchmarking. Work in Progress.
45The CAIT Pre-2020 Pledges Map (http://cait2.wri.org/pledges/) developed by
the World Resource Institute will allow the exploration of climate change mitigation pledges
submitted by Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UN-
FCCC). The Environmental Defense Fund provides (http://www.edf.org/climate/
worlds-carbon-markets) and the International Carbon Action Partnership (https://
icapcarbonaction.com/) offer tools to analyse and compare the designs of the different emis-
sions trading systems.
242
Cembureau (2011). Activity Report 2010. Technical report, Cembureau.
Clò, S. (2010). Grandfathering, auctioning and Carbon Leakage: Assessing the
inconsistencies of the new ETS Directive. Energy Policy, 38(5):2420–2430.
De Bruyn, S., Markowska, A., de Jong, F., and Bles, M. (2010). Does the energy
intensive industry obtainwindfall profits through theEUETS?Aneconometric
analysis for products from the refineries, iron and steel and chemical sectors.
Technical report, CE Delft.
Demailly, D. andQuirion, P. (2006). CO2 abatement, competitiveness and leak-
age in the European cement industry under the EU ETS: grandfathering ver-
sus output-based allocation. Climate Policy, 6(1):93–113. doi: 10.1080/
14693062.2006.9685590.
Ecofys (2014). Dynamic Allocation for the EU Emissions Trading System. En-
abling Sustainable Growth. Technical report, Ecofys.
Ecofys, DeBruyn, S., Nelissen, D., andKoopman,M. (2013). Carbon leakage and
the future of theEUETSmarket. Impact of recent developments in theEUETS
on the list of sectors deemed to be exposed to carbon leakage. Technical report.
Edenhofer, O., Jakob, M., Creutzig, F., Flachsland, C., Fuss, S., Kowarsch, M.,
Lessmann, K., Mattauch, L., Siegmeier, J., and Steckel, J. C. (2015). Clos-
ing the emission price gap. Global Environmental Change, 31:132–143. doi:
10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2015.01.003.
European Commission (2009). Commission Decision of 24 December 2009 de-
termining, pursuant toDirective 2003/87/EC of the European Parliament and
of the Council, a list of sectors and subsectors which are deemed to be exposed
to a significant risk of carbon leakage. Technical report.
EuropeanCommission (2012). The state of theEuropean carbonmarket in 2012.
Technical Report COM(2012) 652, European Commission.
Fabra,N. andReguant,M. (2014). Pass-ThroughofEmissionsCosts inElectricity
Markets. American Economic Review, 104(9):2872–99. doi: 10.1257/aer.104.
9.2872.
243
Fankhauser, S., Bowen, A., Calel, R., Dechezleprêtre, A., Grover, D., Rydge, J., and
Sato,M. (2013). Whowill win the green race? In search of environmental com-
petitiveness and innovation. Global Environmental Change, 23(5):902–913.
doi: 10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2013.05.007.
Fischer, C. and Newell, R. G. (2008). Environmental and technology policies
for climate mitigation. Journal of environmental economics and management,
55:142–162.
Gerlagh, R. and Kuik, O. (2014). Spill or leak? Carbon leakage with international
technology spillovers: A CGE analysis. Energy Economics, 45:381–388. doi:
10.1016/j.eneco.2014.07.017.
IPCC (2014). Climate Change 2014: Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability.
Part A: Global and Sectoral Aspects. Contribution of Working Group II to the
Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change.
Technical report.
Jaffe, A. B., Newell, R. G., and Stavins, R. N. (2005). A tale of two market
failures: Technology and environmental policy. Ecological Economics, 54(2-
3):164–174. doi: doi:10.1016/j.ecolecon.2004.12.027.
Juergens, I., Barreiro-Hurlé, J., and Vasa, A. (2013). Identifying carbon leak-
age sectors in the EU ETS and implications of results. Climate Policy,
13(1):89–109. doi: 10.1080/14693062.2011.649590.
Laing, T., Sato, M., Grubb, M., and Comberti, C. (2014). The effects and side-
effects of the EU emissions trading scheme: The effects and side-effects of the
EUETS. Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Climate Change, 5(4):509–519. doi:
10.1002/wcc.283.
Martin, R., Muûls, M., de Preux, L. B., and Wagner, U. J. (2014). Industry
Compensation under Relocation Risk: A Firm-Level Analysis of the EU Emis-
sions Trading Scheme †. American Economic Review, 104(8):2482–2508. doi:
10.1257/aer.104.8.2482.
244
Neuhoff, K., Acworth, W., Ancygier, A., Branger, F., Christmas, I., Haussner, M.,
Ismer, R., van Rooij, A., Sartor, O., Sato, M., and Schopp, A. (2014a). Carbon
Control and Competitiveness post 2020: The Steel Report. Technical report,
Climate Strategies.
Neuhoff, K., Vanderborght, B., Ancygier, A., Atasoy, A. T., Haussner, M., Ismer,
R., Mack, B., Martin, R., Ponssard, J.-P., Quirion, P., van Rooij, A., Sabio, N.,
Sartor, O., Sato, M., and Schopp, A. (2014b). Carbon Control and Competi-
tiveness post 2020: The Cement Report. Technical report, Climate Strategies.
Oberndorfer, U., Alexeeva-Talebi, V., and Löschel, A. (2010). Understanding the
Competitiveness Implications of Future Phases of EU ETS on the Industrial
Sectors. Discussion Paper 10-044, ZEW.
Ostrom, E. (2010). Polycentric systems for coping with collective action and
global environmental change. Global Environmental Change, 20(4):550–557.
doi: 10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2010.07.004.
Parry, I., Veung, C., andHeine, D. (2014). HowMuchCarbonPricing is inCoun-
tries’ Own Interests? The Critical Role of Co-Benefits. CESifoWorking Paper
Series 5015, CESifo GroupMunich.
Popp,D.,Newell, R., andB, J.A. (2009). Energy, the environment, and technolog-
ical change. NBERWorkingPaperSeries 14832,NationalBureauOfEconomic
Research.
Quirion, P. (2009). Historic versus output-based allocation of GHG tradable al-
lowances: a comparison. Climate Policy, 9(6):575–592. doi: 10.3763/cpol.
2008.0618.
Ranson, M. and Stavins, R. (2014). Linkage of Greenhouse Gas Emissions Trad-
ing Systems: Learning from Experience. Nota di Lavoro 7.2014, FEEM.
Siegmeier, J., Mattauch, L., Franks, M., Klenert, D., Schultes, A., and Edenhofer,
O. (2015). A public finance perspective on climate policy: Six interactions that
may enhance welfare. Green Growth Knowledge Platform (GGKP).
245
Sijm, J., Neuhoff, K., and Chen, Y. (2006). CO2 cost pass-through and wind-
fall profits in the power sector. Climate Policy, 6(1):49–72. doi: 10.1080/
14693062.2006.9685588.
Weyant, J. P. (2011). Accelerating the development and diffusion of new energy
technologies: Beyond the “valley of death”. Energy Economics, 33(4):674–682.
doi: 10.1016/j.eneco.2010.08.008.
Zetterberg, L.,Wråke,M., Sterner, T., Fischer, C., and Burtraw, D. (2012). Short-
Run Allocation of Emissions Allowances and Long-Term Goals for Climate
Policy. AMBIO, 41(1):23–32. doi: 10.1007/s13280-011-0238-1.
246
Colophon
T
his thesis was typeset
using LATEX, originally developed by
Leslie Lamport and based on Donald
Knuth’s TEX. The body text is set in 11 point
Arno Pro, designed by Robert Slimbach in
the style of book types from the Aldine Press
in Venice, and issued by Adobe in 2007. A
template, which can be used to format a PhD
thesis with this look and feel, has been
released under the permissive mit (x11)
license, and can be found online at
github.com/suchow/ or from the author at
suchow@post.harvard.edu.
247
